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Leadership and the Inflection Point
- A Longitudinal Perspective -
Once in a while, many corporations of this world are threatened by
changes in their markets and environment that threaten their existence.
These changes can be characterized by their severity, their sudden
occurrence and by their origins outside the company, which usually
makes it impossible to predict them. They are life-threatening and call
for a dramatic change in the strategy and structure of the corporation.
The deregulation of air transport was such an event. The rapid
expansion of the telecommunications industry with the simultaneous
introduction of new wide-band technologies was another. The same can
be said for the enlargement of the European Union and the addition
of a number of low wage-cost countries.
This book focuses two aspects of the inflection point. The first is the
leadership viewpoint – it looks at the transition from the perspective
of the CEO and his executive board, and considers what they can, and
cannot, do. The second is the longitudinal perspective – it does not
consider an inflection point as a single event, but rather a process that
unfolds over a number of years. 
This book provides an analysis of what the leadership of a firm can do
in each of the development phases of an inflection point. It also tests
these ideas against a case example, the transition of the publishing
industry into the Internet era. 
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Foreword
Writing a doctoral dissertation on major change after spending twenty-five years
advising firms on major change is a process fraught with challenges. The author, it must be
presumed and hoped, has a lot of experience to offer, which has to be encapsulated in a few
hundred pages. The same author has not been exposed to academic analysis, thinking and
writing. Challenges thus to the author, challenges to his reviewer. Hence, this was not an easy
project . Not for the author, and not for the supervisors.
This study can be seen as an inflection point in professional learning. I am grateful for the
seeds that were sown by my many,eminent teachers – professional seniors,university and school
instructors, friends and family elders. On my own, I was fortunate to benefit immensely from
three superb consulting teachers who taught me logic and clarity of thinking: Stephen
Hargreaves, Prafulla Gupta and Kamal Saad. Without them, I would not have been the strategist
I am, nor would I have enjoyed it as much as I do.
In the academic effort, my godfathers were Henk Volberda and Harry Commandeur,
without whose insight and patience this study would have not been completed, and never in the
depth it was. The study also owes a lot to the senior managers of the five publishing companies
who took the time to tell and retell me about their experiences of the internet inflection point. I
can mention Herman Spruyt ,Herman Bruggink and Derk Haank, originally all at Elsevier, Rob
Pieterse and Caf van Kempen, originally of Wolters Kluwer, Hans Swart and Hans Elekan of De
Telegraaf, Jan Houwert, Peter Nientker and Joachim Driessen of Wegener, and,finally, Peter
Tordoir and Ed Penninx, originally of VNU.
A lot of work had to be done to turn awkward, unsubstantiated phases bereft with
typographical errors and poor graphics into the readable papers that follow. If there ever was a
Sancho Panchez to this Don Quichote fighting the windmills of strategy theory, it was Frans
Swarttouw who was tireless in searching the library for the latest theories. Jean Bovenberg  was
my support in turning my awkward prose into legible and elegant intelligence. And finally the
graphics of this document owe their correctness and esthetics to the tireless efforts of Ingeborg
Vonk, Lucy van Erkel and Mariese Kleiwegt in Rotterdam, Jerene Kelly in Santa Monica and, last
but not least, Pien Dermois in Leiden
The Monks of Clervaux (Luxemburg), in particular frère Bernard, should be thanked for
providing the author with a place for contemplation and work. Finally in her special role in my
life, Klaske  would not appreciate it if I dwelt on my gratitude to her. Suffice to say that an
explanation would be, and is, a story without end.
To K.E. and K.P.
5
6
1 Introduction: Perspectives on the Inflection Point
1.1: Introduction: The Age of Discontinuity
One can claim that strategy as a business and academic topic had its heyday in the
second half of the last century. Fundamental work was undoubtedly carried out before that time,
witness the seminal writings on economic growth and entrepreneurship by Schumpeter (1928)
that show business strategy as a much older intellectual process. But the wave of academic
publications on business strategy (particularly Chandler (1962), Ansoff (1965) and Porter (1980))
and the growth of strategy as a business function took place in the 1960s. By the end of that
decade, the strategy methodology, the planning function and strategy were well established in
most of the larger corporations and as an academic research topic. At that time, strategic
management philosophies could be classified into three main schools:
1) Management by control of performance (after the fact), which was adequate when
change was slow,
2) Management by projection, when the future could be predicted by extrapolation from
the past, and
3) Management by anticipation, when change was slow enough to permit timely anti-
cipation and response to discontinuities.
Igor Ansoff, who developed this classification in 1984, already perceived the emergence of an era
of rapid, discontinuous change by identifying a fourth strategy philosophy:
4) Management through flexibility and rapid response to environmental change in which
many significant challenges develop too rapidly to permit timely anticipation
Ansoff thus identified abruptness as an important strategic issue, without exploring the
strategic response in any depth (Ansoff, 1984).
From 1980 onwards, business managers also began to see their world as an arena
moving from a position of relative stability, through periods of chaos and unrest, to new and
unpredictable equilibrium points. It must however be noted that as early as 1942 Schumpeter
stated that “as rare and irregular events in any industry, innovations appear that command a
decisive cost or quality advantage and that strike not only at the profits of existing firms, but at
their foundations and very existence.”
What are the underlying reasons for this new way of strategic thinking? One reason may
be the apparent decrease in the stability of the economic and technological trends that underlie
business. International boundaries seem to have disappeared, resulting in the globalization of
many businesses; capital has become amply available and flexible; and the application of post-
war technological concepts in fields like chemistry, engineering, physics, biology, information
and communications seems to have accelerated. By the early 1990s, new technologies,
deregulation and globalization (or market integration) were generally acknowledged as the
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main causes of increasing market discontinuities (Tushman et al., 1986). Firms now had to search
for “new combinations”of resources to make sure that they could continue to successfully create
wealth (Guth & Ginsberg, 1990).
There indeed are indications that the innovation speed of major “frame-breaking”
products has increased over the last decades. For example, figure 1.1 shows how the
dissemination of products to a quarter of the population appears to have accelerated over the
last century. In particular, the introduction period of electronics and related (communications)
products has been reduced from about 30 years for VCRs in the 1950s, to 7 years for Internet today.
The Internet revolution and the emergence of “new economy” thinking in the late 1990s are but
the last incidents in a trend towards less stability in our strategic environment.
Figure 1.1: Penetration of Products to a Quarter of the Population
These long-term trends did not fail to impact the strategy process: The ever-shorter
introduction times of revolutionary new products and processes have diminished the
effectiveness of traditional planning approaches. Strategists, becoming aware of the risk of
“getting stuck” in their old skills, developed the concept of the competence trap (Levitt & March,
1988; Levinthal & March, 1993), and of their core rigidities (Barnett, 1994), which were not only
internal, but also included outdated inter-organizational linkages (Hermans, 2001).
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Sometimes these strategic traps develop slowly, and sometimes they come as a surprise. In 1942,
Schumpeter noted that “industry innovations may appear that strike not at the margins of the
profits and outputs of existing firms, but at their foundations and their very lives” (Schumpeter,
1942). In more recent years, the focus of these rapid changes has been on technological
discontinuities that are characterized by a dramatic advance of an industry’s price versus
performance frontier (Anderson & Tushman, 1990).
As a result of this turmoil, the existing frameworks for developing strategy,which often are based
on extrapolation of historic trends, no longer appear to work. These include most traditional
methods of strategy development, ranging from portfolio models (propagated by consultants
like McKinsey, the Boston Consulting Group and Arthur D. Little) to competence thinking (which
looks at either the current position of a firm to predict the best takeoff position into the future,or
tries to extrapolate developments from the past). In 1994, Henry Mintzberg wrote a book entitled
The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning, in which he openly questions the causal linkage between
logical planning processes and effective strategy (Mintzberg, 1994). In the same period, Michael
Porter lamented that “management tools such as operational effectiveness and benchmarking
have taken the place of strategy” (Porter, 1996, p61).
The traditional extrapolative techniques were thus gradually replaced by a way of
strategic thinking that relies more on intuition and leadership rather than on analysis for
making strategic decisions (Stopford & Baden Fuller, 1994). From the second half of the 1990s
onwards, many corporate strategy departments were disbanded or merged with M&A or
communications units.The academic world, responding to the need, started looking at adaptive
concepts with new advances made in flexibility thinking (Volberda, 1999), chaos theory
(Kauffman, 1995; Brown & Eisenhardt, 1998), disposable organizations (March, 1995), hypertext
forms (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995) and networking (Davidow & Malone, 1992)
From 1980 onwards, the above-mentioned factors stimulated the thinking about strategy as the
skill of managing discontinuous major change.We mentioned Tushman & Romanelli (1992) and
Kanter, Stein & Jick (1992), but can add at least eleven other sources of thought on the topic
(figure 1.2).
Figure 1.2: Inflection Points and Related Concepts
Precipitating Events Quinn 1978
Strategic Surprises Ansoff 1984
Architectural Innovations Abernathy & Clark 1985
Frame-breaking Change Tushman, Newman, Romanelli 1986
Identity Change Kanter, Stein & Jick 1992
Turning Points Fombrun 1992
Dual Strategies Abell 1993
Breakpoints Strebel, 1994
Discontinuous Change Nadler, Shaw & Walton 1995
Strategic Dissonance Burgelman 1996
Inflection Points Grove 1996
Revitalization Volberda 1996
Spasmodic Innovation Scott Morgan, et al. 2000
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Discontinuity – be it technological, regulatory, demographic, or otherwise – thus appears to have
become a mainstream characteristic of the business environment. And the way in which firms
can cope with such discontinuities appears to attract increasing attention from the research
community, as we saw above. Some see discontinuity as a temporary disequilibrium.Tushman &
Romanelli called the temporary period of unrest a “punctuation,” a form of temporary
disequilibrium. March (1991) saw corporate innovation as an iteration of exploration and
exploitation, which implies discontinuity as a result of exploration. Abell (1993) formulated the
rules by which management could simultaneously innovate/adapt and consolidate, via a dual
strategy track that straddles the implicit discontinuity of this framework.
This study does not focus on discontinuity as a temporary interruption in a continuing
process of gradual development, but rather hones in on major, abrupt and environmentally
caused discontinuities themselves, which we have called inflection points. These discontinuities
can be characterized by the major impact they have on the firm (amplitude), by the speed and
suddenness with which they occur (abruptness), and by the fact that they are at least perceived
to come from outside the firm (externality). Metaphorically, they can be seen as one type of
economic or technology regime giving way to another, one set of industry dynamics replacing
another, and the change of one winning strategic formula to another.
At the start of this study the topic appeared to be timely, as waves of technological
accomplishments in the area of electronics and software swept the information processing and
communications industries. As the research built up, we realized that the “e-business” wave was
but one of a seemingly increasing number of abrupt industry changes. The most dramatic
discourse on these major, abrupt and environmentally caused discontinuities was Grove’s 1995
book, Only the Paranoid Survive, which propagated the metaphorical word inflection point,
without providing either a complete description of the point or conclusive suggestions as to how
managers could survive it.This study aims to make a contribution in both subject areas.
1.2: The Issue and Relevance of the Study
In the work done in the area of strategy development in times of discontinuity, a gap
seems to exist in our thinking about what the leadership of firms does and can do in guiding
their organizations through an inflection point.
In specific terms, this study aims to provide answers to the following questions:
1) What from a strategic perspective is the most effective description of an Inflection Point?
2) How can the leadership of a firm approach an Inflection Point?
3) When is each of the leadership approaches appropriate?
In general terms, the overriding question is 
4) Why the leadership of those firms that successfully pass through an inflection point
appears to vary its leadership style through time.
The subject is relevant to today’s business environment because we have seen that
management can no longer afford to think in terms of evolutionary continuums that can be
planned through extrapolation, but fares better by seeing the world as equilibrium punctuated
by major environmental changes that redefine the rules of the business game. Factors like
technology shifts, deregulation and business globalization require – more than ever – a flexible
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strategy; a strategy based on classical extrapolation techniques simply does not work. At one
time, leadership had the means and opportunity to consider the tradeoff between adaptation
through incremental innovation, by exploiting present opportunities (a strategy posture that
has been coined “Austrian entrepreneurship”) and adaptability through radical innovation
directed at future opportunities (called Shumpeterian entrepreneurship) (Weick, 1982). In a fast-
moving business world, this choice is not always available, particularly if the changes are
imposed from outside. Purely intuitive approaches that rely heavily on the experience of the
leadership are also risky, because this experience base loses its value as the markets shift. These
viewpoints imply that the leadership of a firm has a choice of attitude when their operation
enters and passes through an inflection point.We will see in this study that leadership attitudes
are not an endogenous function of the external environmental trends.
At the same time, a significant amount of theoretical work has already been done in the
area of strategy development in times of rapid environmental change; consider the work of
Tushman & Anderson (1990) on the success of firms during multiple inflection point shifts, or of
Paul Strebel in analyzing the behavior of firms at the breaking point (1994). A few viewpoints,
however, have been underrepresented in these analyses, thereby giving this study a modicum of
distinction and relevance. None of these analyses used changes in the outside environment as a
starting point for a strategic redirection of the firm. What happens when the firm is “surprised”
by an event that unexpectedly arrives at their doorstep from beyond its boundaries? Structure,
processes and people have not had an opportunity to adjust to the new rules.This contrasts with
innovation that originates within the organization, in which case there has usually been time to
redirect the firm in order to cope with the new product or process. Utterback (1995), for example,
provides a comprehensive view of the dynamics of change that we will later use in the framework
for our research. But he does not differentiate between major change sourced from outside or
inside the firm.
Secondly, none of the studies to date has viewed the inflection point through the
leadership lens, looking at what the leadership – i.e., management at the boardroom level – can
do to help the firm pass through an inflection point. Many studies take either an industry-wide
(Tushman et al., 1986) or firm-wide (Strebel, 1994, Utterback, 1995) perspective. This study
develops and tests three leadership approaches to rapid change: directive, conditional and
ecological. Our way of looking at inflection point dynamics enables us to see that these three
leadership approaches have their applicability in different phases of the inflection point.
The longitudinal perspective, which regards the inflection point as a dynamic event, is
the third differentiating element of this study. Through this perspective, we view the firm as it
passes through an inflection point. In the existing literature this has also been done, albeit
usually in relatively imprecise terms. For example, mention is made of major organizational
change as a sequence that includes a period of “unfreezing,” transition, and “refreezing”, terms
first used by Lewin (1947). One of the few researchers who studied industrial change through a
longitudinal lens was Utterback (1994),whose approach will be discussed and applied later in our
analysis. Following his framework, we are able to segregate the business inflection point into its
main development phases. We will see that the leadership can modulate its style to reflect
differences in its business outlook, and that management approaches thus shift as the firm
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passes from one inflection point phase to the next. Again, this process-oriented, or longitudinal,
view provides a new perspective on how the leadership of a firm can cope with rapid
environmental transitions.
1.3: The Scope of our Work
In writing this book, we have limited the scope of our work to (1) strategy for a (2) multi-
business unit firm. Regarding the first limitation, our focus is on the strategy deployment side of
inflection point management. Obviously, there are many other dimensions, like organizational
aspects,competence and technological dimensions,financial considerations,and legal issues.An
interesting organizational element, for example, are the barriers to change that are often found
in organizations that face major change, including inflection points. These organizational
barriers to change have been the subject of numerous studies. Similarly, a careful assessment of
the stakeholders and their interests, and a determination of how the leadership will serve these
interests and make the necessary tradeoffs in serving these interests, is a crucial function. In
varying degrees, each of these factors will come into play, but only as elements in the process of
strategy deployment. Also, since we are researching the dynamics of the inflection point, our
focus is on the process and context of strategy as well as on the content.
A second point of emphasis to be made relates to the number of business units involved
in our consideration of both the firm and the industry in which it operates. Most larger firms
today consist of multiple business- or profit units. In our leadership perspective,we thus consider
the firm’s leader as a person who supervises a number of these units, which are each lead by a
local manager.This study discusses how the inflection point impacts the firm as a family of units,
and the overall supervision that is exercised. Extensive work has been done on the development
of simultaneous,differing strategies by business units.For example,in a group of units,a number
of these may go through an adaptive evolution, while others focus on radical change (e.g.,Weick,
1982).This analysis will regard the firm as relatively homogeneous, which in our case means that
a major challenge to one of the units is,by definition,also a major challenge to all the other units.
There is also a choice of levels in setting the scope:one can examine the firm, the industry,and the
meso-level between the two (Commandeur, 1999, Lewin & Volberda, 1999).
In this study we have also chosen to limit ourselves to changes caused by factors that are
external to the firm and the industry in which it operates. In this sense, there are a number of
options: One can study inside-out changes (including innovation), or outside-in approaches
(including the inflection point).This study opts for an outside-in perspective on the firm, in order
to focus the analysis and avoid a discussion about internal innovation and internal commu-
nications, which are topics of considerable interest that warrant studies in their own right.
A scope restriction also follows from our leadership perspective. Since we want to focus
on the role and strategies that the leadership can adopt, we have set this managerial perspective
as a scope boundary around our area of analysis. We make the point of identifying an inflection
point in terms of externality and abruptness – factors that management can not influence.
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Undoubtedly, major innovations that either have been conceived inside the firm, or changes that
are identified and countered in an evolutionary sense, over a long period of time, are worthy of
serious study. By setting most of the inflection point outside the area of managerial control, we
hope to come to a clearer analysis.
Our study also leans towards the processual side of strategy.The content side will also be
given consideration, when we look at the tools that the leadership can use to analyze its
condition. As consequence of this focus, the context dimensions are taken into account when and
where relevant to explain the processual approach. The content side will also be given
consideration when we look at the tools that the leadership can use to analyze its condition.
Finally, note that there is an interesting juxtaposition of strategy as reactive manage-
ment process aimed at improving the structural position of the firm in a changing environment,
and strategy as proactive forward-looking analysis seeking to position the firm to capitalize on
opportunities ahead. As we will see, the second viewpoint, which tends to lean on projection
techniques, is less effective in inflection point management, in which abruptness and externality
are defining elements.When an event or process is initiated externally and is abrupt, the chance
that it will be a surprise to management is high. Only a few prediction techniques work well in
inflection point environments, and we will not attempt to develop a viewpoint on techniques to
predict the timing and nature of an inflection point. We will thus focus on strategy as a process
of fundamental change.
1.4: Approach to the Issue – Concepts and Cases
There are two philosophical approaches to conducting research in strategic manage-
ment. The first – that has been called the analytical approach – strives for a theoretically sound
and consistent framework. It seeks to develop theory based on observation and measurement.
The second – called the clinical approach – tries to deliver the most adequate solution possible to
the questions posed by management. Much more problem-oriented, it seeks to develop
prescriptive, practical knowledge in the form of do’s and don’ts for the strategist (figure 1.3). Each
approach has its own advantages and disadvantages, depending on the circumstances in which
it is used (Volberda, 2001).
This study is above all pragmatic: its inspiration and underlying hypotheses were the
thoughts of a practitioner, Andrew Grove, and observations made him and by others in the
marketplace. It is inductive, and clearly tries to translate a set of findings from theory and case
research into a framework describing how the leadership of firms operates under inflection
point conditions. As such, the study can be categorized as an analytical approach, since it uses
available theory to describe and explain a business phenomenon.At the same time,however, this
work does not aim for the detail in systematic measurement that characterizes many analytical
studies. It also has a number of clinical (i.e., problem-solving) elements, particularly where our
description of leadership approaches could be used to develop problem solutions and
proscriptive rules.
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Figure 1.3: Research Approaches in Strategic Management
In this chapter, we have made a start in answering the four questions about the “what”.
“how”,“when” and “why” of inflection point leadership.
First, we discussed the models and theories on this and related topics, with the objective
of distilling the relevant experience elements. This review supplied us with a first grounding for
our description of the inflection point and its phases, as well as for our identification of the
options that the leadership can “play” when entering the inflection point.
Secondly, we have developed or identified out of this theoretical base three descriptive
building blocks – the first to identify the inflection point, the second to classify leadership
approaches, and the third to segment the development phases of the inflection point.
The first building block addresses the “what” question. The starting point of our study is the
description of the inflection point, which we will later characterize in three dimensions:
• amplitude i.e., survival is only possible by redefinition of strategy, process capabilities
and resources of the firm as a whole,
• abruptness i.e., the event that takes place is dynamic and within a limited time period,
thereby often surprising management and requiring rapid reaction,
• externality i.e., the event is perceived by the firm as a shift in its environment and of
forces outside its control.
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The second building block addresses the “how” question: Based on a review of theoretical work
done, and after verification in the field, three conceptual leadership approaches to the inflection
point were identified:
• the directive approach, in which the immediate influence of the leadership, acting in a
top-down fashion, is predominant. In the directive sense, the leadership has a number of
strategic tools at hand. Foremost is its power to assemble the portfolio of businesses,
processes and competencies that it considers appropriate to meet the challenges of the
inflection point.
• the conditional approach, in which the leadership of the firm creates conditions under
which the local managers can themselves cope with the inflection point.There are many
conditional approaches that can be identified. In the course of this analysis we have
selected five to be of particular relevance: setting the structure and imposing the
appropriate strategic processes come first, followed by improvement of the flexibility,
innovation and learning abilities of the firm.
• the ecological approach,which stresses the inability of the leadership to impose effective
solutions when an inflection point occurs. The management adopts a laissez faire
attitude to the development and execution of strategy, which therefore either emanates
from lower levels and/or through trial and error, or relies on ex-post accountability to
verify to what extent its (ultimate) demands are met.
The third building block addresses the “when”question:An inflection point is not a single
unified event in terms of the impact on and reaction of the organization. In our fieldwork, we
recognize different phases in the reaction and strategy evolution as the months pass after the first
announcement of the event,and we see how leadership approaches change as the firm enters and
passes through this period of revolutionary change. For a suitable classification of phases of an
inflection point, this study leans heavily on Utterback’s description (1995) of three phases:
• the fluid phase, in which a great deal of change happens at once and in which the
outcomes are highly uncertain in terms of product, process, competitive leadership, and
the structure and management of firms,
• the transitional phase, in which the market starts to accept the new products, a
dominant design emerges and the focus of the firms shifts from the inventors’
workbench to the factory floor,
• the specific phase, in which products or services become highly defined, and production
focuses on volume and low cost.
Out of these three building blocks we can deduct a fourth; when we know the what, how
and when, we have the elements to answer the “why” question, which seeks the logic behind the
shifts in the behavior of leadership as it successfully guides the firm through the inflection point.
To develop and test these building blocks, we have selected two units of analysis. The first is the
passage of firms through the inflection point.The second is the role of the leadership of a firm.
Finally, five case studies to test and refine these approaches in a real-life context will be
discussed. These were directed at five Dutch publishing companies that all had to cope with
Internet as an inflection point. We looked at five major multinational publishers: Reed Elsevier,
VNU, Wolters Kluwer, Wegener and De Telegraaf. This object was useful in the sense that this
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industry had a relatively stable development until a major, abrupt and outside challenge of large
amplitude posed itself in the form of the Internet revolution.
1.5: The Structure of the Study
The chapters of this study thus build up from literature review to framework
development and to field tests. Chapter 1 lays down the main questions of the study as well as its
boundaries and scope. Chapter 2 defines and explores the three dimensions – amplitude,
abruptness and externality – of the inflection point.
Chapter 3 develops the main framework and reviews the relevant theory. The first
paragraphs are devoted to exploring relevant management concepts that have been developed
in the literature over the last twenty years and using these to identify and substantiate our
leadership approaches – the directive, conditional and ecological approaches. We will also see
that although a number of writers have covered these approaches, there appears to be a
knowledge gap in both evaluating the leadership perspective and understanding management
behavior in the longitudinal process of the inflection point.Subsequently we review,successively,
our three major approaches, and discuss under what conditions and in which way they are most
effective. Finally, we explore the development of a framework that guides our field analysis and
synthesis.
Chapter 4 tests the framework in practice, in the form of a case review of five publishing
companies introducing e-business concepts. First, the fieldwork is introduced, and the five
individual case studies are presented in individual segments relating to, respectively, Elsevier
Science, Wolters Kluwer, VNU, Wegener, and De Telegraaf. These field reviews are then discussed
in the concluding pages of this chapter.
Our study comes to a close in Chapter 4, where we draw our conclusions of the work done. Figure
1.4 shows the structure of the study.
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Figure 1.4: The Structure of this Study
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2 Describing the Inflection Point - Available Concepts
2.1: Introduction: Describing the Inflection Point
Chapter 1 introduced the phenomenon Inflection Point and the questions that we will
address.The next step in our quest is to see in more specific terms which management concepts
have been generated in the literature through the years to describe how firms to cope with major
environmental upheavals (Chapter 2.2). This review considers the proposals on major change of
ten writers; these we have grouped into two groups. The first group, which we will call holistic
studies, considers major change to be mainly disequilibrium between the firm in its entirety and
its environment. These studies tend to search for generic and leadership-oriented solutions. The
second group, which we will call the specific studies, tries to identify specific (functional) causes
and solutions for major changes that the firm experiences in the environment. Based on this
review, we will identify and describe three determining dimensions of inflection points that
contribute to our further purpose of analysing leadership behaviour (Chapter 2.3). These
dimensions are:
1) Amplitude – survival is only possible by a redefinition of the strategy and activities of the
firm.
2) Abruptness – the event is dynamic and unforeseen, and requires rapid reaction.
3) Externality – the event is initiated from outside the firm.
Since an inflection point is a dynamic event, we also need to find a way to examine the
time dimension. For this purpose we found a framework in Utterback’s analysis of major
industrial changes (Utterback, 1995), which identifies three phases in a turnaround:
• A fluid phase
• A transitional phase
• A specific phase
After we analyse how this time-phasing fits with the dimensions and characteristics of the
inflection point,we will be able to use these frameworks in the subsequent analysis of leadership
approaches and the fieldwork (Chapter 2.4).
2.2: Grounding Theories of the Inflection Point
Holistic Studies of Major Change
Some authors describe major change as an important disequilibrium or disconnect of
the firm with its environment, a state that can be readjusted through a repositioning of its
resource capabilities and/or management. These writers generally describe this imbalance in
holistic and relatively abstract terms, including incongruence with stakeholder needs,
inappropriate linkages with the marketplaces in which the firm operates, and an architecture
that no longer functions.Their solutions are phrased in terms like replacement of management,
adjustment of power balances, and redefinition of structure, which at times are supported by a
reference to the relatively generic and effective “five forces” model of Porter. In this group we will
discuss four writers with a theoretic focus – Abernathy & Clark, Kanter et al., and Quinn – and
three writers with a background in business practice: Grove, Abell and Scott-Morgan.
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An Inspiring Practitioner: Andrew Grove
Andrew Grove, who popularised the word “Inflection Point” in his narrative of the ups
and downs of Intel in “Only the Paranoid Survive” (1996), was the inspiring start of this study.
Grove described an inflection point as “a time in the life of a business when its fundamentals are
about to change”,adding the statement that the size of change is of a “factor 10x”.At a later stage,
this was expanded to include the shift from one type of industry dynamics to another, the change
of one winning strategy to another, the replacement of one technological regime by another
(Burgelman & Grove, 1996). In analysing the inflection point and the possible reactions of
management,Grove refers to the five forces model of Porter (Porter, 1980),without elaborating or
adding to this framework. Given the nature of these five forces – customers, suppliers,
competition, substitutes, and new entrants – Grove’s focus is on external forces that impose the
inflection point.
In his book, Grove describes two case studies of inflection points, both relating to Intel
(the company of which he was legendary CEO). The first relates to the rapid penetration of
Japanese and Korean suppliers of the DRAM computer memory business, which was the original
core business of Intel. By mobilising their low-cost capital and labour, and by focusing entirely on
sales, at the expense of immediate profits, these producers were able to undermine Intel’s
position in a business in which dramatic product innovation was giving way to process
optimisation as key success factor. It was late, and nearly too late for Intel, when the firm found
out what the rules of the new game were, and decided that it had no chance in memory circuits,
a business that it promptly exited in order to focus on the more complex and profitable
microprocessors, a segment that it has since dominated. In our terminology, this moment, with
its three characteristics of abruptness, amplitude and externality, was clearly an inflection point
for Intel.
The second case provided by Grove was Intel’s entry into the consumer market. Until
1990, Intel’s customers included a limited number of PC producers, and the firm used a typical
industrial marketing approach.Gradually,however, the company found out that competitors like
AMD and Micron were able to emulate the processor designs of Intel and to introduce competing
products with decreasing time lags. One of the strategies that Intel adopted to counter this
competitive threat was to launch a marketing campaign towards the PC buyer with the motto
“Intel Inside”. This campaign was quite successful, as distributors and producers found
themselves confronted with customers asking specifically for PCs with Intel processors. The
strategy backfired with the introduction of the Pentium processor in 1994. Initial production
batches of this processor were found to have a minor design flaw that resulted in errors with
complex floating point calculations used both in advanced scientific and games applications.
Instead of taking calls from a limited number of understanding PC producers, Intel found in itself
accountable to hundreds of thousands of naive consumers calling for simple remedies or
replacement.Again,this was an event that could be considered as life threatening,and forced the
company to rethink all its major processes and functions. In the terminology of this study, the
Pentium recall case certainly shows the characteristics of abruptness and amplitude. But one can
argue that positioning Pentium as a consumer product was an internal innovation, although the
leadership clearly turned out to be unprepared to cope with the consequences of this innovation.
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At a later moment, in early 1997, Grove expanded his views on the inflection point at a speech in
Davos, using examples from the personal computer and telecommunications business.
Regarding the personal computer business, Grove argued that the industry structure had
changed from a “vertical” assembly (which included integrated companies like IBM, Digital
Equipment and Univac) to a horizontal structure in which each function in the supply chain was
delivered by an independent set of producers. In the new personal computing world,content was
provided by news publishers like Time, or scientific publishers like McGraw Hill, Elsevier, Wolters
Kluwer, as we will see in our case analysis. The applications were served by AOL or Yahoo, the
operating systems were provided by Microsoft, Linux and Apple, platforms by Dell and
Compaq/HP and the processors by Intel and Micron (figure 2.1). And, of course, Grove could not
foresee the major breakthroughs in (broadband) communications that would form yet another
inflection point for the industry.
Figure 2.1: An Inflection Point in the Computing Industry
The theoretical scope of Grove’s work went beyond the Porterian analysis mentioned
above. And in adapting to the event, he leaned heavily on learning organisation concepts – for
example, by stressing the value and need of mental models at the leadership level about the
future, and by his view of the ideal organisation being a combination of debate (chaos reigns)
and determined march (chaos reined in) (Grove, 1996).
Three Holistic Theories: Abernathy & Clark; Kanter et al.; Quinn
The work of Abernathy and Clark (1985) is relevant for a better understanding of the
concept of major change. When the authors talk about architectural innovation, they refer to
changes that depart from established systems of production, that open new linkages to markets
and users, that are characteristic of the creation of new industries as well as the reformation of
old ones. These innovations are called architectural because they lay down a new architecture
(i.e. the broad framework in which competition occurs and develops).
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Architectural innovations are associated with strong forms of technological and market
transilience, which they define as the capacity of an innovation to influence established systems
of production and marketing.
Figure 2.2: A Transilience Map of Innovations
Abernathy and Clark discuss amplitude rather generically as a departure from
established systems of production and new linkages to markets and users. Their concept of
technological and market transilience addresses not only these linkages but also the competency
set of the firm. In this sense they do address the operating environment of the firm, and give us a
valuable perspective on innovation as an internal process. They do not study, in any detail
externally imposed change and abruptness (figure 2.2)
A second holistic theory on major change is provided by Kanter et al. (1992), who use the
term identity change as the most fundamental of three change patterns (the other two being
internal coordination change and external political change). They characterise this identity
change as a reformulation of the relationship of an organisation with its environment, including
the assets it owns, the markets it approaches, the niches it occupies, the relationships it has to its
customers and to the organisations that fund it, supply it, and confer legitimacy to it. In their
view, the organisation derives its identity from the ties it has with its stakeholders and from the
identities of its stakeholders. When a firm’s relationship with these stakeholders are altered in
every aspect, the identity of the firm undergoes a fundamental adjustment.
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Kanter et al. suggest that the reformulation of the relationship between the firm and its
stakeholders is the defining element of the inflection point. The result of this redefinition is a
restructuring, repositioning and redefinition of the boundaries of the firm, and thus the
reestablishment of a new equilibrium between the firm and its environment. These identity
changes are most likely to arise when the environment shifts abruptly. Dramatic and highly
visible to all parties concerned with the firm, these changes also alter the viability of existing
stakeholder ties and create the potential for new ones. Identity changes therefore appear to be
acute, and there is a short timeframe for the transition of one set of business concepts to the
other. Most often, these changes appear forced or constrained rather than voluntary; natural
adoption would have resulted in evolutionary change, identity change reflects more than
internal innovation, and the change is imposed from the outside or from the top.
Kanter et al. give us a view of a firm that thrives when it has created an equilibrium with
its stakeholders, and runs into deep trouble when this equilibrium is disturbed.The trouble ends
only through a redefinition of the business that enables a new equilibrium,conceivably with new
stakeholders.
Quinn (1978) covers major change from a number of dimensions. His views are
encompassed in the theory of logical incrementalism. In this theory, the leadership combines the
contributions of rational analysis of the firm and its environment into a framework of conscious,
purposeful and proactive management. In Quinn’s model, firm’s position of equilibrium is
seriously disrupted by precipitating events, which Quinn describes as external or internal events
over which management no longer has control,and which precipitate urgent,piecemeal, interim
decisions, with inexorable impact on the company’s future. Quinn cites a few examples of
precipitating events, such as the impact of the ‘73-’74 oil crisis on General Motors, and the Arab
petroleum nationalisations of the same period on Exxon. He also mentions major internal
innovations such as the commercialisation of xerography by Xerox (and its predecessor, Haloid)
and float glass by Pilkington.
Quinn states that the leaders of these corporations did have some, albeit limited, means
to foresee and prepare for these major changes, including good information on historical
markets (Exxon), or a strong set of company values (Pilkington), but he also observes that none
was able to foresee the timing (which we will call abruptness), severity and nature (amplitude) of
these changes. When the events occurred, time constraints and a lack of resources and
information hindered them from being able to analyse all options and their consequences. But
the early decision made at that time led to new initiatives or lost opportunities that were
difficult to reverse later.
Quinn’s concept of precipitating events takes us a long way in describing the inflection
point. His idea of suddenness and unexpectedness clearly lies in the domain of abruptness. His
referral to the early decisions that were taken (or avoided) by management, that “inexorably
shaped the company’s future strategic posture”, leading to developments or lost opportunities
that were difficult to reverse later, paint a vivid picture of existential aspects of major change.
Where Quinn differs from our concept of inflection points is in his acknowledgement of external
and internal events as characteristic of precipitating events, and the examples that he uses to
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substantiate or illustrate his points are mainly external. In this respect he differs with our
description of the inflection point.
Holistic Practitioners: Abell and Scott Morgan et al.
The views on the differentiated roles of leadership in facing a strategic surprise, first
explored by Ansoff, were expanded by Abell (1993) who proposed that the best way to approach
major change is to segregate the management of the existing business from the preparation for
the new environment. In doing so, Abell recognises the phenomenon of revolutionary change, in
which the classical Porterian standards of customer satisfaction, bases of competition, key
success factors and the way in which these are to be met are redefined. He also states that these
shifts usually constitute the most rapid form of business change (abruptness), and recognises
that they contain elements of surprise, suddenness and rapidity, without expanding on those
concepts.
A somewhat longitudinal and structural approach was adopted by Scott-Morgan et al. (2001),
who categorise change processes into four groups (figure 2.3).
Figure 2.3: Innovation Map According to Scott-Morgan et al.
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Of these, spasmodic change combines a high level of change (presumably amplitude, although
the nature of this change is not explored in great detail) with a low frequency (i.e., non
continuous), and therefore comes closest to the concept of the inflection point. Scott-Morgan et
al. state that spasmodic innovation (their terminology) is called for when organisations undergo
a surge of change as they shift from one form to the other. They metaphorically describe the
organisation best able to undergo this form of change as a cube. The temporal characterisation
of “short, efficient bursts” shows overlap with the element of abruptness of the inflection point.
In order to maintain a modicum of stability (according to Scott-Morgan et al.), it is
desirable that the organisation that undergoes a spasmodic innovation tries to keep as many
things constant as possible. First of all, the dominant structure should be kept constant,
including its power structures, feedback mechanisms and performance measures, which would
enable the organisation to effect the desired radical change within a matter of days. Success of a
spasmodic innovation depends on understanding the process, and possessing the flexibility to
cope with the (external) unknown in the course of the process.
An essential difference between a spasmodic innovation and the other theories on major
change is the thesis that basic structures can and should remain unchanged (whereas nearly all
other writers on the topic stress the necessity of adjusting fundamentals, all the way up to
stakeholder relations and leadership (Kanter & Jick)). Also, Scott-Morgan et al. are not concerned
with the source of the change. Accordingly, they do not discuss externality or the alternatives
thereof.
Figure 2.4 summarizes the viewpoints of the holistic studies regarding the three descriptors of
the inflection point.
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Figure 2.4: Holistic Views on Major Change
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Specific Studies of Major Change
Specific studies of major change try to list discrete, functional, causes for the change to
occur, and specific, discrete, management actions to remedy a possible negative impact on the
firm. Causes listed typically include technological change, globalization of markets and
competition,and government (de)regulation.The management measures that are identified are
reorganisations of the business (Ansoff, 1984), and the generation of new capabilities (Nadler et
al., 1994). In this group, we review the writings of four theoretists: Tushman et al., Ansoff, Nadler
et al., and Strebel.
Tushman et al. (1986) were among the first to focus on discontinuous change from a firm,
rather than an industry, perspective. Their basic proposition about punctuated equilibrium is
that companies experience long periods of incremental change, and then go through major
restructuring that forces them to make painful discontinuous system-wide shifts. These shifts
transform not only the enterprise, but also the competitive environment or “industry” into
something significantly different from what it was (Stopford & Baden Fuller, 1994). Tushman et
al. refer to these shifts as “frame-breaking change” and characterise them as sharp and
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discontinuous adjustments in strategy, power, structure and controls. Frame-breaking changes
are abrupt, painful to participants and often resented by the old guard.
In the view of Tushman et al., frame-breaking changes occur in response to, or in anticipation of,
environmental changes, which can only be accommodated through more than incremental
adjustments. In their view, discontinuous changes spring from one or more of the following
causes:
• Industry discontinuities (i.e., sharp shifts in the technological political or legal conditions
that reformat the bases of competition)
• Product life cycle shifts that lead to important adjustments in the bases of competition.
This is caused by the fact that the competition rules change dramatically as a product
moves from embryonic to mature stages of development. Typically, embryonic products
compete on performance and innovativeness, whereas for mature products, cost,
volume and efficiency become dominant.
• Internal company dynamics that create internal breaking points (see Strebel). Typically,
new technologies or a new scale of operations require new management designs.
In effectuating the necessary adjustments to the firm, the leadership has, according to Tushman
et al., four sets of tools, each implying a discontinuity with the traditional way of working. These
include:
• A reformed mission and core values
• An altered power and status framework: some individuals and groups lose in the shift,
while others gain,
• Reorganisation, involving a redefinition of structure, systems and procedures,
• Revised interaction patterns: people will have to adapt new ways of working together,
• New executives, usually brought in from outside the organisation and placed in key
positions of influence.
Tushman et al. stress that the most successful transitions of frame-breaking change are
effectuated by executives who recognise the need and nature of the change at an early stage,and
acted decisively. Tushman and Anderson, for example, talk about major restructuring and
system-wide shifts that are characterised as sharp and discontinuous adjustments in strategy,
structure and controls – omitting key specific factors like resources, competencies and culture.
One of the first to comprehensively describe sudden major change was Ansoff, who
coined the concept of Strategic Surprises in 1984. Ansoff states that,whereas the management of
change has been the raison d’etre of management as far back as one can remember, there is an
increasing incidence of turbulence originating from unaccustomed and unfamiliar sources, like
foreign technologies, foreign competitors and governments (externality). Some of these changes
arrive suddenly and unexpectedly, thereby becoming strategic surprises (i.e., abruptness).
Although these strategic surprises cannot be handled by normal systems and procedures, failure
to respond implies either a major financial reversal or the loss of a major opportunity
(amplitude). The changes arrive, requiring an urgent and prompt response; they pose novel
problems in which the firm may have little prior experience.
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Ansoff also states that the combination of these factors creates major managerial problems.The
leadership, finding that previous strategies and plans do not apply, is also confronted with a
wealth of new, often fragmented information that is difficult to process and synthesise. The
suddenness of the change and the prospects of a major loss, often widely perceived throughout
the organisation, create the danger of widespread panic.
Ansoff gives the leadership a key role in confronting a strategic surprise.He suggests that
top management repartition its responsibilities into three groups, one to control and maintain
organisation morale, the second to assure continuance of the traditional business with a
minimum of disruption, and the third to take charge of the response to the surprise. In doing so,
he precedes the thinking of Abell, who has elaborated further on the concept of multiple
strategies.
A comprehensive view of externally initiated major change is provided by Nadler et al.
(1994),who classify destabilising events into six categories:shifts in industry structure or product
class life cycle, technological innovation, macroeconomic trends and crises, regulatory and legal
changes, market and competitive forces and, finally, growth. Nadler et al. make an immediate
linkage to the capabilities that the firm needs in order to perform in the post-event environment
by stating that the rate of depreciation of intellectual capital increases as the rate of change goes
up. This means that the firm needs to gear itself toward generating new capabilities that are
more relevant to the new environment.
A destabilising event is characterised by the fact that it creates life-threatening business issues,
affects the entire organisation rather than individual parts or subsystems, and alters the core of
what the organisation represents to its customers and members (amplitude). Such an event
requires a whole new configuration, with a new strategy, new work patterns and new formal
organisation arrangements. In some situations, the immediacy of change may not permit
maintaining continuity with the past: re-creation often changes and may even destroy existing
core values (abruptness).
An important differentiator of a destabilizing event (as described by Nadler et al.) and
the inflection point lies in the segregation made between anticipatory and reactive disconti-
nuous change. The first bases itself on sufficient understanding upfront of the impending
change, which more often than not means that it has been internalised, either as an internal
innovation or as a gradual absorption of know-how. The latter – dubbed reactive discontinuous
change – calls for re-creation of the firm structure, and comes closest to the inflection point.
Nadler et al. make note of the fact that in re-creations the changes are more sudden – abrupt
(figure 2.5). It also can usually be traced to external factors, such as those explained above.
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Figure 2.5: Management Perspective on Change
Nadler et al. are amongst the few that have to some extent considered the longitudinal,
managerial aspects of major change when they state that management should first recognise
discontinuous change ahead of time, then make the appropriate choices when the change
occurs, and finally manage the change in the organisational sense.
In his 1994 book Breakpoints, P. Strebel covers many of the elements of the Inflection
Point. Strebel defines breakpoints as sudden radical changes in the rules of the business game
that can shape the course of an industry or business. A breakpoint is also quick, and difficult to
foresee and deal with (figure 2.6).
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Figure 2.6: Discontinuous Change
Strebel identifies divergent and convergent breakpoints. The first occur when product
variety proliferates abruptly, typically in the embryonic (or fluid) stage of an industry or in
product rejuvenation. Convergent breakpoints are associated with dramatic improvements in
processes and systems, and typically in the transition of an industry from embryonic to
exponential growth. Examples are the standardisation of production systems, or the
introduction of market standards (e.g. in consumer electronics). Although Strebel pays a lot of
attention to internal breakpoints (in-company innovation), he also mentions “industry
breakpoints”, which are, for example, caused by a new revolutionary product that transforms the
rules of the competitive game, or fundamental changes in process (like the adoption of lean
production methods by the Japanese car industry) or distribution processes, such as the
launching of direct insurance services.
Since internal innovations are an important source of breakpoints, Strebel spends
considerable time discussing the role of leadership in preparing for an adequate exploitation of
the event. He stresses the ability of management to learn from breakpoints, to take advantage of
them, and to create competing breakpoints. And, since a breakpoint is often much less of an
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unavoidable surprise than the abrupt externality of the inflection point, it pays for a manager to
be aware of the pace and forces of change, and of the resistance against change. The more
internal and gradual nature of a breakpoint enables a much more proactive management
approach.
Figure 2.7 summarizes the relevant findings of the specific studies in the area of rapid external
change:
Figure 2.7: Specific Views on Major Change
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2.3: First Conclusions: Views on the Three Dimensions
These descriptions lead us to conclude that our central theme of major change is a
polymorph phenomenon. Notwithstanding the variety of terminology, most authors appear to
converge on capabilities (broadly defined) as a central theme, although that word is not always
used. These include the capability to develop and maintain the necessary resources and
competencies, the capability to create the right structure, architecture and posture (Quinn 1978)
both within the firm and with the outside stakeholders (Kanter et al., 1992), and the capability to
start off with the right mission and values (Tushman et al., 1986).
The inflection point occurs at the moment when all these factors are no longer aligned
with the needs of the environment, and when the capabilities to align them appear to be lacking.
This lack of alignment is revealed in lagging performance and lost opportunities (Ansoff 1984).
Market and operational performance suffer first, followed by financial performance (Strebel 1994).
And lagging performance leads to a life-threatening business condition (Nadler et al., 1994).
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In our analyis,we apply this convergence to the phenomenon of major “10x”change (Grove 1996),
and we can use the list of parameters outlined above to give a first impression of what we mean
by amplitude, a concept that we will describe in more precise terms later.
The passage of time has an important impact of time on the variety of parameters that
make amplitude.This impact can be stated in terms of preparation. If the timing is good, then all
the capabilities, resources and other amplitude factors are there when needed. If the timing is
not good, then they are not there. Timing thus means preparedness. If we want to use this
concept of unpreparedness in a leadership context, we arrive at our two other descriptors of
inflection points: abruptness and externality. Abruptness implies not only that the firm is
unprepared when it enters the inflection point, it also implies that the leadership probably is
(too) late in becoming aware of the amplitude of the shock that is underway and in planning the
necessary measures to counter this shock. In order to focus the discussion on leadership attitudes
once the inflection point has arrived, we have adopted externality as third descriptor. Both are
supported by the literature, in particular by the structural theoretists, as we will see later.
We have thus arrived at an operational set of three descriptors for an inflection point
(amplitude, abruptness and externality); these will provide the backdrop against which we will
develop our framework.
Our literature review of 2.2 shows that amplitude is the only dimension that is
mentioned and discussion in any depth by all the authors. Most of them also mention the
abruptness of the strategic change,but few discuss externality in any specificity – with exception
of Ansoff and Tushman et al. On the contrary, most writers tend to focus more on internally
generated changes (innovation), like Abernathy and Clark, and to a lesser extent Strebel. Ansoff
and Kanter et al. thus are the only ones to explicitly identify all three characteristics.
From our literature review, Amplitude emerges as a multi-faceted dimension. These
many facets share one common ground that was already indicated by Grove when he wrote his
book introducing the inflection point. He called it a “10x” and life threatening event, and it
appears that all researchers agree that an inflection point – or overlapping concepts like break-
points and frame-breaking changes – have an important impact on the way the firm operates
and on its performance.Quinn talks about“events that inexorably shaped the company’s future”,
Most of the writers take a relatively pragmatic view on amplitude, conceivably because they
usually focus on the strategic actions that are necessary to counter the inflection point or major
change that often is the starting point.
Ansoff mentions a major financial reversal or loss of a major opportunity. These
statements all seem to point to the fact that performance threatens to deteriorate (i.e. threatens
to show a wide (often negative) amplitude). And, as said before, performance can be defined in
terms of stakeholder satisfaction. The most concise definition of operations amplitude covers
customer satisfaction, bases of competition and key success factors (Abell), and, at a more
detailed level, products, processes and systems (Strebel).
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This performance amplitude is not enough to define the inflection point. We also have to
consider the fact that a performance amplitude is the consequence of one or more operating
amplitudes: sales must go down, costs must go up, inventories must built, beds or seats must
remain empty, experienced people must leave before profits go down. And these operating
amplitudes are caused by external amplitudes: people stop buying product or services; inflation
drives costs up, etc. We can categorise these into two sub-groupings: demand amplitudes affect
the demand for the products and services that are delivered (like economic cycles, demographics,
technology affecting product or service performance, competition and fashion), and input
amplitudes (like labour cost, supplier economics, production and technology). The hierarchy of
amplitudes can be illustrated by figure 2.8, which shows how different sets of input and output
amplitudes, cause operations amplitudes which in turn lead to performance amplitude.
Figure 2.8: Four Aspects of Amplitude
This hierarchy of four aspects of amplitude (figure 2.8) is covered by the literature.When
Abernathy & Clark (1985) talk about new markets and users emerging, this is an example of
demand amplitude.The same can be said about Tushman et al. (1986) when they discuss changes
in markets, macroeconomics, regulation and industry structure. Strebel (1992) and Abell (1993)
talk about radical shifts of the business and the nature of doing business, whilst Abernathy &
Clark (1985) provide a more forward-looking description when they talk about departures from
existing systems and links to new markets and users; they all discuss what we call input
amplitude. The identification of demand and input amplitudes carries in it the element of
externality, thus touching on the third dimension of the inflection point.
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• Resource availability
The operating amplitude of the inflection point is described by Nadler et al. (1994), who discuss
the acceleration of the traditional capabilities of the firm,and the need to create a new capability
set. Tushman et al. (1986) call for a new mission, organisation or executive. As result of these
external, industry-wide structural changes, the performance position of the firm suffers: Ansoff
(1984) states it in relatively undramatic but concrete terms when he talks about a major reversal
or loss opportunity, which can readily be translated into very specific market terms (like market
share) or financial terms (like revenues).
Abruptness encompasses the time dimension of the inflection point, and positions the
inflection point as a discontinuity in a longitudinal routine of business activities through time.
As is the case with amplitude, abruptness can be seen from an environmental (ie., external), or
from an internal firm perspective. In taking the external perspective, one can talk about sharp
shifts in the conditions of the industry (Tushman et al., 1986), or about sudden changes in the
rules of the business game (Strebel 1994). A breakpoint is quick, difficult to foresee and to deal
with (Strebel 1994). And when the phenomenon is called a precipitating event, we may conclude
that the general nature of the contingency may have been anticipated, but that the timing and
severity could not possibly have been foreseen (Quinn 1978). Environmental abruptness thus has
an element of surprise. Abruptness also relates to the time period that the leadership has to
effectuate the necessary adjustments, and the necessity to take early decisions with major
impact (Quinn 1978).
Abruptness can thus be described in terms of pre- and post-inflection point abruptness.
Ansoff (1984), and Kanter et al. (1992) talk about the suddenness with which the Inflection point
is precipitated – a suddenness that bears a strong element of surprise. Ansoff probes the effect of
this surprise in his discussion on the abundance of new information, and the inability of the
traditional leaders to cope with this information. Apparently, the cognitive capabilities of
management threaten to fall short of the requirements posed by the new situation (Cyert &
March 1963). And after the inflection point has occurred, there is an urgent “abrupt” need for
change, as is stressed by Nadler et al. (1998) and Abell (1993). Quinn (1978) talks about the
requirement for urgent interim decisions.
Finally,we have in this study opted for Externality as a differentiating characteristic of an
inflection point in order to focus the analysis on the outside world as the crucial and often
unknown strategic driver of the business: a shift in the environment is a far more serious threat
to the firm than major internal adjustments like the loss of key individuals, since internally
initiated changes and replacements of these individuals can be more readily realized than an
overall redirection of the entire organisation (Teece et al., 1997).We thus avoid the terrain relating
to why the leadership does not always understand and react to what is happening within its own
company, which points to the complexities of internal innovation and internal communications.
These important topics warrant studies in their own right.
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Externality thus refers to an event or a trend that is new for the firm and its leaders. In most
business sectors,a firm is part of the larger segment – with the exception of one-firm monopolies
– and we can thus in most instances talk about generic events affecting the entire segment in
which the firm operates. Inflection points can thus be segregated from external events are firm
specific (except, as mentioned, in monopolies) and from internal events (which we have called
innovations), and fall outside the scope of analysis.
The main consequence of externality is the loss of control that the leadership
experiences in the inflection point, which forces it into a reactive role. However there is such a
thing as “proactive reactivity” (Quinn 1978) in that constructive, early decisions and measures
taken as soon as the inflection point is noticed can have a major impact on the eventual success
of the firm through its transition, as we will see later.
Alongside the loss of control comes the externally imposed need for restructuring,
repositioning and redefining the business boundaries that alters the viability of stakeholder ties
or creates the potential for new ones (Kanter et al., 1992).
The redefinition of boundaries may express itself in opportunity, or need, for networks
and alliances which complicate the description of externality: what should the leadership of the
firm consider to be “inside” and “outside” its organisation? One obvious step is to define an
externality as anything that originates outside the borders of the firm – which was described in
Chapter 1 as a single strategic unit, being subject to unified strategic decisions. But one should
realise that the increasing intensity of alliances and networks of the last decades makes the
boundaries of the firm less discrete.
Externality has been defined in the objective terms of the environment (Tushman et al.
1990) or industry (Abernathy & Clark 1985) or novelty, originating from new directions (Abell
1993). Nadler et al. (1994) describe these in more precise terms when they talk about four external
causes of upheaval, including industry structure, macroeconomics, (de) regulation and market
forces.They also cite innovation, which of course can have an internal origin. Externality can also
been seen in more subjective terms, as a novel problem with which the firm has no previous
experience (Ansoff).
Externality has become a more complex concept as companies and researchers have
started to realize that alliances can be a valuable way of leveraging the capabilities of the firm in
the different markets in which it operates (Dyer & Sigh 1998). This interest in the question “what
is external” has, if anything, increased exponentially in recent years with the arrival of internet
(Bell 2000).
We can show the convergence between these three characteristics into the inflection point by
plotting them into a three-dimensional matrix (figure 2.9).
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Figure 2.9: Three Dimensions of the Inflection Point
On the foreground of the cube, we show externally imposed change. Here again, both
amplitude and abruptness can be low (-) or high (+). Low amplitude and low abruptness show up
as gradual evolution of the firm. Here, the introduction of e-business or the euro in production
companies is a good example. When many functions are affected in a serious way, amplitude
goes up (+), and we can talk about a gradual restructuring of the firm: railroad privatisation, or
the introduction of the euro in currency banking are good examples. When only one or a few
products/functions are affected in an abrupt way (+), we can talk about a functional revolution,
like the outsourcing revolution in production. And, finally, when both amplitude and abruptness
are high (+), we end with an inflection point, which we will analyse for e-business in publishing.
On the background of figure 2.9, we show the internal world of innovation, which for the
purposes of this study we describe as an internal process. When the amplitude of innovation is
low (-), this means that only a few functions of the firm are affected: we call this product- or
functional innovation. Product/Functional innovation can be gradual (-) (taking place over a
relatively long time period that allows for careful preparation – a typical example would be the
introduction of the Boeing 707 and 747 jetliners by the launch airline),or abrupt (+) (when it takes
place with dramatic speed – for example, the introduction of e-ticketing by its pioneers). When
many functions or products are affected, and the amplitude of innovation becomes high (+), we
can say that the entire business is changed. This change can take place either with relatively low
(-) abruptness (like the networking strategy of many PC and software producers that promises to
transform entire companies to network-based software suppliers), or with high (+) abruptness
(in which case we end up with radical business innovation).
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2.4: Three Phases of the Inflection Point
In order to determine how the leadership of a firm should position itself in a inflection
point, we first have to gain a better understanding of how this inflection point evolves. If we
regard this as a longitudinal event, we find that the characteristics of the environment of our
firm change quite dramatically from the moment of first abrupt occurrence of a “major
externally-caused amplitude” to the final restabilization of the external environment. The
easiest way to analyze these changes in the external environment through the inflection point is
by segmenting the latter into phases, and by seeing how key variables shift as the business, and
thus the firm that is part of this business,moves from one of these phases to the next. In doing so,
it is of course important to look at these phases from a leadership perspective, which is an
important “lens” of this book. In our search for an appropriate model of these three phases, we
found that the passage through the inflection point closely parallels the innovation phases that
were identified and described by Utterback in his “Mastering the Dynamics of Innovation” of
1995. In specific terms, Utterback talks about:
• The fluid phase. This encompasses the initial period of the innovation of an industry, in
which a great deal of change happens at once and in which the outcomes are highly
uncertain in terms of product, process, competitive leadership, and the structure and
management of firms,
• The transitional phase is this second phase of industry innovation. The market starts to
accept the new products, a dominant design emerges and the focus of the firm shifts
from the inventor’s workbench to the factory floor,
• The specific phase is the third and final phase in industry innovation. Now, products or
services become highly defined, and production focuses on volume and low cost,
Figure 2.10, derived from Utterback (1994), shows how a selected number of functions of a firm
change as they pass through the three phases of the inflection point
Figure 2.10: Characteristics of Three Phases
Subject Phases
Fluid                      Transitional           Specific
Innovation Frequent major Frequent major Incremental changes
product changes process changes
Offerings Diverse customized designs One or more stable designs One standard
Business Flexible and inefficient Becoming rigid Efficient and rigid
processes
Cost of change Low Moderate High
Competition Few, diverse, growing Many Few: oligopoly
Organizational Informal Project and task groups Structure, rules and goals
control
Source: Utterback (1994)
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Use of Utterback’s classification, which was originally intended to describe industry innovation
processes for inflection points, is justified by the overlap between the two concepts. Both
innovation and inflection points show high levels of amplitude. Many – albeit not all –
innovations are abrupt because they penetrate the entire industry within a limited time period,
and surprise many of the industry participants. For many of the firms that make up an industry,
in particular those that are established, an innovation comes across as an external. Undoubtedly,
a number of innovations are internal to a given firm (with a given leadership), and may also be a
one-company affair. But Utterback’s classification fully covers the type of innovation that we
have called inflection point. One should note that, whereas Utterback looks at the transition
phases through an industry lens, this thesis focuses on the viewpoint of the leadership and their
perception of the industry.
The case reviews provided in chapter 4 will demonstrate how these descriptors of the
three phases of innovation apply to the inflection point. There however are a few notable
exceptions.The most notable of these are the organizational and control mechanisms used in the
transition, in which Utterback emphasizes the use of project- and task groups,and we emphasize
the hands-on control by the leadership. We will discuss these commonalities and differences in
more detail at the end of chapter 4 (figure 4.24)
The phases of Utterback show their relevance when we look at the three defining
dimensions of the inflection point – amplitude, abruptness and externality – in each of the
phases, and see how their function changes. The transition through the inflection point
expresses itself in a different emphasis on each of the three defining dimensions of the inflection
point. The fluid phase, as seen from a leadership perspective, is abrupt. The situation created
outside of the firm is dynamic, unclear, and unpredictable; the knowledge and capability levels
necessary to succeed in the new environment are still (very) limited. Nonetheless, the firm’s
internal organization and functions usually do not yet experience the full impact of the
inflection point and continue under the momentum of the old, pre-inflection point whilst the
pressure for some form of adjustment action starts to build regime. Therefore, the amplitude of
(internal) change is still low, but increases rapidly.
In the transitional phase, the amplitude, speed and complexity of the readjustment
build up to a high level. The timing, however, is more controlled and predictable – which
translates into moderate abruptness. Here, the leadership has gained certain knowledge of the
issues and,if only because of the high amplitude – many functions experience major challenges –
is under strong pressure to take rapid and incisive action, bypassing local management. Strategy
and capabilities are internalized, and the driving events are no longer all external.
Finally, in the specific phase, amplitude and abruptness gradually decrease as the
leadership brings the firm under control under its new strategic direction. However, since all the
functions now feel the impact of adjustment, the amplitude is still moderate. The knowledge
base and capabilities to succeed under the new circumstances have permeated through the
organization, which means that local management can play an important role in managing the
strategic transition.The following figure 2.11 illustrates the trends.
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Figure 2.11: Three Dimensions in the Phases of an Inflection Point
Dimensions Development Phases
Fluid           Transitional   Specific
Amplitude Low/increasing High Moderate/ declining
Abruptness High Low Low
Externality High Moderate Low
Having thus explored the differences between the three phases, we must ask ourselves a
final question: how do we know whether a firm, or a group of firms (this being highly dependent
on the segmentation of the business sectors), is experiencing a fluid, transitional or specific
phase of the inflection point? Fortunately, Utterback’s framework is quite pragmatic, and many
of his variables can be readily observed from the outside.We can thus base our rating criteria on
his topic list as discussed in figure 2.10. One exception in Utterback’s listing is his “cost of change”,
which we omitted because it is very difficult to measure in practice, particularly when we talk
about investments in people and capabilities.The other is organizational control,which to a large
degree is included in our conditional leadership approach and will thus be discussed later under
that header. With minor adjustments to render Utterback’s classification pragmatic, we thus
come to the following characterization of the three phases of the inflection point (figure 2.12), as
a pragmatic derivative of Utterback’s figure 2.10.
Figure 2.12: Observable Characteristics of Inflection Point Phases
Subject Phases
Fluid                      Transitional           Specific
Product/Service Frequent Regular Rare
Changes:
Local Firm-wide
Designs/ Local Firm-wide Firm-wide
Standards:
Flexible Multiple One
Business Flexible Becoming rigid Rigid
Processes:
Bottom-up Top-down Top-down
Competition: Few and Growing Many and Declining Oligopoly
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2.5: Conclusion: Literature Supports the Three Dimensions of the Inflection Point
Our analysis leads to the conclusion that the literature supports the three dimensions in
which we capture the inflection point.
Amplitude is noted by all the writers. As we have seen, major change has over the last
decades become an important topic, and it is not surprising that major shifts in the outside
world, and the resultant major shifts inside firms, have been discussed with a certain frequency
and intensity. We have seen that “major change” can be defined in many different ways and at
varying levels of specificity.
Abruptness is touched on by many writers dealing with major change, but is generally
not defined in precise terms: when people talk about “surprises”, “suddenness” or the need for
“immediate decisions”, the focus is on the consequences, not on the cause or nature, of the
abruptness. It remains a core ingredient for the inflection point and related concepts if only
because it permits a sharper delineation of amplitude, the phasing of the inflection point, and
the shifts in leadership attitudes.
Externality is the least covered, if only because the student of major change can to some
extent ignore it and in he/she includes it in both external and internal changes in his analysis.
This widening of scope does, however, mean that internal innovation is included, which in turn
means that a range of issues and problems are added to the list of research. Most of these relate
to the fact that an innovation, being internal, by definition can be managed proactively, whereas
a rapid major change from the outside always forces the leadership into an (initially) reactive
posture. Examples of questions that would have to be added:
• Why was the leadership unable to manage the innovation in an evolutionary way,
thereby countering the life-threatening side of amplitude?
• How can an innovation be used proactively to change the architecture of the business, in
such a way that the firm improves its position, as is discussed by Strebel and others?
In our view, combining internal innovation with external inflection points into one
framework risks increasing imprecision in describing the actual framework and process of
inflection point transition.
We were, however, able to use the framework developed by Utterback to describe the
different phases that the firm passes through the inflection point. We noted that these phases
are compatible with the three dimensions of the inflection point in the sense that these
dimensions play a different role in each of the phases. This will enable us to develop a dynamic
framework of leadership approaches, and verify this in practice.
Our literature review leads to two other findings. The first is that, to date, nobody has
consistently adopted the leadership lens.Many researchers have thought about the organisation
as a whole, and, for example, stated that the appointment of a new leader is an effective way of
moving through an inflection point (e.g. Kanter et al., 1992,and Tushman et al., 1990). Others have
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analysed the division of tasks in the leadership (Ansoff, 1984, Abell, 1992), or the conditions to be
created to enable innovations to succeed, like Abernathy & Clark (1985), with their transilience
map. But a systematic review of what the toolset is with which a (renewed) leadership can
“attack” the inflection point is only available in fragmented form, from different sources (e.g.,
Strebel, 1994).
The second key finding is that a longitudinal view on inflection point transition has not
been explored in any detail by any of the authors to date, and thus will benefit from further
discussion.From the literature,a long list can be developed of ideas to improve the position of the
firm in inflection point conditions. The problem, however, is that in the initial stages of the
unfolding of the inflection point, the management rarely has the necessary insight to design a
complete improvement program (see Ansoff 1984 on information overload and Cyert & Marsh
1963). Later on, the leadership gains experience in the new environment – and thus the ability to
correctly select, interpret and synthesise information from the new marketplace(s),but also finds
that the organisation has a different pace in absorbing the new rules, and that the old structures
and rules no longer suffice.This leads to a shift in the use of leadership tools. In a third stage, the
firm learns to cope with the new environment,which again facilitates the use of other leadership
tools.
For the first time, therefore, we can regard the process of guiding the firm through an
inflection point as a series of successive leadership postures – i.e., a longitudinal perspective.
A question that has relevance to the student of inflection points in general, and
particular relevance to our fieldwork, is which characteristics we can observe in industry
developments that will qualify these as an inflection point. When we go back to our three
dimensions and the descriptions provided above, we can hypothesize that amplitude should
show in the threats to the market position of the firm that risks losing a major part of its
customers due to its inability to respond to new demands. Conversely,we should observe a risk of
serious financial losses, and a willingness to make major financial investments simply to catch
up with the newly required capabilities. The last statement can also be made about
competencies and skills: we should observe heavy recruiting or training of personnel with the
newly required qualities, and conceivably an exodus of “old-timers”.
Regarding abruptness, we should observe in the actions of management a sense of
urgency, a feeling that there is only a limited time period to make the necessary adjustments.
Acquisitions are a typical action of management that feels it has run out of time. And
pronouncements in annual reports and the press provide another indicator of management
sentiment.
Externality can be verified through the contribution that the firm has made or has not
made to the development of technologies and capabilities that characterize the competitive
environment after the inflection point. When the firm has developed the capabilities that cause
or facilitate the environmental turnaround, the event may be an innovation, but not an
inflection point, according to our characteristics.
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3 Three Leadership Approaches to the Inflection Point
3.1: Introduction: The Leadership Perspective
This chapter shifts our focus from the inflection point itself to the actions that the
leadership can take to guide the firm through the period of rapid change. First we will discuss the
seven schools of thought – our grounding theories – that have guided us in identifying three
different styles of leadership behavior.Each of these seven schools has its own perspectives on the
inflection point. Subsequently, we arrange the leadership attitudes described in these seven
schools along two important criteria of relevance for an inflection point.The first of these criteria
is the nature of the strategic redeployment enacted by the leadership, which can be adaptive or
selective.The second is the speed of strategic redeployment, which can be radical or incremental
(section 3.2).We will then see how these seven grounding theories indeed end up supporting the
three dominating leadership approaches to an inflection point – the directive, conditional and
ecological approaches (section 3.3). Subsequently, we test the practical validity of our approaches
in five key managerial areas of interest (or anchor points), and we see how this test against
managerial practice helps us further describe and delineate the three approaches (section 3.4).
Figure 3.1 illustrates this process.
Figure 3.1: Conceptual Underpinnings
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3.2 Identify 7 grounding theories to the Inflection Point: (1) Leadership (2) RBV (3) Dynamic
Capabilities (4) Learning School (5) Institutional Theory (6) Population Ecology (7) Life Cycle/
Punctuated Equilibrium (Figure 3.2: Theories + Authors)
3.2 Verify the grounding theories in two areas of theoretical relevance (1) nature of transition:
adaptive versus selective (2) speed of transition: radical versus incremental (Figure 3.3)
3.3 Identify three leadership approaches: (1) Directive (2) Conditional (3) Ecological (Figure 3.4)
3.4 Verify the three leadership approaches against five managerial anchor points: (1) Leadership
(2) Content (3) Context (4) Process (5) Accountability (Figure 3.12)
3.2: Grounding Theories of the Analysis
In our search for the most appropriate theoretical underpinnings of strategy develop-
ment through the inflection point, we required theories that would both illuminate the actions
that the leadership can take in an inflection point, and help us understand and explain two
important essential characteristics of strategy deployment. The first is the choice between an
adaptive and a selective management perspective that we will observe in the leadership of firms
that pass through the inflection point. Selective perspectives regard the (internal) renewal
capabilities of the firm in an inflection point as being restricted by factors like resource scarcity,
dominance of industry norms, and structural inertia. Adaptive perspectives, on the other hand,
suggest that firms can and do change, overcoming their rigidities: their successful transition of
the inflection point is due to their ability to learn different behaviors and to explore new
competencies (Volberda, Baden Fuller and Van den Bosch, 2001). The second essential
characteristic is the choice the leadership has between an incremental and a radical
management style.The incremental style is compatible with the existing structure of a firm and
is reinforced over a period of years. Radical, frame-breaking changes involve simultaneous, sharp
shifts in strategy, power and controls (Tushman et al., 1994).
Based on our preference for theories that address these two perspectives in rather
specific terms, we have selected seven theories, listed in Figure 3.2.We have also named the most
important authors for the different schools of thought.
Figure 3.2: Grounding Theories of the Analysis
Theory Authors
Leadership Schumpeter (1934); Barnard (1938); Selznick (1957)
Resource-based view Penrose (1959); Learned et al. (1969);Wernerfelt (1984)
Dynamic Capabilities Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1997); Eisenhardt and Martin (2000)
Learning School Argyris and Schon (1978);Weick (1979); Lindblom 1960; Senge (1990)
Institutional School DiMaggio and Powell, (1983; 1991); Greenwood and Hinings (1996)
Population Ecology Hannan and Freeman (1977; 1984); Aldrich and Pfeffer (1976)
Life-Cycle/Punctuated Equilibrium Miller and Friesen (1984);Tushman and Anderson (1986); Romanelli
and Tushman (1994)
The Leadership School
The source of the leadership perspective of this book goes back a long way: Schumpeter
was the first to regard the leader/entrepreneur as more than a mere administrator of ongoing
affairs. In the 1920s he already saw the leader/entrepreneur as being occupied with the
“incessant creation of new plant and equipment embodying new technologies”,as “thinking and
acting beyond the ordinary course of business routine,” and as “doing things that are already
being done in a new way” (Schumpeter, 1928).
In the postwar period, the organization increasingly was seen as a cooperative system,
with management and employees as members. In its purest form, the leadership was considered
to be granted by the subordinates.The mission of the latter, being subject of a (implicit) contract
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with the members of the organization, was seen to maintain this system of cooperative effort
(Barnard, 1938). Within this philosophy, the leadership can discharge its mission through three
tasks:
• by developing and maintaining a system of communication
• by securing the personnel that together form the organization
• by formulating the purpose and objectives of the organization
This school of thought, which strongly influenced management thinking in the 1950s
through 1970s, does not leave the leadership a lot of freedom to serve the shareholders and other
stakeholders of the firm, or to set dramatic new directions that may not be in the immediate
interests of the employees.
A more current view on leadership regards management as responsible for the creation
and maintenance of distinctive competencies in the firm and for realizing an appropriate fit
between the internal state of the firm and external expectations (Selznick, 1957). Furthermore,
the leadership is expected to maintain ultimate control and consciousness of the firm: in this
school, the CEO or general manager – i.e. the leadership – should be the only strategist of the firm
(Andrews, 1997). Accordingly, there is a close linkage between entrepreneurship and patterns of
resource deployment, as well as the creation of new capabilities of positioning in markets
(Stopford and Baden Fuller, 1994).
Stopford and Baden Fuller (1994) listed the directions that the leadership can take to effectuate
major change in three dimensions, of which the first two will be discussed in this book:
• Creation of a new business – which parallels our proposed directive approach
• The transformation or renewal of existing organizations – which follows our conditional
approach
• Changing the “rules of competition” for the industry, which is outside the scope of our
analysis, since this proactive action towards the environment is not consistent with the
inherently reactive/environment-dependent character of an inflection point.
In assessing these theories, we can state that the leadership school is radical in nature,
due to major changes to which the leadership has to respond. The leadership of a firm must
adjust the firm to survive these major changes and avoid drifting into a downward spiral.
Resource-based Views
Resource-based theories view the firm primarily as a portfolio of resources and
competencies (Penrose, 1959; Grant, 1997). In a formal and limited sense, a firm’s resources at a
given point in time can be defined as those (tangible and intangible) assets that are tied (semi)
permanently to the firm (Caves, 1980). Resources can be classified into three distinct groups:
physical/capital resources, human capital resources and organizational resources. In order to be
a source of sustained competitive advantage, resources must meet four criteria: they have to be
valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable and non-substitutable (Barney, 1991).
The resource-based school maintains that the firm’s purpose is to use these productive
resources to produce and sell goods and services.Thus, from a managerial perspective, the firm is
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more than an administrative unit; it also is a collection of productive resources. Disposal of these
resources,between different uses and over time, is decided by the administration (Penrose, 1959),
which in this context refers to the leadership. When facing the inflection point, this “bundle of
tangible and intangible resources and tacit know-how” must be identified, selected, developed
and deployed to generate competitive advantage (Learned et al., 1969).
The resource-based view of the firm is incremental in nature, due to the embeddedness
of skills in the organizational routines. Furthermore, the resource-based view of the firm is
adaptive; the firm seeks to identify and select, develop and deploy resources as it strives for
competitive advantage.
Dynamic Capabilities
Dynamic capabilities are the fundamental drivers behind the creation, evolution, and
recombination of resources into new sources of competitive advantage (Henderson & Cockburn
1994;Teece et al., 1997).These abilities are the antecedent of organizational and strategic routines
by which managers alter their resource portfolio to generate new value-creating strategies
(Grant, 1994; Pisano, 1994). Capabilities can be segregated into the skills and knowledge base, the
technical systems, the managerial systems and the values and norms of a firm (Leonard-Barton,
1992).
Dynamic capabilities theory sees the transition through the inflection point as a renewal
process of a firm that is effectuated through the firm’s abilities to “integrate, build, and
reconfigure internal and external competencies to address rapidly changing environments”
(Amit & Schoemaker, 1997). Although it appears that this theory allows a measure of strategic
freedom, managers must take path dependencies into account. The dynamic capabilities of a
firm at a certain point in time and their counterpart, its core rigidities, limit its options ahead.
Dynamic capabilities can be useful to a firm only when they increase its revenues or
reduce its cost base. This can be considered as an overriding driver behind the Schumpeterian
creation, evolution and recombination of resources into a new basis of competitive advantage
through the inflection point (Henderson & Cockburn 1994; Teece et al., 1997). The link between
dynamic capabilities of a firm and the stage of industrial development, in which an inflection
point is a punctuating event, was laid by De Boer,Van der Bosch and Volberda (1999).
Baden-Fuller and Stopford (1994) developed a typical leadership model for inflection
point transition that leans heavily on capabilities to rejuvenate the firm. This rejuvenation is
seen as a four-step management process. First, galvanize the organization into action; then,
simplify by removing unnecessary complexity. Subsequently, build the necessary new
capabilities; finally, leverage to maintain momentum and stretch the advantage. Dynamic
capabilities are thus adaptive in nature because they seek to alter, renew or adapt the firm’s
competence base. These alterations will have only an incremental impact on the firm, because
path dependencies limit the firm’s freedom of the competence base.
An important test of the importance of dynamic capabilities is done by looking at the a
contrario case, which can be coined core rigidities (Leonard Barton, 1992). When a gap develops
46
between the requirements of a rapidly changing environment (e.g., in an inflection point) and
the existing capabilities of the firm (including its values, skills, managerial and technical
systems), the result is a shortfall in the performance of the products and services it seeks to
provide in the marketplace. These deeply embedded knowledge sets thus actively create serious
and mounting problems, unless the leadership takes energetic steps to fundamentally recreate
a more appropriate set of capabilities.
The Learning School
The successful passage of a firm through the inflection point can also be regarded from
the perspective of the mindset,attitude,knowledge and experience of the organization as well as
the leadership that runs it. Learning can be defined in terms of an individual or organization
obtaining know-how to solve specific problems based on existing premises, and to create new
premises (Argyris & Schon, 1978 and 1974; Bateson, 1973).
One should note, however, that there is a difference between individual and organiza-
tional learning. Though individual learning is important to organizations, organizational
learning is not simply the sum of each member’s learning (Fiol & Lyles, 1985). Learning enables
organizations to build a common understanding of their environment and to begin assessing
viable strategies (Daft & Weick, 1984; Starbuck et al., 1978). This learning process results in a
changed mental map shared by the members of the organization.
The translation of learning concepts to a corporate setting was made by Lindblom (1960,
1968) who considered policy setting as a “never-ending process of successive steps in which
continual nibbling is a substitute for a good bite”. Learning thus also is the process by which
existing organizations adjust and adapt to their environment (Fiol & Lyles, 1985).
It is intriguing to note that if the leaders of a firm are well-tuned to each other and share
common objectives, they can be expected to have a shared sensitivity as to the outside threats
(like inflection points) that may present themselves as barriers to the realization of these
objectives. Accordingly,a “learning organization”should be capable of adjusting,at least to some
extent, to the inflection point once it occurs.
Learning can be segregated into the following (Argyris & Schon, 1978):
• single-loop learning, in which the detection and correction of errors permits the
organization to carry on its present policies and achieve its current objectives,
• double-loop learning, in which the norms, values, policies and objectives are altered, and 
• deutero learning, consisting of inquiry into the learning system proper
A parallel but different way to look at these is to identify adaptive learning, which
concerns coping and generative learning, which is about creating (Senge 1990). An inflection
point calls on both skills.Those organizations that have limited learning systems are only capable
of single-loop learning. Undoubtedly, transition through an inflection point requires at least
double-loop learning:in this respect, learning theory borders against institutional and ecological
philosophies that are critical or negative about the ability of the organization to adjust.
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The role of management in a learning process is indirect. Learning cannot be imposed, it can only
be stimulated, and at times initiated.The role of the leader (or his advisor) is therefore to map the
problem as the organization perceives it, to test it, to contribute/stimulate the generation of
solutions, and finally to support the implementation (Argyris & Schon, 1978).
As shown above, learning is adaptive in nature, as it seeks to realign the firm with its
environment due to changing environmental conditions.Additionally, the realignments through
learning within the firm are incremental (Quinn, 1980).
The Institutional School
Institutional theories maintain that the passage through an inflection point, which is a
renewal journey, is governed by a powerful set of industry norms by which the firm has to play.
The result of coercive, normative and mimetic isomorphism, this passage is achieved by
maintaining congruence with shifting norms and shared logic within an industry once it has
established itself (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). As such, institutional thinking is not a theory of
institutional change, but rather seeks to explain the isomorphism (relative uniformity) and
stability of organizational arrangements in a given population of organizations. The institu-
tional context may provide templates for the post inflection point organization forms, and
institutional pressures lead organizations to adopt the same organizational form (DiMaggio &
Powell, 1991).
The first two forms of isomorphism mentioned above relate to, respectively, political
influences – such as regulations – and the need for legitimacy (coercive isomorphism), and the
influence of uncertainty that may cause organizations to mimic each other (mimetic isomor-
phism):Organizations tend to model themselves after similar organizations that they perceive to
be more successful. This, of course, is a relevant factor in an inflection point. Normative
isomorphism follows from the ambition of the members of an occupation to define the
conditions and methods of their work and to establish a cognitive base and legitimization for
their occupational autonomy (Larson, 1977; Collins, 1979).
In institutional theory, the environment is very selective through the three forms of
isomorphism. Firms that do not follow the industry standards and regulations risk being
selected out. These mimetic processes that take place in organizations are bound to be
incremental, because of the difficulties that stem from mimicing behavior. Institutional theory
can encompass both incremental and radical change processes.
The Population Ecology School 
Population ecologists such as Hannan & Freeman (1977) express their “doubt that the
major features of the world of organizations arise through learning or adaptation”. Rather, the
ecological school concludes that firms basically are not capable of making the radical changes in
strategy and structure that are required by the inflection point. Moreover, managerial intent can
be expected to have little or no impact on adaptation (Lewin & Volberda, 1999).The basic premise
of the population ecology school is selective – environments use resource competition and
scarcity to select their appropriate organizations. This theory leans heavily on Darwinian
concepts developed by biologists.
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Population ecologists state that true strategic decisions, such as major investments in plant or
production facilities, lead to sunk costs. Coping with the inflection point is based on and limited
to accumulation of structural and procedural baggage through retention processes (Hannan &
Freeman, 1977 & 1984; Aldrich & Pfeffer, 1976). Changes within those organizations, if at all
possible, will be incremental, due to structural inertia.
Population ecologists maintain that the strategic role of the leadership is quite limited,
since they regard the organization as incapable of major adjustments. The strategy function is
therefore relegated to a higher stakeholder level – starting with the holding company if that level
exists. There, the leadership has leverage in the resources (capital, manpower etc.) that it can
allocate or withhold from the business.
Life Cycle Theory/Punctuated Equilibrium
Punctuated equilibrium theory depicts organizations as evolving through relatively
long periods of stability (equilibrium periods) in their basic patterns of activity. These stable
periods are punctuated by relatively short bursts of fundamental change (revolutionary periods)
(Romanelli & Tushman, 1994). Periods of stability breed adaptation and are followed by periods
of selection during the revolutionary periods.The model has been used in a number of social and
physical science disciplines, such as biology, sociology and psychology. Gould (1980; 1982) is the
founder of the concept of punctuated equilibrium and has successfully tested this model in a
biological setting.
In periods of stability, the current structures, systems, controls and resources are
elaborated and enhanced; in periods of discontinuous change, they are transformed funda-
mentally. Tushman & Anderson (1986) studied the impact of technological breakthroughs in the
minicomputer and airline industries. They found that competence-destroying discontinuities
are initiated by new firms and are associated with increased environmental turbulence;
competence-enhancing discontinuities are initiated by existing firms and are associated with
decreased environmental turbulence.
This theory have a dualistic perspective on change over time. Periods of radical selective
change are followed by periods of incremental adaptive change.
Linking the Theories: Finding the Areas of Relevance
We can now move towards an effective typology of leadership approaches by plotting
the seven grounding theories against the two all-important classifications of speed (radical vs.
incremental) and nature (adaptive vs. selective) of strategy deployment that were presented at
the beginning of this chapter.
Of the theories presented, only leadership school can be classified as completely radical,
because this theory involves radical change by searching for new business ideas. The learning,
resource based,dynamic capabilities, institutional and population ecology theories are incremental
in nature because they build on the existing structures of the company in an evolutionary mode.The
life cycle/punctuated equilibrium faces periods of incremental change that are followed by periods
of radical change and can therefore be positioned in the middle of this continuum.
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In the other dimension – the nature of strategy deployment – population ecology and
institutional theories are selective because they reflect a process of renewal in a world that is
highly constrained in terms of resources, industry norms and structural inertia. And leadership,
resource based, dynamic capabilities and learning are typically adaptive because they reflect a
belief that firms can and do overcome their rigidities and change. The life cycle/punctuated
equilibrium alternates between periods of adaptation and periods of selection and can therefore
not be placed in a fully selective or adaptive mode.We will now map these theoretical approaches
on the two axes, as can be seen in Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3: Plotting the Grounding Theories against the Nature and Speed of Strategy
Deployment
From the seven grounding theories summarized above, we can deduce a rich variety of
approaches that can be applied by the leadership to an inflection point. To come to a workable
model, we will need a synthesis.
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3.3: Towards a Typology of Leadership Approaches
Figure (3.3),presented in the previous section,shows us that the seven grounding schools
inspire different leadership approaches: where a manager follows the leadership school of
thought,he or she will end up approaching the inflection point with a radical change process that
is adaptive in nature. Conversely, resource-based views and the dynamic capabilities school will
steer the leadership to adopt a posture that leads to a more incremental and adaptive change
process. The institutional and population ecology theories stress both an incremental and
selective approach to change. And, finally, the life cycle/punctuated equilibrium school may lead
to a radical and selective leadership style.
We can now translate the schools of thinking into three management approaches that cover the
quadrants of our matrix (figure 3.4)
Figure 3.4: Grounding the Three Leadership Approaches
The first approach, which we shall call the directive approach, is grounded in the
leadership schools. It considers the way through an inflection point as subject to one or more
direct leadership decisions. Under the directive approach, the leadership takes and enacts the
decisions destined to lead the firm through the inflection point. Subordinates may be allowed to
provide input and analysis, but leadership retains firm control of the resulting strategic actions
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that provide the adjustment to the inflection point challenges. These directive decisions lead to
changes in the configuration of the firm and typically relate to either the portfolio of assets of the
company, or to key appointments, or otherwise to the boundaries that are set to its operations –
in short, the decisions about what the firm should do. Directive decisions do not require
(conceptual) inputs from lower levels of management, nor do they concern themselves with the
capabilities of the people and managers within the operations to consider, develop and
implement their own solutions to the inflection point. And because they do not need these
inputs or adjustments, they are capable of rapid and dramatic strategy redeployment.They thus
are radical and adaptive.
At the opposite end of the spectrum is the ecological approach. This third main line of
leadership thought is inspired by the population ecology and institutional schools, which stress
the limited ability of even a strong leader or strategist to effectively comprehend and respond to
both the multiple dimensions of an inflection point,and the complexities involved in adapting to
the new circumstances.The firm is what it is, and the capabilities, characteristics and resources it
has acquired over time – consciously or unconsciously – determine whether or how it will survive
the transition. This viewpoint can be taken of the corporation as a whole, as “environmentalists”
typically do. The role of the leader of a given firm is thus limited to the question whether that
leader should extend his or her given commitment after a reasonable reporting period – which
translates into a form of (near) binary accountability that is executed ex-post (i.e., after the
inflection point occurs). This approach can also be interpreted as a transaction model: “I (or my
predecessors) have given you resources, you give me results, or I’ll dissolve my contract with you”.
In between these two extremes lies the conditional approach, which finds its theoretical
grounding in the resource-based and dynamic capabilities views, on one hand, and the
punctuated equilibrium theory, on the other. It takes the capabilities of local management and
staff to consider their situation and their inflection point as focal point of strategy and action,
and thus focuses on creating conditions in the company that enable the people within it to
develop and implement their own solutions. These conditions can be the structure of the
corporation, or processes for predicting, planning, and innovating for inflection points, or the
flexibility with which an organization reacts to outside impulses. We maintain that these also
include the targets set by the leadership for the firm and its units. This introduces a seemingly
directive element in this approach; the conditional approach emphasizes delegation (i.e., giving
the local management the freedom to make their own choices within a given framework),
whereas the directive approach emphasizes decisions and actions without delegation. At the top
of the firm, leadership behavior tends to be selective and may be radical (the bottom left-hand
quadrant). At the local level, management behavior tends to be more adaptive and incremental
(the top right-hand quadrant).
Conditional leadership looks at the longer-term continuum in which the inflection point is
an interruption in a life cycle. During this interruption, the speed of strategy deployment can be
radical, and the firm can experience selective pressures. At this point, the firm’s position can best be
described as a punctuated equilibrium.Thus, conditional leadership is compatible also with life cycle
and punctuated equilibrium theories. Conditional leadership concerns itself with the question how
the leadership of a given firm can structure its organization and processes to weather the changes.
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We have thus identified the three basic approaches that the leadership can take when
considering strategy development for inflection points:directive,conditional and ecological.This
selection is based on the way in which the leadership exerts its power to form and implement the
strategy of the firm, and on the freedom that is left to the local managers who run the units and
functions within the firm to set their own strategic course.
3.4: The Leadership Approaches and the Anchor Points of Management Practice
Introduction
Figure 3.4 deduced from theory the three leadership approaches to leadership in an
inflection point. Each of these approaches has its characteristics, upon which we will elaborate in
the following chapters. Before doing so, it is important to verify the value of this classification of
three approaches in management practice, if this analysis is to have any value in the
management world. For this, we have to identify five managerial anchor points, which are areas
that the leaders of a successful firm – identified by sustained performance from the perspective
of its stakeholders – have to master. Many of these areas can be considered for this list. For this
analysis, we have identified five groups of managerial anchor points relating to, respectively, (1)
leadership; (2) strategy development/content; (3) environment/context; (4) organizational
structure & processes; and (5) performance & accountability. This choice was predicated on the
importance of each of these anchor points for inflection point leadership, and for management
in general. From the first criterion, the choice of leadership as an anchoring point was an obvious
one, as was the choice for strategy development and environmental alignment: these topics are
all centerpieces for any firm that tries to pass through an inflection point. The last two anchor
points – structure and accountability – were added because they are crucial differentiators
between the three leadership approaches that we have identified. In explaining our selection:
A: Leadership relates to the role that management plays in periods of rapid change, either
at the top of the organization – leadership direction, or in the field – in the form of local
entrepreneurship.
B: Strategy development/content deals with the thought- and action processes employed
by the firm seeking to adjust to changes in the environment. Here, the anchor points are
the emergence of a consistent set of capabilities, and the speed of adjustment of the
business portfolio.
C: When looking at the environment and the context of strategy, the crucial test is to what
extent there is scope for alignment and fit with the changes in the outside world.
D: In the area of organization and processes we have identified two managerial anchor
points, one relating to the complexity of structure and processes, the other to knowledge
creation and integration.
E: Finally, in examining performance and accountability, we have taken accountability as
the main anchor point.
Before proceeding with the actual discussion of each of the anchor points, we will
explain how we verified their selection against existing management practice. Our source is the
framework for analysis provided by Burgelman in 1994, and later used by him in developing the
inflection point concept. In his work, he identified five dynamic forces that shape a company’s
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evolution and the emergence of strategic dissonance, and that help managers find a way
through the period of uncertainty:
• the first dynamic source identified by Burgelman is Corporate Strategy, which in his
interpretation reflects the beliefs that the leadership has about the basis of the firm’s
current success and the changes to be anticipated. In our terminology, this covers many
elements of our concept of leadership.
• Strategic Action is Burgelman’s word for strategy deployment – what the firm actually
does strategically matches the content side of strategy development,
• The Basis of Competitive Advantage is grounded in Porter’s five determinants of
industry attractiveness (Porter, 1980): bargaining power of customers and suppliers, the
nature of rivalry among incumbents, and the threats of new entrants and substitution.
Technological change, legislation or government regulation can affect these elements
and their relative importance. These elements are descriptors of the environmental
anchor point.
• Distinctive Competence, which encompasses the competencies that have made it
possible to develop a competitive advantage and survive, which are based on structure
and processes.
• The Internal Selection Environment, which links strategy and action to competencies
and competitive advantage, and is comprised of processes (like resource allocation rules)
and cultural elements, and as such fits closely with our concept of performance and
accountability.
Figure 3.5 shows graphically the fit of the five dynamic forces determined by Burgelman with our
five managerial anchor points.
Figure 3.5: Fit of the Managerial Anchor Points with the Burgelman Framework
Anchor Points
A B C D E
Leadership Strategy Dev./ Environment Management Performance & 
Content Context of Structure Accountability
and Processes
Five Dynamic Forces:
Corporate Strategy ˚ (˚)
Strategic Action (˚) ˚
Basis of Competitive ˚
Advantage
Distinctive Competence ˚
Internal Selection (˚) ˚
Environment
When we test our three leadership approaches against these managerial anchor points,
we will see that together they cover them very well, but in totally different, and to a large extent
mutually exclusive ways.Where an approach is less effective or even ineffective in addressing an
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anchor point, this is compensated by the (full) effectiveness of the other two leadership
approaches, with at times the third in a supporting function. We will identify one or two
characterizing elements of each of our anchor points, and test how these elements are expressed
in each of the three leadership approaches. The characterizing elements were selected because
they were differentiating against other anchor points (i.e., they describe unique characteristics of
the anchor point) and because they were operational (i.e., they enabled a “hard” and unambi-
guous test of the leadership approaches).
For the leadership anchor point,we selected leadership direction and local entrepreneur-
ship because the first of these two elements represents the top-down element of leadership, and
the second the local input. In talking about strategy development, we took one characteristic
related to time and speed, and one related to the content of strategy. The environmental anchor
point is addressed by checking the scope for alignment and fit. In considering the management
of structure and processes, we have taken knowledge creation and integration, on one hand, and
the complexity of structure and processes, on the other, as characterizing elements. For
performance and accountability, we have limited ourselves to accountability as the sole charac-
terizing element. Figure 3.6 summarizes our selection.
Figure 3.6: Characterizing Elements of the Managerial Anchor Points
Anchor Point Characterizing Elements
A. Leadership: Leadership direction
Entrepreneurship of local management
B. Strategy Development/Content: Speed of adjustment of the business portfolio
Consistency of capability development
C. Environment/Context: Scope for alignment and fit
D. Management of Structure and Processes: Knowledge creation and integration
Complexity of structure and processes
E. Performance & Accountability: Accountability
A: Leadership
As we mentioned earlier, the leadership style is an important element in this thesis.This
style differs in a significant way when looking at the three approaches. The differences will be
shown with the two selected characterizing elements, leadership direction and entrepreneur-
ship of local management. Leadership direction is an important organizational facet that has
been extensively discussed in the management literature. The entrepreneurship of local
management, the local parallel of leadership direction, can also be found in the leadership
literature (Bourgeois & Brodwin, 1985; Burgelman 2002). We will start with the first
characterizing element and see how this varies in the different leadership styles.
Leadership direction
In the different leadership styles the direction of command differs a great deal. In the
directive approach, the CEO issues directives top down into the organization. He decides what
the strategic positioning of the firm should be; he charts the way ahead, in what Bourgeois and
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Brodwin call the commander approach (1985). In a world that (at least as these words are written)
appears to suffer from increasingly dramatic economic swings after the post-world war period of
gradual growth, strong top-down leadership is increasingly seen as a prerequisite for corporate
survival. The organizational change literature, too, seems to be increasingly aware that the
political dynamics of change are often shaped more directively or coercively than a traditional
collaborative approach would recommend (Dunphy & Stace 1988).
In the conditional approach, the leadership sets conditions under which the local
management has to operate. This leadership direction can be best symbolized as U-turn
management.This U-turn management resembles middle-up-down management, as proposed
by Nonaka (1994), where top managers create basic managerial concepts (the premises of
decision making) and break them down hierarchically – in term of objectives and means – so that
subordinates can implement them. Top managers’ concepts become operational conditions for
middle managers, who then must decide how to realize the concepts. In middle-up-down
management, top management sets the direction, provides the field of interaction, selects the
participants in the field, establishes the guidelines and deadlines for projects, and supports the
innovation process (Nonaka, 1988).
The ecological approach gives freedom to the local management in dealing with
strategy. However, the leadership wants to see the results after a fixed period of time. This
management style has similarities with the “crescive” model (Bourgeois and Brodwin, 1984),
where the leadership tries to encourage the front-line managers to develop, champion, and
implement sound strategies. In this model, strategy moves upward from the firing line, rather
than downward from the top. Burgelman (1983) has shown that these strategies often take place
bottom-up, and that the leadership approves of these afterwards (‘reactive sensemaking’).
Entrepreneurship of local management
The entrepreneurship of local management in the directive approach is low because it is
the firm’s leadership that takes charge of entrepreneurship. This approach has theoretical
similarities with Chandler (1962), who states that the primary role of local management is that of
operational implementor. Accordingly, there are few if any local entrepreneurs in this model.
In the conditional approach, local management must play by certain rules and in a
certain context defined by the leadership. There is room for strategic initiatives, but they have to
fit into the context set by the leadership. This is more in line with the perspective of Bartlett &
Goshal (1993), who stated that the leadership has to be the creator of purpose and challenger of
the status quo of the firm. They label this managerial mode proactive bottom-up; it allows for a
high degree of local entrepreneurship, and has a partial overlap with our conditional approach.
In the ecological approach, the front-line managers have the most room for entre-
preneurship. This is supported by research of Quinn (1985) and Huy (2001), who state that front-
line managers typically have the most current knowledge and expertise and are better in seeking
fit with the market. This leadership style, which holds that the motor of corporate entre-
preneurship resides in the autonomous strategic initiatives of individuals at the local levels in
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the organization, whilst the leadership assesses the results ex post, can be described as
‘ecological legitimizer’(Burgelman,1983).The ecological leadership approach is thus reactive and
bottom-up in nature. It relies entirely on the entrepreneurship of (many) local managers.
Figure 3.7: Leadership in the Three Approaches
Directive Conditional Ecological
Leadership direction Top-down U-turn Bottom-up
Number of local entrepreneurs Few Many Many
B: Strategy Development/Content
The second managerial anchor point, strategy development/content, looks at the actual
content – actions, directions – of the strategic initiatives employed in our three leadership styles.
We have two characterizing elements in this anchor point: (1) speed of adjustment in business
portfolio and (2) consistency capability development. The first element leans heavily on
leadership theories, the second on dynamic capability and learning theories.
Speed of adjustment of the business portfolio
The three leadership styles have their own characteristics regarding the speed with
which adjustments can be made in the business portfolio. In a directive mode, the leadership can
make timely decisions regarding alterations in the business portfolio. Due to the nature of
directive leadership,corporate turnarounds,or journeys of renewal,can be very speedy (Volberda
et al., 2001).This directed journey has a modicum of overlap with our directive approach, because
it is also a top-down process. However, the directive approach also puts a heavy responsibility on
the leadership, who stand alone in making the key decisions. Decisive and prudent management
is needed, leading to immediate action when the firm is confronted with major environmental
change The advantage is that these actions can be undertaken with little organizational delay
under a directive leadership (Ansoff et al., 1975).
In the conditional approach,the speed with which the company can change is lower than
in the directive mode – mostly due to the limited strategic freedom of individual mangers, both
at the top and at local levels. Conditional management requires the creation of the conditional
management framework within the firm, which implies the setting of rules by the leadership,
and the adoption of these rules by the local managers. Both these efforts take organizational
time and energy. This adoption process also means that this operating mode can be used only
when there is sufficient participation and support within the organization (Dunphy & Stace
1988).
The speed of overall adjustment in the business portfolio in the ecological approach is
low, as overall strategy deployment has to wait for local initiatives to take place (or not...), prove
their success, and be adopted by other units. In these so-called evolutionary theories, strategies
are incremental in nature, and major company-wide turnarounds are difficult if not impossible
to realize (Nelson & Winter, 1982).
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Consistency of capability development
In the directive approach,capability development is a core task of the leadership.The CEO
and top management provide the main thrust behind identifying and building capabilities
(Chandler, 1962). Capabilities that are aligned and consistent with one another reinforce each
other. Such a set of capabilities can only emanate from a single corporate centre in which the
leadership has a unified strategic intent regarding capability development (Prahalad & Hamel,
1990). One should realize, however, that the capacity of the leadership to define, design, acquire
and implement such a set of capabilities in all its detail may be limited, which may distract from
the eventual consistency and effectiveness of the resulting capability set.
In the conditional approach, capability development revolves more around the
directives that are issued from above. The leadership clearly emphasizes the importance of
capability development, and offers plenty of incentives in order to stimulate the local
management (Huy, 2001). Local management has to develop dynamic capabilities within a
certain context, but there is room for interpretation, which can lead to a divergent policy
regarding the development of capabilities.
In the ecological mode of leadership concerning capability development, dynamic
capabilities are being formed at the bottom of the organization, and the leadership decides
afterwards if the chosen directions are correct (Burgelman, 1983). The consistency in the
development of dynamic capabilities across the firm will be low, because a lot of different
initiatives are undertaken locally with no top-down direction. This inconsistency between the
individual local capability developments will reduce opportunities for synergy between the local
units, which is one of the main disadvantages of this laissez faire style of leadership.
Figure 3.8: Strategy Development in the Three Leadership Approaches
Directive Conditional Ecological
Speed of adjustment in business High Low Low
portfolio
Consistency capability development Moderate/ High /enabling Low/ laissez faire
guided directed facilitating
C: Environment/Context
The environmental context of the firm forms the third anchor point. A number of theories,
such as Porter’s five forces concept, provide analytical tools for firms that appear to have lost the
connection with the markets in which they source and sell. The linkage between the firm and its
environment can be two-way: in many instances (especially for firms with many suppliers), the
firm ends up seeing itself as unwilling victim of the market circumstances that dictate its demand
supply and at times its margins.This view is supported by the theories developed by the population
ecologists. But in a number of industries (or rather business segments) an innovative firm can
indeed influence its environment. Environmental context thus can work in two directions.We have
identified one characterizing element in this cluster: scope for alignment and fit. This element is
deduced from leadership theories and life-cycle/ punctuated equilibrium theory.
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Scope for alignment and fit
This characterizing element deals with the strategic freedom that a firm has within the
different leadership approaches to succeed in a changing environment.This strategic freedom is
particularly important, as poor performance acts as a catalyst to management action and
organizational change (Cyert & March, 1963). Effective response, or adaptation, requires decision
makers to update their beliefs, including identifying and interpreting unfamiliar environmental
events (inflection points) and action alternatives, and reinterpreting familiar issues and
concepts to more closely align their internal organization with the external environment (Barr,
1998). Revolutionary change is necessary when a relatively stable environment becomes
turbulent and the organizational elements no longer fit the environment.
In the directive mode there is broad scope for alignment and fit, because leadership has
many options for major action when faced with an inflection point (Romanelli & Tushman,1994).
The range of options that managers effectively have at their disposal to stay in sync with the
environment is a function of the adjustments that they are able to make in their interpretations
of the firm and its environment (Barr, 1998). In a directive mode, the scope for alignment and fit is
great, because the leadership has the power to engage in major strategic action to realign the
firm with the environment through direct action and direct orders to local management.
In the conditional mode, the scope for alignment and fit is moderate, due to the limited
freedom of front-line management, which must operate under specific targets and conditions
laid down by the leadership. These conditions lock the strategic initiatives into an imposed
strategic direction towards an intended optimal fit. There is emerging recognition in the
organizational change literature that the political dynamics of change are often shaped more
directively or coercively than would be recommended by a more conditional approach, and that
this may be the only (or even best) way to bring the organization back in line with changed
environmental circumstances (Dunphy & Stace, 1988).
In the ecological approach, the leadership is not expected to assess upfront whether the
strategic initiatives taken by local management on behalf of the firm are in line with the
demands of the environment. The basic premise is that front-line management is closest to the
fire and therefore able to make the right decisions (Huy, 2001). Fit will thus be achieved at the
business-unit level without consideration of the corporate perspective. It will thus be difficult for
the firm to maintain its overall fit with the environment. According to this approach,
collaborative change programs, which involve participation by both leadership and front-line
managers, do not work when the firm no longer fits in its environment and when important
decisions about the organization’s future have to be made (Dunphy & Stace, 1988). The
incremental adjustment steps that follow, characterizing ecological strategy deployment from a
firm’s perspective, will not increase the fit with the environment, due to the amplitude and firm-
wide scope of the inflection point. The scope for alignment and fit is thus low in this leadership
approach.
59
Figure 3.9: Environment/Context in the Three Leadership Approaches
Directive Conditional Reactive
Scope for alignment and fit High / many options Moderate / few options Low / no options
D: Management of Structure and Processes
In this anchor point we identified characterizing elements that will help us to delineate
the three leadership approaches: (1) knowledge creation and integration and (2) the role of
structure and processes.These elements have their theoretical grounding in leadership, learning
and dynamic capabilities theories.
Knowledge creation and integration
Knowledge, which is receiving more and more attention in today’s business world, is
currently regarded as the principal productive resource of the firm. The fundamental role of the
firm is to integrate the knowledge of ‘individual specialists’ (Grant, 1996). The following sections
will assess how this integration and creation of knowledge works in the different leadership
modes.
In the directive approach, the leadership carries out the process of knowledge creation and
integration. Only the upper echelons are involved in this process, as only top managers are able
and allowed to create information (Nonaka, 1994). Moreover, information created by the
leadership exists for the sole purpose of implementation.
In the conditional approach, the leadership gives voice to a company’s future by
articulating metaphors, symbols, and concepts that orient the knowledge-creation activities of
employees (Nonaka,1994). Knowledge is created by self-organizing teams,but within the context
that is put forward by the leadership. Quinn (1992) calls this way of working a “future vision” that
gives intellectual members of the organizations some challenges for intellectual growth and
develops their capacity for adapting to shifting industries.
In an ecological approach, those that create information are not the top leadership but
local management. In this style of organization, the process of knowledge creation and
integration is executed entirely by local management (Nonaka, 1994).The current trend towards
empowerment, which takes account of the nature of knowledge acquisition and retention in
firms, is consistent with a bottom-up management style (Grant 1996).
Complexity of structure and processes
The role of complexity of structure and processes varies in the three leadership
approaches. In the directive and ecological approaches, structure and processes are but
impediments to the effective development and deployment of strategy by,respectively, the firm’s
leadership or local management. In the directive case, the leadership must be as close as possible
to the action; it will thus be well informed about the environment before taking decisions, and
the decisions, once taken, can be rapidly and effectively executed with a minimum of distortion
through delegation to lower levels of management. In the ecological case, strategy design and
deployment is in hands of local management and firm-wide structure and processes can only
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impede the speed and effectiveness of its work. In the conditional leadership approach, however,
structure and processes are the essential instruments through which the leadership develops its
strategic concept and achieves its execution. The challenge here is to impose the right structure
and processes, and to manage their complexity.
In the directive mode, the complexity of the structure and processes should be limited,
because the strategies developed here should be explicit and kept simple: “simplicity is the
essence of good art and the conception of strategy brings simplicity to complex organizations”
(Andrews, 1987).This sort of leadership can be called the entrepreneurial organization, which has
a flexible and informal structure with much of the coordination handled by the leadership itself
(Mintzberg, 1989).
Complexity is high in the conditional mode,due to the context created by the leadership,
within which the local management has to operate. This operating mode is much more difficult
for the leadership to handle, due to the increased freedom of the local management (Volberda et
al., 2001).
In the ecological mode, complexity can be rudimentary and limited to an ex-post review process.
In the process, the leadership of the firm assesses the result of the business units and decides on
the next round of resource allocations.
Figure 3.10: Management and Organizational Structure and Processes in the Three Leadership
Approaches
Directive Conditional Ecological
Knowledge creation and integration Low / intended High Low / emergent
Complexity of structure and processes Limited High Rudimentary
E: Performance & Accountability
This last anchor point has one characterizing element: accountability. This anchor point,
which follows from leadership theories, considers the function of leadership through the lens of
accountability.
There is a general tendency in corporations that leadership and front-line managers are
more responsible for achieving results than for performing a task (Hammer, 1996).
In the directive mode, accountability is executed both ex-ante and ex-post, in the sense
that the leadership states clear, explicit and detailed targets to its local managers that do not
leave room for local strategy interpretation, but only for implementation. After the actions have
been performed, the leadership verifies whether its specific orders have been carried out.
Accountability in the conditional approach is important ex-ante and during the strategy
deployment: Up-front, the leadership spends a great deal of effort explaining overall targets, and
leaves ample room for local management to specify the tactics/local strategies used to achieve
these general targets. While strategy is deployed, a comprehensive system of planning and
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control ensures that the leadership is informed step-by-step about progress made.
Accountability against each of these steps is executed, moreover, on a near-continuous basis. As
result, ex-post accountability is less severe than in the other approaches.
In the ecological approach, the accountability is almost entirely ex-post. The leadership
sets a few (e.g., between one and three) up-front targets (like return on investment of growth)
and leaves the realization of these targets entirely to local management. These targets are often
explicit, in the form of a management brief, but may be implicit and unwritten. After a
predetermined period of up to a year – often set by external accounting rules – the leadership
conducts an (informal) accountability session in which the performance of the local
management is graded against the few up-front targets.The leadership thus assesses the results
ex-post and leaves the actual execution of operations to people responsible for the performance
of those entities (Merchant, 1998).
3.5: Conclusions about the Three Leadership Approaches
We will end this introduction with a table (Figure 3.11) that shows how each of the three
leadership approaches has a different profile against the five managerial anchor points. The
horizontal axis shows the three leadership approaches; the vertical axis shows the anchoring
points and their characterizing elements.
Figure 3.11: Leadership Approaches and the Managerial Anchoring Points
Managerial Anchor Points Leadership Approaches
Directive Conditional Ecological
A: Leadership
A1: Leadership direction Top-down U-turn Bottom-up
A2: Entrepreneurship of local management Few Many Many
B: Strategy development: Content
B1: Speed of adjustment in business portfolio Holistic Local Local
B2: Consistency of Capability development Moderate High Low
Guided / Enabling / Laissez Faire
Directed Facilitating
C: Environment: Context
C1: Scope for alignment and fit High/Many Medium/Few Low/No 
Options Options Options
D: Management of Structure and Processes
D1: Knowledge creation and integration Low/Intended High Low/ Emergent
D2: Complexity of structure and processes Limited High Rudimentary
E: Performance & Accountability
E1: Accountability Both Ex-ante Ex-post
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We have now developed a set of three leadership approaches that is grounded in theory and
tested against five managerial anchor points, and thus provides a solid basis with which to
resolve the questions that have motivated this thesis.
Our literature search enabled us to identify seven schools of thought that have particular
bearing on the strategic behavior of leadership in inflection point situations. We showed that
these schools have sufficient relevance and scope by plotting them against two axes that are of
crucial importance for inflection point strategy: the nature of the transition through the
inflection point – which can be adaptive or selective, and the speed of transition – which can be
radical or incremental.
We then examined the nature of management actions that can emanate from each of these
schools, as defined by their nature and speed, and found that these converge around three
general leadership approaches that we have called, respectively, the directive, conditional and
ecological approach. Six of the seven grounding theories each clearly point to a single approach.
The seventh (life cycle/punctuated equilibrium) also predominantly fits in one school.
Subsequently, we verified the three leadership approaches against five managerial
anchoring points to show that they indeed cover these anchor points. Also, they are quite
different in nature and do not overlap in any substantive way. For this, we used five clustered
managerial anchoring points: (A) leadership; (B) strategy/content development; (C) environ-
ment/context; (D) management & organizational structure and processes and (E) performance
and accountability. Each of the three approaches, indeed, has its own unique profile against the
anchoring points, and the areas of overlap are incidental. They thus constitute a valid model for
the practice of management.
Figure 3.12 shows how the theoretical underpinnings provide the conceptual model in a
deductive fashion, and how the anchor points provide the test of managerial pragmatism in an
inductive way.
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Figure 3.12: Development of the Main Hypotheses
The next three sections will take an in-depth look at each of the three leadership approaches and
the theories that support them.
3.6: The Directive Approach
Introduction
This segment describes the directive leadership style and discusses under which
circumstances it is effective. After the introduction, we review the theoretical grounding of the
approach. Subsequently, we discuss the anchoring points, followed by the important tools of this
approach for practitioners. Finally, we evaluate the main advantages and drawbacks of the
approach and its main application areas.
Directive leadership is a way of managing the firm in which the chief executive officer or
executive team makes a decision and enacts the changes that it deems necessary for the firm to
adjust to the inflection point. The leadership dominates, which leaves local management in
supportive and implementation roles, at best, in the strategic redirection (Chandler, 1962). For
example, when the leadership readjusts the business portfolio of the firm by acquiring and
divesting businesses, this is to be accomplished with help of corporate staff and investment
banks, lawyers and other outside advisors, with no participation whatsoever of the (local)
management. The need for dominant leadership has often been expressed in the literature, and
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is regarded by many as the single most important force in a successful transition process of a firm
(Andrews 1971; Duncan & Stacey, 1988). Seen through the directive lens,a firm’s strategic moves in
the inflection point are the consequence of leadership action.
What determines the success of directive leadership and what are its main applications?
To be able to function successfully in a directive mode, the leadership must possess the necessary
understanding of both the existing firm and of the post-inflection point environment. This
insight into the new markets and competition is necessary to develop a workable vision and
strategy for the post-inflection era. And the understanding of the existing organization is
necessary to make sure that the existing resources and capabilities are used optimally in the new
environment: given the major challenges that characterize the inflection point, a firm can ill
afford to squander its means. Understanding depends on the right experience and background,
and on the right information sources within the firm and the relevant markets. However, given
the complexity of the inflection point transition, even a well-informed executive may find that
understanding all the elements and executing all the necessary decisions is an insurmountable
task,given the limitations of the human mind (Simon,1976).Strategists are permanently trapped
by bounded rationality and by their incomplete and imperfect perceptions of their environment
(Simon, 1957). The human workday is another determinant of the effectiveness of directive
management, in the sense that time limits the amount of information that an executive can
absorb and transmit to others, and time limits the number of decisions he or she can make. This
means that success as a directive leader depends on the use of managerial tools that require
limited time and limited know-how.These include, among other things, transactions and the use
of accountability. The objects of these transactions can be businesses, assets or technologies, in
which case we talk about various forms of portfolio management. Accountability always
pertains to individuals or groups of people who are made and held accountable for the
achievement of explicit or implicit targets. If accountability is to be a time-efficient tool of the
directive leader, it should pertain to a few targets only, and be part of a simple or even
rudimentary process. Conversely, the directive leader will seek to avoid management tools that
require extensive and detailed information, and a lot of leadership time. These included relying
on complex management processes and procedures, and substantial delegation.
The tools listed above also show a number of limitations of the directive approach,
particularly as so much depends on so few individuals. The advantages of this approach are also
derived from the small number of people involved in strategy development and execution.
Hence, as we will see later, there is no need for a group strategy process and compromises, which
allows for quick decisions and quick action, and provides an opportunity for dramatic change.
The directive approach is thus particularly suited to situations in which urgency calls for
dramatic action within a short period, with little time available for strategic analysis, communi-
cations and discussion. It is a preferred way of managing innovations that requires changes in
the pattern of resource deployment and the creation of new capabilities of positioning in
markets (Stopford & Baden Fuller, 1994) – the pattern of which is consistent with an inflection
point. But to be effective, the approach does require that leadership have the understanding and
capacity to make, and implement, the right decisions.
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The directive leadership approach stands out clearly from the two other ways of managing
through the inflection point that we identified in the preceding chapter. The most important
differentiators are the roles of the leaders and the local managers: in the directive approach, all
strategic power is with the leaders, whereas the two other approaches leave the local managers
with strategic responsibilities that range from important to dominant. We have also seen that
the mix of advantages and disadvantages of the directive approach make it particularly suitable
– much more than the two other leadership approaches – to realize rapid, incisive strategic action
that does not require inputs from local management. The most important examples of these
kinds of actions are business portfolio adjustments and other major new investments (which, by
the way, are all actions that change the boundaries of the firm). As soon as the strategic path
becomes more complex, and requires involvement and initiative from a broader group of local
managers, the directive approach loses its advantage of speed and decisiveness, and two other
leadership approaches become a better vehicle for realizing change.
The Theoretical Grounding of the Directive Approach
Directive leadership is a cornerstone of traditional theories on management. Cantillon
(one of the first authors to write about management as an intellectual topic) introduced the
word “entrepreneur”, citing as his main function to “buy means of production at certain prices in
order to combine them into a product that he is going to sell at prices that are uncertain at the
moment at which he commits himself to his costs”. (Say, 1949). Here, the leader – or leadership – is
directly responsible for control and consciousness in the firm and its only strategist (Andrews,
1971). In the leadership approach, the role of local management in strategy formulation and
deployment is limited: clearly not a decision maker, it may have an executional function in
implementation, but only as direct tool in hands of top management (Chandler 1962, Bourgeois
& Brodwin 1984). No discussion thus of delegation to local management, of target setting and
accountability.
The most obvious way for the leadership to exert its direct influence in a rapidly
changing environment is by managing the portfolio of assets of the firm (Amit & Schoemaker,
1993, Langlois, 1994), and, in a broader context, by acquiring or divesting the resources that the
firm needs to function in the changing environment (Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984). In the
latter case, resources are very widely defined as “all the assets, capabilities, organizational
processes, information, knowledge etc. controlled by a firm to conceive and implement the
strategies that improve its efficiency and effectiveness” (Barney, 1991). Thus, the whole idea of
competence management (Selznik 1957) can be construed as being part of resources that are the
object of directional leadership: the leader should not only govern physical assets, but also the
competencies of his organization (Prahalad & Hamel, 1994). Conversely, since competencies and
capabilities cross the spectrum of functions of a firm, the champion of a new competency/-
capability-based strategy can only be the top leadership (Stalk, Evans & Schulman, 1992).
The idea of control and consciousness should also be seen from a dynamic perspective:
an important function of the leadership/entrepreneur is to find new combinations for the
resources that he controls (Schumpeter, 1928). This dynamic concept was expanded when the
ability to generate competencies was recognized by Nelson and Winter in 1982 (also Teece et al.,
1997) as an independent skill: dynamic capability development. The same dynamic can work the
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other way around: as the organization adapts to its new environment, new leaders are enabled,
and old leaders replaced (Kanter et al., 1992).
The directive approach is most appropriate in a situation where 1) the CEO is able to wield
a great deal of power, 2) there is a reasonable information flow to the top, 3) the strategist can
avoid political two-way processes and 4) the firm can be split into doers and thinkers (Bourgeois
& Brodwin, 1983).
The Directive Approach and the Managerial Anchor Points
This chapter introduced five managerial anchoring points for our leadership
approaches: (1) leadership; (2) strategy development: content; (3) environment: context; (4)
management & organizational structure and processes and (5) performance & accountability.
All of these provide perspectives on the directive leadership approach.
(1) Leadership in the directive approach
The view that the CEO is the architect and central actor of strategy was already
recognized in the early days of management theory by authors like Chandler (1962) and Andrews
(1971). In this view, strategy is a deliberate, conscious set of directives that determines decisions
into the future, including local implementation. It is clear that this way of running a business
implies firm, hands-on control by the leadership. Strategies must be broken down into highly
specific goals and objectives ready for immediate “no-brain” implementation by local
management; this was well illustrated by Bourgeois & Brodwin with their “commander” model
(Bourgeois & Brodwin 1984). As result, every local sub-unit of an organization and every
individual have a clearly defined set of purposes or goals that are specific to the degree that
motion only into a deliberately chosen direction is possible, and any drift in an unintended
direction is impossible (Andrew, 1971).
The leadership is not limited to typical directive actions (like portfolio decisions): it is also
involved in the conditional aspects of running a business, like the development and adjustments
of the firm’s structure, and the deployment of people in such a way as to permit both business
success and individual expression of ambitions, which leads to individual satisfaction. The
mission is to serve all these interests in the most effective and efficient way (Barnard 1938).
The directive leadership mode views the very powerful leadership as dominant actor in
the strategy process. The leadership assesses the new business environment and initiates major
actions “top-down”, with major impact – amplitude – on the business portfolio. Front-line
management must conform to the vision of the leadership, and there is no room for dissident
thinking.
The well-formulated goals and purposes provided by the leadership turn local
management into operators. Since power is centralized in the hand of the chief executive, local
management functions in an operating mode with a low level of entrepreneurship (Mintzberg et
al., 1999). There is no room for local strategic initiatives and there are few if any local
entrepreneurs: the primary role of local management is that of operational implementer that
must obey to the directives issued from the upper echelons (Chandler, 1962). The commander
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model described above (Bourgeois & Brodwin, 1984) separates thinkers from doers, and this is
exactly what happens in the directive mode of leadership.
The view that the best way out of an inflection point is through directive leadership was
substantiated in four separate case studies of the glass industry, the cement industry,
minicomputers and disk drives by Tushman et al.,1986. In their perspective, the local
management in these cases had no say in a successful transition through an inflection point,and
simply obeyed the directives from above. Local management had only a supportive role by
implementing the changes that had been issued by the leadership. These studies did not,
however, consider the different transition phases of an inflection point. We will see in chapter 7
that their propositions are correct, but apply only to the transition part of the sequence of
developments that defines the inflection point.
(2) Strategy Development: Content in the Directive Approach
In the beginning of this chapter we showed that the directive leadership approach is
coercive and top-down in nature. Coercive top-down change is socially disruptive, in the sense
that there is no structural means built in to mobilize and motivate local management and staff
beyond hierarchical instruction (Ansoff et al., 1990:430). But it does offer the advantage of a rapid
strategic response, and permits a radical and holistic change program. And in turbulent times,
when the organization no longer fits in its environment and there is little time for extensive
participation from all the levels, dictatorial leadership is needed to adapt in a timely way, by
deploying a major organizational restructuring (Dunphy & Stace, 1988). In the ensuing directed
renewal journey, speed is a critical advantage (Volberda et al., 2001). And directive leadership
permits a rapid adjustment of the business portfolio. Clear signals of speedy and radical action
are takeovers, divestitures and the recruitment of managerial or technological talent.
The leadership of the firm has the potential of playing a central role in the development
and nurturing of dynamic capabilities (Chandler, 1962; Prahalad & Hamel, 1990; and Stalk et al.,
1992). With a single central actor in this process of capability development, the firm can be
expected to display a high level of consistency. To transmit these capabilities into the field, the
firm must first have a well-formulated statement of strategic intent, which conveys a sense of
overall strategic direction to the entire firm (Prahalad & Hamel 1994). Strategic intent should be
differentiated (pointing at a unique position in the future), bring forward the ‘where’ question
and help employees comprehend the heading of the firm. Therefore, although the overall
consistency of vision and capability requirements at the corporate level may be high, the actual
realization of capability development at the local level ends up being moderate, particularly for
complex organizations with a large distance between the leadership and the field.
(3) Environment: Context in the Directive Approach
Environmental disconnect shows up when the products or services of a firm no longer
meet the changing performance and cost expectations of the customers, when new competitive
offerings are perceived to be better or cheaper, or when a firm can no longer recruit the people or
procure the equipment and materials it needs at a cost that enables profits. The underlying
causes lie in finding the appropriate set of businesses, assets, people and capabilities. As we have
seen, directive leadership is good at effectuating transactions, and therefore tends to do well in
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acquiring, or divesting business activities, assets, people and capabilities.These transactions can
often be executed rapidly,and we may conclude that the leadership in a directive mode can act in
a rapid and radical way to adjust the portfolios of a firm that finds that it no linger fits in an
environment that has changed in the course of an inflection point. And, with few exceptions, a
radical change in strategy is the better track to success than gradual adjustment (Tushman et al.,
1986).The disadvantage of transaction-based strategic adjustment is that the resulting portfolio
often does not fit both the exact needs of the markets in which the firm intends to operate, and
the characteristics of the activities that already exist in the firm: the failure rate of corporate
acquisitions has been well documented.
We have seen above that the directive approach is particularly suited to realize rapid,
radical adjustments – albeit that changes involving large numbers of local managers and other
staff members are more difficult to realize by purely directive means.We can therefore conclude
that in a directive approach the scope for alignment and fit is high,and leaves the leadership with
many strategic options.
(4) Management of Structure and Processes in the Directive Approach
In the directive, top-down, approach, top management is the agent of knowledge
creation (Nonaka, 1994). Information created by these top-managers is intended and exists for
the sole purpose of enabling implementation; it is therefore a tool rather than a strategic
direction. Information absorption – which is necessary to cope with the new environment –
depends at least in part on the structure and processes deployed by the leadership.The relatively
simple corporate structures, like functional and business unit structures, without which
directive leadership cannot function, also have a restrictive effect on the ability of the
organization to absorb this information (Bosch et al., 1999). However, knowledge integration
within the (small) leadership team of the organization is, by definition, perfect across the top
level of the firm. The problem arises with the integration of knowledge within lower levels of a
firm that can be successful only if local management and all other layers are involved in this
process. In the directive (top-down) mode, the dominant knowledge stream in the organization
is top-down, and the knowledge that resides in the local managers by definition has a limited
chance of reaching the upper echelons of the corporation. Therefore, one can argue that the
knowledge creation and integration in this leadership style at the grass-roots level are low and
intended (Volberda et al., 2001). Since the knowledge creation process exists only at the apex of
the organization, the ideas and knowledge created by front-line managers are not part of the
focal area of the leadership and therefore risk being lost. Front-line managers may well be
discouraged by this way of working, which increases the risk of motivational problems. Seen
across the firm, the level of knowledge creation and integration is therefore relatively low.
The directive approach finds the leadership at the apex of the firm, where it sets the
course of the organization and provides local managers with specific orders. Directive leadership
can be effective only in an organization with limited complexity of structure and processes.
When local management is involved in executing strategy under directive leadership, it must
understand the specifics of the implementation task at hand. A directive way of working
translates into hierarchical relationships. The needs for effective communication and hierarchy
are best served in a simple structure with simple processes (Mintzberg, 1983).
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(5) Performance & Accountability in the Directive Approach
In the directive approach,accountability lies with the Chief Executive or leadership of the
organization. Responsible for all the strategies that are developed and implemented, the
leadership has dominant control over the process and must therefore assume responsibility for
the consequences of the choices it has made. This is consistent with the traditional view that
regards the general manager of a firm as responsible and accountable for its success (Andrews,
1971).
Independent executive action without delegation characterizes the directive approach,
which we have seen to be particularly suitable for leadership that uses transactions and simple
targeting and accountability as important management tools.This targeting and accountability
is executed in three steps.The first is the setting of targets,which must be simple in order to avoid
the need for complex delegation (requiring substantial expertise and time). The second step
includes the processes of monitoring and review, which must be simple and infrequent, for the
same reason. Accountability is the third step, and consists of either remunerating good
performance or punishing bad performance. In that sense, accountability is both ex-ante and ex-
post. In some cases, targeting and review have been simplified to the level of being totally
informal (i.e. without process) and undocumented.
Tools for Practitioners in the Directive Approach
Adjusting the Business Portfolio. The directive approach is a radical leadership style that
makes it possible for the firm to initiate major strategic action. This section will bring forward
some of the tools available to the leadership. Seen from a leadership perspective, directive
approaches are controlled by the leadership of the firm by (re) configuring its business portfolio
boundaries.
In many ways, an adjustment of the portfolio of a corporation is the easiest way to
improve both its responsiveness to the forces driving the inflection point, and its ability to adjust
to the impact. In rapidly changing environments, there is obviously value in the ability to
reconfigure the firm’s assets structure, and to accomplish the necessary internal and external
transformations (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Langlois, 1994).
Portfolio analysis has its roots in the financial world. Stocks bring varying levels of
returns in the form of share price increases and dividends. They are also, in varying degrees,
volatile in nature and inherently risky as a financial instrument (Fama & Miller, 1971). An investor
can diversify this risk by putting an appropriate mix of stocks in his portfolio.The same applies to
businesses when choosing the right portfolio mix.
In its initial essence, business portfolio analysis starts by plotting the businesses, assets,
technologies or competencies of a corporation along the different dimensions of attractiveness,
related to objective criteria like market growth and profitability, and firm-related criteria like
competitive positioning (e.g. Figure 3.13).This plotting takes place against a segmentation of the
environment. The task of management is then to invest in promising activities and to divest the
less promising activities. In one well-known model proposed by the consultants of the Boston
Consulting Group, the individual businesses are first defined according to their market
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segmentation and then subsequently ranked into four categories: those in which the firm has a
strong position in promising markets (the “stars”), those in which the firm has a strong position
in mature markets (the “cows”, or “cash cows”), those in which the company is strong in weak
markets (the “dogs”) and finally those in which the company is weak in emerging markets (the
“question marks”). The stage is thus set for strategic action in which resources are withdrawn
from the less attractive and promising “dogs” and “cash cows”, and are reallocated to the “”stars”
and, to some extent, the “question marks”. The following figure may serve to illustrate this
approach.
Figure 3.13: BCG matrix
Traditionally, the way in which portfolio strategy was executed by the leadership was by
acquiring or divesting businesses – an SBA (strategic business area served by a strategic business
unit) being characterized in terms of growth and profitability prospects, key competitive success
factors, and expected (economic, technological, and socio-political) turbulence (Ansoff, 1984: 69).
Business and market portfolio management owes much of its conceptual underpinnings to the
work of the major consultancy firms such as McKinsey,The Boston Consulting Group and Arthur
D. Little in the 1960s. Each of these firms developed ideas on how the markets and businesses of a
firm should be segmented,and how these segments can be ranked against each other – for which
many criteria are available. External criteria include (among others) market positions or market
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share, growth and competitive intensity. Examples of internal criteria are relative size and
growth, asset utilization and profitability, using various definitions. The leadership of the firm
was able to use these techniques and formulate their own top-down course of action.
A portfolio can also be defined as a series of activities within a delivery chain from raw
materials and manpower to final consumers, which leads to a very different kind of analysis.The
basic unit of competitive advantage is then the discrete activity in the delivery chain that creates
buyer value and hence differentiation, and also determines the firm’s relative cost. The firm’s
strategy is manifested in the way in which it configures and links the many activities in its value
chain relative to its competitors. The value chain also distinguishes between activities that
directly produce, market and deliver the product and those that create or source inputs required,
and support activities. Discrete activities are part of an interdependent system of linkages in
which the cost or effectiveness of one activity can be affected by the way in which others are
performed. (Porter, 1980 and 1985).
The competence portfolio manager of a successful corporation seeks to use
competencies to drive the success of the firm both by improving the performance of its
individual units and by creating synergistic linkages between these units. Prahalad (1970) was
the first author who stressed the importance of the resource side of the business process with the
introduction of the concept “distinctive competence”.
A competence is an integration of skills at an aggregation level that is high enough to
permit analytical handling, and low enough to remain realistic (Prahalad & Hamel, 1994). As a
strategic concept, a competence makes sense only if it is distinctive (Selznick, 1957), increases a
firm’s ability to deliver key success factors in today’s industry (McGrath et al., 1994 & 1995), and
allows a firm to achieve a (future) purpose, preferably in a manner superior to that of its
competitors (Prahalad & Hamel, 1994). Looking through the resource lens, we can consider a
competence as the ability to sustain the coordinated deployment of assets in a way that helps the
firm achieve its goals, in which assets have to be defined in the broad sense, as anything tangible
or intangible the firm can use in its processes for erecting, producing or offering its products
and/or services to a market (Sanchez et al., 1996).
As stated above, only core competencies are worthy of strategic consideration, and the
epithet“core”is met by passing three criteria – for customer value,for competitive differentiation
and for extendibility into the future (Prahalad & Hamel, 1994). In this somewhat analytical and
not very dynamic view, the road of success for a corporation is thus to identify, acquire, build,
deploy and protect the right portfolio of core competencies.
Competencies can be categorized into three types: 1) market access competencies that
help a firm maintain close proximity to its customers (like the management of distribution and
logistics), 2) integrity-related competencies that allow a firm to do things more quickly or reliably
than its competitors (like just-in-time inventory management) and 3) functionality-related
competencies that enable a firm to invest in products and services with unique functionality and
distinctive customer benefits. To garner rents and survive, a firm must distinguish itself from its
competitors in one or more of these types of competencies (Prahalad & Hamel 1994).
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Technology portfolios are a precursor and subset of competencies in portfolio thinking, which
focuses on immediate product and process-related competencies. Since these competencies are
more narrowly defined, it often is easier to develop and manage a technology portfolio than a
broader competency portfolio. In designing and creating the right technology portfolio, firms
should consider technology maturity, competitive position, rewards and risks to determine how
much funding should be allocated to each research or development project. Moreover, if only
because of the narrower scope of technology management compared to competency
management, the leadership should ensure that their technology programs are in step with the
overall strategy of the firm (Roussel et al., 1991).
From the leadership perspective, impact and immediacy are the main advantages of
portfolio management in the directive approach. The major market turbulence that results in
the “amplitude” of change that a firm undergoes when passing through an inflection point
usually means that the old definitions of markets and the old segmentations no longer apply.
And when the new markets are defined, and their segments identified, the leadership will in
many instances find that its position in the resulting portfolio matrices (which presumably was
favorable or tenable) is no longer that attractive.
The main reason why the leadership of a firm seeks to adjust its portfolio(s) is to acquire
the resources and competencies needed to ensure survival in the new inflection point
environment. After all, this new environment will have new success factors, and new success
factors result from Schumpeterian new combinations of new resources and new competencies.
These can be acquired individually, or in an integrated fashion when a complete business is
purchased.
Once the leadership of the firm has decided what the composition of its portfolio of
elements should be, there basically are three ways for the leadership to acquire the necessary
resources, competencies etc. Acquisition of a firm that already possesses the sought-after
businesses, assets, resources or competencies is an action that often has substantial amplitude
(i.e., impact on the overall firm) and abruptness (speed of action), but usually requires an
integration process to link the new activities with the existing business – often a difficult process,
albeit well researched. Acquisition of a competency requires a similar effort, which explains why
it is only recommended for technologies that are basic to the new business,but which the firm for
some reason has been late in developing itself (Floyd, 1997). Notwithstanding these complica-
tions, a directive leadership is often tempted to rely on acquisition to achieve the necessary
adaptation because of their speed and potential impact, and because control of the transactions
is often easy for the limited manpower available, by definition, to a directive leader. The second
way for the leadership to acquire the necessary resources and competencies is through recruit-
ment of individuals with the necessary skills and experience. This approach has a similar result
and risk profile, albeit on a smaller scale.The third way, in-house development, calls for a vision of
the results that are to be achieved (e.g. the necessary capabilities), and of the resources
requirements (in most cases, people with the necessary skills, or know-how). Furthermore, a
process blueprint must be made of the work schedule. Given the need to involve local
management and staff and the effort needed to do so, this is a difficult approach for an
individual or a small group that encompasses a directive leadership, particularly in an
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organization of any complexity. In-house competence development is thus part of the
conditional leadership style, and is discussed below.
The process of developing a portfolio strategy, in essence, is the testing of the chosen
portfolio strategy against three decision rules of scope, coherence and diversity, from two
perspectives: the fit of each of the current portfolio elements with the three rules, and the fit of
possible new portfolio elements (the latter constituting of the new portfolio thrust of the firm)
(Ansoff, 1990).
The portfolio scope establishes the outer boundaries of the search for new elements, and
is typically defined in terms of size versus existing elements, geography, or market potential.
Portfolio coherence specifies the synergies of portfolio elements in three dimensions: functional,
strategic and management synergies.The first relates to the sharing of the productive resources,
competencies and other functions of the firm. Strategic synergies are identified when the
elements show (strong) overlap in their strategic targets. And management synergies occur
when there are commonalties and complementarities between the management requirements
of each of the targeted portfolio elements. Finally, portfolio diversity specifies the differences
that will be preserved among the portfolio elements; this, in particular, to spread risk and achieve
the right coverage of opportunities. This diversity can be sought in elements like geography,
socio-political climates and market maturities, as well as in each of the portfolio elements, such
as competencies and resources.
The major market turbulence that results in the “amplitude” of change that a firm
undergoes when passing through the inflection point usually means that the old definitions of
markets and the old segmentations no longer apply. When new markets are defined, and their
segments identified, the leadership will in many instances find that its position in the resulting
portfolio matrices, which presumably was favorable or tenable, is no longer that attractive. The
resulting portfolio may well have moved from a nice balance between strong positions in
developed markets (cash cows) combined with emerging activities in new arenas (stars), to
reflect a new imbalance with too many cash cows and even dogs, and not enough stars. In
portfolio theory the way forward is clear: back to redefinition and segmentation of markets,
eliminating the dogs, and investing in the stars of the newly defined markets.
Drawing the boundaries of the firm: In a world in which firms are increasingly
imbedded in complex sets of social, professional and exchange relationships, a viewpoint that
regards firms as atomistic actors competing for profits against each other in an impersonal
marketplace is increasingly inadequate. As the economic environments become sharply more
competitive, the firm’s network assumes enhanced strategic importance (Gulati et al.,2000),and
researchers realize that a firm’s critical resources may increasingly extend beyond its formal
boundaries (Dyer & Singh, 1998). Boundary questions thus relate directly to the core of strategy
(Volberda & Elfring, 2001). Chandler (1962) demonstrated the importance of the boundaries of
the firm.
These cross-boundary linkages form a broad range of modalities between the two
extremes of the integrated internal functions, on one hand, and the arms-length market
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relationship, on the other. The rich variety of cross-boundary linkages in which firms indulge
includes alliances, networking, outsourcing, franchising, licensing agreements, long-term
supplier contracts and joint ventures. Boundary theory addresses first of all the issue of which
activities should take place and which should be handled either within the firm or through
anonymous markets. It also addresses the question of which form of relationship is most suitable
to bridge the fuzzy boundary line between the firm and its environment (Foss, 2001). Due to the
variety of possible agreements nowadays, the boundaries of the firm may be hard to detect.
The issue of what constitutes a boundary is further complicated by the many theories
that together constitute the boundary school. This includes various manifestations of
transaction cost economics (which emphasizes static alignment (e.g., Williamson, 1985 and
1986)), the resource-dependency approach (which stresses power considerations (Pfeffer &
Salancik, 1987)), and capability and network-based approaches (which are discussed in this book
under their respective headings (Foss, 2001)). Boundary issues can thus be addressed and
resolved in many different ways through different perspectives in the social sciences. In fact,
research dealing with the boundary question is rooted in various disciplines varying from
economics to sociology and from psychology to history (Volberda & Elfring, 2001). Because of this
and other difficulties, the strategic implications of boundary thinking are not yet clear,
necessitating further analysis and consideration (Foss, 2001). Notwithstanding these complica-
tions, we see in the business world that cross-boundary relationships, which are based in
transactions and can capably be handled by a leadership short on time and expertise, are a
suitable tool for directive leadership.
Advantages and Disadvantages of the Directive Approach
The two main advantages of the directive leadership mode stem from the fact that the
formulation and the implementation initiatives of a strategy reside in the epicenter of the firm,
with one person or a small group. The chief executive or leader(s) of the firm wield considerable
power and are the only person(s) that formulate the strategy, with minimum interference from
or interaction with stakeholders within or outside the firm.
As result, the leadership can effectively and efficiently make and implement major
decisions that alter the strategy and destiny of the firm. These top-down actions can thus be
radical, major moves that have a fundamental impact. At a certain point in time in an inflection
point (with its major amplitude) there will be a need for such a response, which will exert a
countervailing major impact on the firm. A second advantage is speed.The process is more rapid
than a conditional or political process in which local managers and other stakeholders are
involved. When a firm is out of sync with the environment, speedy action may be crucial for its
survival.
A disadvantage of the directive approach is its high dependency on the qualities,
knowledge and dedication of the individual leader(s) in charge of the firm. In a world of
increasing complexity it is unlikely that the chief executive can monitor all the trends that take
place in an industry. Simon (1976) has introduced the notion of ‘bounded rationality’, which
means that an administrator or Chief Executive has limited reasoning, perception and
information-processing abilities.
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We have seen above that the directive approach is not very conducive to the transfer of
information from the field. Therefore, the leadership of the firm risks having to work in relative
isolation when it formulates the strategy or decides on certain courses of action on his own. It can
be argued that the leadership is at a disadvantage in making the decisions without the necessary
input of front-line management. After all, front-line managers have the best knowledge of the
market and are in the best position to comprehend these trends (Huy 2001).
In a top-down directive leadership style, front-line managers are not encouraged to
come forward with ideas for, or comments on, the strategic propositions made, which often leads
to motivational problems. When front-line managers sense that their ideas are completely
ignored, they feel discouraged, which can be counterproductive to local implementation of the
new strategy and can lead to resistance to change. Many firms have had difficulty with coercive
change programs due to the resistance of employees. Major change programs initiated by the
leadership of the firm may be socially disruptive, so that front-line management might want to
stick to the status quo.This problem can be overcome by building a broad management coalition,
which results in a shift of leadership approaches to the conditional style.
Another downside of this operating mode is that dynamic capabilities cannot easily be
developed at all levels of the firm, due to the restricted role of the local management. To create
firm-wide flexibility, all levels should be involved in the strategizing process.When major actions
are taken in order to pursue a certain direction, commitment is made.When front-line managers
who have ideas to improve the change program are not heard, the firm’s flexibility suffers.
Application of the Directive Leadership Approach
This chapter has reviewed and elaborated on the directive leadership style in an
inflection point. To be in any way effective, the directive approach has a number of contextual
requirements and limitations. We have seen that a key precondition to making productive
decisions regarding the firm and its units is a good knowledge base of the business details, result
of an effective knowledge-creation effort at the leadership level. A second condition is a relatively
low level of complexity of the arena in which strategic decisions are made and implemented.
Finally, since directive leadership in its essence disregards the views of local management, it has
an increased implementation risk due to lower level resistance – unless the urgency of action is
so high that all parties concerned understand and accept direct action by the leadership. The
directive approach is therefore more appropriate for urgent situations.
The impact of a directive leadership approach can be major, and is rapid, because no
layers of management are involved in the main lines of decision-making and implementation to
delay or compromise action. Since the leadership is responsible for the entire firm, it also usually
results in an adaptive strategy change, rather than a selective adjustment. There are few
organizational constraints to the choices the leadership has, and as result it has a maximum
number of strategic options that it can enact. Alignment and fit of the strategic actions with the
chosen direction is perfect.
This approach is well suited to when the firm is in trouble and quick and major
adjustment is called for, and when the leadership has gained enough understanding of the
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environmental situation to set the right general direction. Top-down decision-making has a
significant time advantage above the conditional and ecological approach. However, this also
implies a disadvantage, because local managers will feel ignored in the strategizing process,
which can lead to motivational problems and resistance to change. Figure 3.14 summarizes the
discussion.
Figure 3.14: Advantages, Disadvantages and Use of the Directive Approach
Advantages Disadvantages Best Application
Directive Concentrated decision- Lack of information from Major, firm-wide change
making the market place
No consensus required Motivation of Local Speed
management
Limited local involvement
Finally, we can now resolve the question regarding how an outside observer can identify
a directive behavior, in particular by referring to figure 3.12.The easily observed traits of directive
behavior fall into two categories: the kind of actions that the directive leader takes, and the
nature of communications with his local managers. Regarding the first point, we have seen that
large acquisitions and investments in not only equipment, but also knowledge and people, are a
clear signal of directive behavior, since it is under most circumstances difficult if not impossible
to obtain full consensus and support from a large group of people on these sweeping moves.The
limited, one-way nature of (vertical) communication is another indicator of directive behavior.
Orders and information must be passed down from the leadership to the local managers, if only
to enable implementation of decisions taken. But we observe relatively few, short meetings with
a specific agenda, in which these messages are conveyed only to the limited number of local
managers that need to act on the commands given.
3.7: The Conditional Approach
Introduction
This section describes the conditional leadership style and discusses under which
circumstances it is effective.This introduction is followed by the theoretical grounding. Manage-
rial anchoring points are subsequently discussed, followed by the important tools for
practitioners and the advantages and disadvantages of the conditional approach. The chapter
finishes with an indication of its main applications.
The conditional approach is an incremental style in which the leadership influences
strategy by setting ex-ante strategic targets, and providing the structural and capability context
to local management, who have ample leeway to decide upon and implement the details of the
strategic course. Since the leadership thus not only provides the general strategic direction, but
also has a wide range of contextual tools (like organizational and process architecture,
information, measurement and remuneration systems) at its disposal to control progress
towards its stated objectives, it has ample power, even though the specific details of strategy
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implementation may vary from its intentions (Bower, 1970). The conditional approach bridges
the belief in independent internal evolution of an organization,and the belief that this evolution
can be impacted by the leadership (Baaij & Commandeur, 1997) 
The conditional approach is suited to complex environments in which it is difficult for
the leadership to monitor and comprehend local business details. Managers at the operating
levels of the organization are closer to the fire and have more information about the heading of
an industry (Chakravathy & Lorange, 1991). It has been shown that successful strategic initiatives
often stem from individuals that champion opportunities (Bower, 1970; Carter, 1971) The
conditional leadership style has a differentiated profile when contrasted against the directive
and ecological approaches. Compared to directional leadership, it does not rely on self-
implemented strategic actions, but rather on indirect tools that depend on a relatively high level
of delegation of local powers. Local management thus has a real influence and role in
formulating and executing the specifics of the new strategy. Compared to the ecological
approach, the leadership has an important “ex-ante”role, as well as powerful tools at its disposal
to set the overall direction and to control progress in that direction. The ecological leader, on the
other hand, who can do little else except register the results ex-post and take his measures in the
next round of investment decisions, must therefore leave the entire task of strategy formulation
and implementation to local management.
In its operation, the conditional approach differentiates itself in particular by its reliance
on structure, processes and detailed target setting. By virtue of strong delegation to the local
management, it also enables local learning, as well as speedy and flexible responses at the local
level. Enabling and encouraging the development of local capabilities and competences is thus
an important element of conditional leadership.
The Theoretical Grounding of the Conditional Approach
The conditional approach is grounded in the belief that new ways of doing business that
are an essential element of an inflection point, and that a firm’s success is highly contingent on
the ability of the firm to invent, or rapidly apply, new forms of organization and management
(Miles & Snow, 1986). Internally, the conditional approach is grounded in the Bower process
model of strategy realization that depicts multiple, simultaneous, interlocking, and sequential
managerial activities over three levels of organizational hierarchy – the top leadership, and local
management at the middle and bottom levels.
The leadership sets conditions in the conditional approach under which the local management
has to operate. This behavior combines elements of two somewhat overlapping leadership
models that were identified by Bourgeois and Brodwin (1984): the change model (which uses
structure and staffing to reset the firm’s priorities) and the collaborative model (in which the
leadership relies on group dynamics to reach consensus). The latter model includes redesign of
planning, performance measurement and compensation policies, as well as the use of cultural
adaptation techniques.The leadership of the firm thus gives up a modicum of immediate power
and relaxes its own position in order to stimulate “vertical”strategic initiatives at all levels of the
organization. In this approach, strategic management is about finding the right balance in
permitting autonomous strategic behavior at the local level, resulting in what Bates (1977) has
labeled the ‘president’s paradox’ of control for the leadership.
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Conditional leadership typically relies heavily on formal and informal processes to achieve
strategic change. From the first impulse to change to realized turnaround, many steps can be
identified (Quinn, 1978), including:
1) an analysis by different line and staff groups of the strengths, weaknesses, competencies
and problems of the organization,
2) projections of current sales, profits and investment needs,
3) an analysis of selected external movements and opponents’ actions for opportunities
and threats,
4) establishing broad goals as targets for local management’s plans,
5) identification of gaps between expected and desired results,
6) communicating planning assumptions to local management,
7) requesting plans from local managers for their specific local goals, resource needs and
supporting action plans,
8) as needed, studies of alternatives, contingencies or long-term opportunities,
9) review and approval of local plans, and summing these for corporate needs,
10) developing long-term budgets, presumably related to these plans,
11) implementing plans 
12) monitoring and evaluating performance, presumably against plans, but usually against
budgets.
In an inflection point, conditional leadership must rely on the entrepreneurial forces at
the local levels to realize the major changes needed.We can identify five types of entrepreneurial
forces that need to be developed and nurtured: 1) pro-activeness of the units, which points to
both a willingness to explore unknown paths as well as a willingness to borrow from others, 2)
ambition beyond current capabilities, which drives capabilities and leads to attempts to develop
necessary new competencies, 3) team orientation, which in the horizontal sense between units
supports creativity and knowledge transfer, and in the vertical sense enables rapid, effective
decision-making, 4) the capability to resolve dilemmas, which in itself is derived from a combina-
tion of creativity and entrepreneurial drive, and 5) individual and team learning capability
(Stopford & Baden Fuller, 1994).
Conditional leadership in larger organizations requires structures that can easily result
in complexity and convoluted processes, involving organization forms such as matrices,
networks, and different levels of delegation. A particular challenge is the building of capabilities
and the realization of an integrated strategy within a complex structure; we thus see the
emergence of combinations of complex structures and internal venturing in the form of “M”
structures (Bartlett & Goshal, 1993).
The Conditional Approach and the Managerial Anchoring Points
The preceding section elaborated on the five main clusters of anchor points, namely (1)
leadership; (2) content: strategy development; (3) context: environment; (4) management &
organizational structure and processes and (5) performance & accountability for the directive
approach.This section will do the same for the conditional approach.
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(1) Leadership
In the conditional approach, the leadership of the firm sets out ‘strategic’and ‘structural’
context determination processes, which comprise the corporate context in which internal
corporate venturing (ICV) and strategic initiatives can take place (Burgelman, 1983). These ICV
projects represent strategic initiatives that originate at the bottom of the organization within a
strategic and structural context. Burgelman (1983) sees ‘ structural context’ as the various
organizational and administrative mechanisms that are enforced by the corporate management
to implement the current corporate strategy. Bower (1970) calls this ‘structural context’ the
reflection of corporate objectives with which the leadership of the firm can manipulate the
context in which the local management have to make decisions and actions. This ‘structural
context’ influences the organization in many ways, and examples include measurement and
information systems, and reward and punishment systems. Although in most organizations the
leadership sets certain conditions by which the front-line managers have to play (such as, for
example, accounting rules), these conditions form the backbone of the firm’s governance in this
approach, and are thus more numerous and more explicit.
In this model, the context is actively established by the leadership,but local management
retains a certain degree of freedom. There is room for strategic initiative, although local
managers have to meet the criteria that have been set by the leadership. The role of the CEO is
‘premise-setter and judge’(Bourgeois & Brodwin,1984).This can be depicted as a U-turn,because
the leadership first sets top-down certain conditions, which are then followed by bottom-up
strategic initiatives that fit in the provided context (Figure 3.15).
Figure 3.15: U-turn Management
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Conditions
• Targets
• Policies
• Structure
• Processes
Actions
Leadership
Local Management
Implementation
Operating Plans
Accountability
• Reporting
• Remuneration
In the conditional style, the leadership has three ways to control the strategic process: (1) by
emphasizing a particular theme or strategic thrust; (2) by endorsing the planning methodology,
which also shapes premises like the product-portfolio approach and (3) by establishing the
structure, which will influence the kind of strategies proposed. The level of control chosen is
important in the conditional approach,since it influences the freedom of the local management.
(Bourgeois & Brodwin, 1984)
In the conditional approach the local management has more substantially strategic
freedom that in the directive leadership model, but less than in the ecological approach. Within
the overall strategic thrust, local strategic initiatives can emerge from managerial activities of
front-line managers. This delegation model can be extended to one in which top management
creates a strategic context for nurturing and selecting promising renewal initiatives – for
example, by ensuring the maximum incentives for local management, described by Volberda et
al. (2001) as a facilitated renewal journey. The result is an internal corporate venturing climate
that acts as the motor of corporate entrepreneurship through multiple autonomous strategic
initiatives of individuals at the operational levels in the organization (Burgelman, 1983). Local
management is stimulated to entrepreneurship within an internal context created by the
leadership (Bartlett & Goshal 1993). Despite the strong influence of the conditions set by the
leadership, local management often has enough freedom to develop independent strategic
initiatives that are not in line with this context.
The entrepreneurship of the local management thus tends to be high in this approach,
because it has a lot of freedom in choosing a specific local strategic direction. However, local
management is not totally free in its chosen direction, due to the context that has been set by the
leadership of the firm. Top managers exercise a critical influence on the strategic initiatives of
lower-level managers by establishing the context in which these managers make decisions and
take actions (Bower, 1970). Local strategic initiatives will show new features, but will have
common traits with the conditions set across the firm by the leadership.
(2) Content: Strategy Development
The speed of adjustment in the conditional approach is lower than in the directive
approach,due to the more intensive and elaborate communication between leadership and local
management. As we saw in the first part of this paragraph, the leadership has to provide context,
and the local management champions have to communicate upwards both local specifics and
strategic ideas. There are a many processes involved in this U-turn leadership style (Burgelman
1983; Noda & Bower 1996). Together, these processes take up a lot of time and will therefore
hamper the speed of the change. In industries experiencing major shifts, the time needed for
assimilating, summarizing and passing information up and down the chain of command is
often so long that timely adjustments are no longer possible (Bourgeois & Brodwin, 1984).
These delays are not only a matter of top-down communications. There also will be debate
between the different levels of the hierarchy on whether certain initiatives are consistent with
the firm’s overreaching mission and strategy, and this again takes time. The conditional
approach is thus incremental in nature, and it is difficult to make major changes in the business
portfolio, if only because it is nearly impossible to secure the involvement of the local business
unit management in a timely fashion.
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Capability development depends, to a high degree,on the motivation and skills of the individuals
that acquire the new capacities, and the leadership has only limited means to impose capability
development within a delegated framework in which it alone sets the context. In doing so, the
leadership also has to maintain a balance between imposing “hard” planning (reporting and
accountability processes), and stimulating an appropriate culture and values (the “soft” side of
the business) (Londen, 1998). Front-line management will be well aware of this context, and will
try to play by these rules in order to make the new business ideas or adaptations successful. But,
as result, the firm-wide consistency of capability development in the conditional approach will
be moderate.
Due to the enabling and facilitative management style, consistency tends to be moderate to
high. Capabilities developed locally will end up being moderately congruent with the firm-wide
context that is set by the leadership.
(3) Context: Environment
In the conditional approach, the scope for alignment and fit of a strategy against the
environment of the firm is moderate, with only a limited number of strategic options, because
the leadership of the firm is dependent on the capabilities and motivation of the local
management to detail and implement the general strategic directions that they have indicated.
As we have seen, local management has a relatively high degree of freedom within an overall
direction set by the leadership. In a case analysis of Intel, Burgelman (1994) proposed that firms
whose internal selection criteria accurately reflect external selection pressures are more likely to
strategically exit unattractive businesses than firms whose internal selection criteria do not
accurately reflect external selection criteria. When a certain business unit has lost its
significance to the firm because an inflection point has swept across the industry, it usually is
local management that notices first. If the leadership uses appropriate internal selection
mechanisms, this message will be rapidly transmitted along predefined pathways to the upper
echelons of the organization. But when the message does not fit any of the predetermined
mechanisms, it will have to pass along informal channels, and the leadership will be ill prepared
to react to an entirely novel event. The scope for alignment and fit thus depends on the
congruence between the internal selection mechanism and current corporate strategy. In
general terms, the context that is set by the leadership and the ‘retrospective sense making’
(Burgelman, 1983) has a decreasing effect on the scope of alignment and fit.
(4) Management of structure and processes
As we saw earlier in the chapter, the conditional approach matches the middle-up-down
management style as proposed by Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995). In this style, the leadership
stimulates the organization in the knowledge-creation process by providing the necessary
conditions. In the middle-up-down model, top management provides ‘visions for direction,’ as
well as the deadline by which the visions should be realized (Nonaka, 1994). Local management
deals with the day-to-day reality of the operations and must decide which important ideas and
insights can be drawn and then articulated to the leadership. Knowledge is created by self-
organizing teams,but within the context put forward by the leadership. A conditional leadership
style is also capable of creating and operating relatively complex management structures (like
the matrix form), which has a positive impact on the ability of the organization to absorb (new)
knowledge (Bosch et al., 1999).
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The gap that exists between the vision of the leadership and the reality of day-to-day operations
at the local level is the main focus of the knowledge-creation and integration process. In the
middle-up-down management style, the primary managerial challenge is to overcome this gap
and strive for an accelerating information and knowledge creation (Nonaka 1994). In the
conditional approach, the whole organization participates in the knowledge creation process,
which can be managed by self-organizing teams. In the thus created “facilitated renewal
journey,” the potential for learning across business units of the firm can be quite high (Volberda
et al., 2001). We may therefore conclude that knowledge creation and integration is high in the
conditional approach.
In the conditional mode, the necessity to create a context of targets, structure and processes
results in complexity. The strategy proper, in a conditional mode, is the result of definition,
impetus, and championing by a group of people at both the leadership and local management
levels in which the local management has a considerable degree of freedom (Volberda et al.,
2001). The resulting group process – coined the Bower process model of strategy making –
consists of multiple, simultaneous, interlocking, and sequential managerial activities (Noda &
Bower, 1994).
Unsurprisingly, this mode of strategy building and realization is by far the most
cumbersome and time-consuming for the leadership to handle, compared to the other two
approaches. The leaders must set down well-formulated guidelines, and constantly monitor the
gap between its guidelines and the current state of affairs at the operating levels. The required
reporting and information processes are difficult to manage.And,finally,all these activities must
take place simultaneously, resulting in a complex process.
(5) Performance & Accountability 
Accountability in the conditional approach is specific, and mostly ex-ante, because front-
line managers get detailed goals that must be achieved before starting on strategy
implementation. The leadership subsequently holds the local managers responsible for the
implementation of strategies and good results.
In the conditional world, exercising accountability is a continuous and intensive process,
with the emphasis up-front. Since the firm’s leadership provides and controls direction, and the
local management acts, there is a stream of reports and feedback going up and down the
hierarchical chain. In the backbone process, we can identify three main management processes:
target setting, the monitoring and review process, and the accountability process. In the
conditional approach there are multiple targets relating to market, operational and other
performance areas that are set at least annually, and sometimes updated quarterly. In a more
formal listing, there are four major areas in which performance can be targeted and
benchmarked: 1) financial, 2) customer-related, 3) business process-related and 4) learning and
growth (Kaplan & Norton 1996). Targets can be set for a year, but also quarterly, monthly or even
weekly. At times, they may even be set for multi-year periods. Monitoring (the arms-length
tracking of performance) and review (the discussion between supervisor and manager of
performance against stated targets) again have a fixed schedule in a conditional framework –
monthly, sometimes quarterly, and even weekly. At least yearly, sometimes semi-annually, this
ends with an accountability action in which there are a number of main options: continuation or
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termination of the relationship, continuation of title and position or promotion/demotion,
maintenance or increase of base salary, the amount of variable compensation and the fringe-
benefit package. Accountability can relate to a single individual or to a group of individuals.
Tools for Practitioners in the Conditional Approach
The preceding sections explained how the structure and processes are essential tools in this
leadership approach. Another important tool of the conditional mode is company-wide learning.
Choosing the Right Structure: Structure has always been considered an important
element of strategic change, of which the inflection point is a subset. In strategic thinking,
structure is usually considered to be one of the main levers to effectuate a strategy once it has
been developed (Chandler, 1961). However, one can also state inversely that structure permits
new strategies to be pursued, and that way the firm does business is contingent on the way the
firm is organized (Miles & Snow, 1986).
Structure can be defined as the rules that define the interrelationships of individuals or
units within a firm. These relationships can be hierarchical, advisory, supportive, or informative.
The differentiation between a structure of individuals versus a structure of units is important,
because the nature of relations between individuals differs from the nature of linkages between
units: the first tend to be more informal and flexible, the latter more formalized and rigid – if only
due to the number of people who have to understand, accept and work within the relationship.
An integrative vision of structure vs. strategy, which is developed hand-in-hand, leads to
the conclusion that various strategic postures invariably lead to their own structural positioning.
For example, it has been determined that “defender” companies, which have reactive strategies
often in mature markets, tend to rely heavily on functional organization structures. Companies
that have aggressive entrepreneurial strategies – “prospectors” – tend to thrive by using more
flexible structures, such as autonomous work groups or product divisions in which planning and
control are highly decentralized.Companies in relatively mature but competitive and fluctuating
markets end up as “analyzers,” who often employ a “mixed” structure, such as a matrix wherein
project, program or brand managers act as integrators between resource groups and program
units (Miles & Snow, 1986).
Structure is an important factor in determining the survival chances of a firm in an
inflection point because it defines to a large extent the immediate control that the leadership
has in the behavior of the firm, the degree of leeway that the operating units have in formulating
their own responses, and the formal support that operational and functional units can provide
to each other. It has been claimed that major competitive breakthroughs have been achieved by
firms that invented, or were quick to apply, new forms of organization and management
structures (Miles & Snow, 1986).
This is particularly relevant for firms in an inflection point, because of the lack of time
available to fill in gaps in the functioning of the organization through informal, ad-hoc
measures, and because the severity and complexity of the required adjustments can be realized
by the leadership only if the lines of command are clear.
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Structure has many linkages with the other functions of the firm. A complete restructuring
invariably touches upon areas like information technology, performance measurement, human
resources, resource allocation, knowledge management, project tasking and competency
management (Nolan & Croson, 1995).When the leadership orders a redefinition of structure (i.e.,
a redefinition of the interrelationships between individuals or units), it creates a condition for
these individuals or units to behave in a different way, thus opening the avenue to adjusted
behavior of the firm as a whole in face of the inflection point. As such,structural adjustment is an
important conditional tool.
Structure is inherently static, in that it defines interrelationships,but it does not describe
how the individuals and units of the firm actually work together to perform the tasks that make
the firm function. The latter are described in processes. This is one of the reasons why formal,
explicit structure descriptions and instructions can never describe all the details and
peculiarities of individual or unit relationships. They are therefore always supplemented and
reinforced by informal, unwritten structural rules, which can to some extent be imposed, but in
the majority of cases are developed by the individuals or groups of individuals who are the actual
participants within the structure.
A well thought-through structural adjustment as a means of adapting an organization
for an inflection point has the major advantage of directness and speed:from one day to another,
people are confronted with, and can start working in, a new set of interrelationship rules. The
quality of the restructuring, i.e., the degree to which it meets the expectations of the leadership,
is to a remarkably high degree predictable and controllable, compared to other inflection point
approaches. And if the understanding of the leadership of the inflection point environment and
its needs have been read correctly, the same can be said of the impact on the performance of the
firm.
Most restructuring efforts are to some extent imposed,and also involve a change in work
rules and habits that most individuals in the firm have usually have come to experience as
“comfortable”. Part of the “comfort” is derived from the support that the informal structure
provides to the formal rules.When the formal structure is changed, the participants usually have
to develop the necessary informal (sub) rules that bridge the gaps found in daily usage of the
formal rules. The development of the informal structure takes time and effort for parties to
conceive, negotiate and implement their ad-hoc arrangements. The result of this is, in many
organizations, a lack of motivation or resistance to structural change. This resistance to change
will have a negative effect on the speed with which the people in the organization start
conforming to the new structure.
Although restructuring in the narrow sense – between individuals – has lost some of its
popularity as a tool on its own, it remains the core of most inflection point strategies, in
combination with process redesign and other inflection point approaches. Restructuring
between units, often linked with a portfolio review, continues to increase in importance. We can
also see a new interest in trying new and often paradoxical organization forms designed for
flexibility and knowledge creation, forms that are crucial for organizational survival in the hyper
competitive markets that characterize inflection points (Ilinitch et al., 1996).
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Installation of Processes: Processes are the schedules that firms follow when they work to serve
their stakeholders demands. In particular, they define the way in which the execution of tasks is
shared between individuals or units, or passed on from one individual or unit to the next.
Processes link the different units of organization structure to each other: as soon as a task is
performed by a unit and passed on to the next within or outside the firm, a process takes place.
Processes have been identified as the key building blocks for the creation of competencies and a
continuous flow of innovations (Deschamps, 1995).
Processes can be formally described, or informal. When the leadership prescribes
processes, they do so by issuing a specific instruction, e.g., through a written document. These
formal process descriptions are rarely complete, in the sense of describing every action in minute
detail. The resulting gaps are filled by informal, unwritten processes developed through
intuition, experience, and agreement between the parties concerned with the execution of the
process (Scott Morgan, 1994). Thus, in providing the process, the leader creates conditions under
which the people who actually operate can and will develop their own work style.
We can illustrate this by a simple case study of the weekly timesheet, a listing of all hours worked
on each task that the leadership of a global professional firm requires all of its members to
submit to the control department, each Friday morning, with their (electronic) signatures
attached. This policy procedure has lead to the following types of actual behavior in different
countries:
• In Germany, all the sheets were filled out by the team leaders at the beginning of each 3-
6 month project without any staff involvement, and mailed out one-by-one every week.
• In Brazil, the sheets were completed by the administration, based on projections
provided by staff on a monthly basis, and sent out to staff for signature.
• In the UK, the sheets were filled out at the beginning of the week by the team leaders and
sent down for signature by the individual staff members.
• In the US, staff members were requested by their local managers to submit their signed
sheets two days early for verification and correction by local administration.
• In France, there was an office-wide panic each Friday morning as individual staff
members took time off from their ongoing assignments to fill in the sheets at the last
moment, with the administration riding herd on the laggards.
This interpretation of the policy through informal processes at the local levels leads to
significant differences in revenue recognition (an accounting issue) and to variances in the
quality of information that the leadership received.
Processes are important for inflection point management, first of all because they make an
organization and its structure function. Without processes, individual tasks would not be
assigned from above, would not be shared or passed on between individuals or units, and there
effect would not be measured and accounted for. For the leadership, processes are crucial, in the
sense that it is through processes that leadership can exert its influence beyond its direct reports.
Finally,one should realize that processes stand at the basis of all new developments.They govern,
among other things, competence creation, portfolio readjustment, and most of the innovation.
86
Structure and processes are inexorably linked to each other. Redefinition of an organization can be
accomplished by restructuring, as has been described in the preceding chapter, in which case the
processes have to adjust, through positive action or intuitive reaction to the new structure.
Redefinition can, on the other hand, also be realized through process adjustment, which invariably
means that position descriptions and therefore structure must also be reviewed and changed.
Process adjustment may well be the most immediate way in which the leadership can
change the behavior of individuals or units in the firm, and should therefore be a serious
candidate for any inflection point package. Process adjustment, however, cannot stand on its
own. Process adjustment shares the disadvantage of restructuring, in that it often triggers
resistance in the organization: after all, the “set ways” of people are but a romantic notion of the
formal and informal processes that they follow. Process readjustment also shares the backward-
looking characteristic with structure, leading to a risk of inflexibility in view of the rapid changes
of the inflection point.
The most radical and all-encompassing form of corporate redirection through processes has
been coined Business Process Redesign, which can be defined as “the fundamental rethinking
and radical redesign of business processes to achieve dramatic improvements in critical
contemporary measures of performance such as cost, quality, service and speed” (Hammer &
Champy,1993) Business Process Engineering was an important,albeit incomplete and potentially
distracting step towards creative redefinition of the hierarchy. However, it does not:
• address the network organization
• deal with the dichotomy between the stabilizing function of the organization infra-
structure and the flexibility and responsiveness afforded by networks
• specify endpoints or overall objectives beyond “order of magnitude improvements
(Nolan & Croson, 1995).
Although one can perceive an element of backlash against process redesign as a means
to adapt the firm to major change (after the disappointments experienced with re-engineering),
the central role of process adjustment as a means to change the posture of an organization can
be expected to remain undiminished. With the increasing emphasis on networks as opposed to
direct hierarchy, it is likely that processes between (independent) units rather than individuals
will be increasingly interesting.
Learning: As we have seen, learning and the creation and integration of knowledge are
important elements of the conditional approach. Learning is the capability of an organization to
adapt its constituent elements – such as capabilities, knowledge, culture, structure, processes
etc. – in response to internal or external stimuli, the latter including inflection points. Learning
can be differentiated into generative learning, which is about creating, and adaptive learning,
which is about coping (Senge, 1990: 40). Knowledge can be defined as the set of beliefs that an
individual holds about causal relationships among the phenomena that he/she observes
(Sanchez, et al., 1996:9). Knowledge can therefore be heavily influenced by the conditional
structures within which the individual operates.
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An inflection point transition involves complex change, which is enabled through learning. This
learning can be the result of one of the other tools discussed, or it can be initiated as a means to
change on its own. According to many management researchers, complex and rapid changes like
inflection points can best be managed as incremental, goal-oriented interactive learning
processes. (Quinn, 1985: 207). The most effective strategies of major enterprises tend to emerge
step-by-step from an iterative learning process in which the different layers of the organization
probe the future, experiment, and learn from a series of partial (incremental) engagements
rather than through global formulations of total strategies. Good managers are aware of this
process, and they conscientiously intervene in it (Hrebiniak & Joyce, 1984).
There is no single set of methods that builds learning capability, and the leader must
therefore rely on a mix of different tools. A pragmatic approach to improving the learning ability
of organizations is offered by Peter Senge in The Fifth Discipline (1990). Senge’s point of
departure is the observation that prolonged exposure to a defined business environment
immerses management and staff in a “mental model” that may impede sensitivity to changes in
the environment as well as an organizational ability to change. Senge offers five disciplines to
help a firm become a truly learning organization – mastery, visioning, scenario analysis, systems
analysis, and team dynamics.These tools do not portend to change the boundaries and structure
of an organization, and also do not offer specific tools to motivate people, except that learning
processes themselves often are impressive motivators.
After reviewing the five disciplines described above, one is left with an uneasy feeling
regarding the comprehensiveness of these five tools (is there a sixth?), and about ways to
implement a learning organization. These questions are to some extent covered by the five
disciplines of Senge, and the use of unwritten values and processes, the “unwritten rules of the
game” as object of analysis and, subsequently, as lever to change (Scott Morgan, 1994). One can
change these unwritten rules and stimulate learning by considering the triangle of personal
motivators, triggers and enablers (Figure 3.16). As such, this provides an analytical way of
“mobilizing the masses” for a major change process, and therefore provides a foundation stone
for successfully making an organization learn. The almost engineering-like approach to
changing the rules is a strength and also a scope delimiter of Scott-Morgan’s’ approach. In his
world, enablers feed the motivation of organization members, who receive this “compensation”
by setting off triggers.Therefore, if the firm no longer performs (e.g., after an inflection point has
fundamentally changed the business), one has but to change either enablers or triggers or, if
possible, motivators, to meet the new situation (Scott-Morgan, 1994). Boundaries, structure and
processes are beyond the scope of his analysis.
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Figure 3.16: Mechanism of Unwritten Rules of the Game 
(Scott-Morgan et. al., 1994)
A third approach to stimulating self-learning follows more explicit (“written”) processes.
Typically, these process steps could be to:
• develop new perspectives on the meaning of control: learning in a group is a form of
control that managers do not normally recognize as such
• design the use of power
• encourage self-organizing groups. A group will self-organize only if it discovers its own
challenges, goals and objectives,
• present ambitious challenges instead of clear long-term objectives or visions
• expose the business to challenging situations: Managers who avoid taking chances face
the certainty of stagnation and therefore the high probability of collapse in the long
term.
• devote explicit attention to improving group learning skills
• create resource slack (Stacey, 1993:99).
Organizational learning is the one approach that fully mobilizes the talents, experience
and motivation of the individual staff members to realize the changes made necessary by the
inflection point. Apart from assuring full utilization of the capabilities of the firm, it also
minimizes the risk of resistance to change. Learning is highly flexible, and once an organization
is in learning mode, it needs very little direction from above.
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Motivators
e.g. career advancement
Enabler
e.g. supervisor
Triggers
e.g. profit reports
This also points to a disadvantage of a learning organization approach: the outcome cannot be
controlled by the leadership, and may be unpredictable. Attempts to steer a learning process and
its conclusions, once they are launched, invariably lead to demotivation and stagnation.
A second disadvantage of learning models is the effort needed to make them work,which
means that learning can take place only in an organization with the necessary organizational
slack to absorb the cost of installing and maintaining the learning effort. One study claims that
only companies like Hewlett Packard, IBM, Matsushita and Intel had the growth that enabled
them to afford these techniques (Bourgeois & Brodwin, 1984).
The same effort to make them work gives rise to a third disadvantage, the risk of
organization fatigue. When unwritten rules shift, the culture is disrupted – by a misfit or an
overload – and people are forced into a series of learning experiences. By misfit, we mean a shift
in the unwritten rules: if a new pattern of unwritten rules emerges that does not satisfy personal
goals, we experience it as motivational misfit. If the new patterns of unwritten rules do not fit
with the existing pattern of the status quo, people find themselves in a conflictual misfit (Scott-
Morgan et al., 2000:186). Also, if many aspects of a firm’s learning environment change simulta-
neously, the ability to ascertain cause-effect relationships is confounded because cognitive
structures will not be formed and, hence, rates of learning diminish (Teece et al., 1997:167). The
result of these complications is cumulative change fatigue (Scott-Morgan et al., 2000).
As a final conclusion, one could state that any major change in an organization requires
adaptation of all the constituent elements, including the informal,undocumented and therefore
largely unmanageable elements. A conscientious attempt to improve the learning ability of the
organization is therefore almost a necessity for the leadership of a firm passing through an
inflection point. Because of effort and time requirements, as well as the need for organizational
resource “slack”, a learning approach is less effective when time and resources are short.
Advantages and Disadvantages of the Conditional Approach
One of the main advantages of the conditional approach is that it enables the leadership
to leverage the experience, know-how and energy of local management, and reduces the
demands on its information, insights, and time. In today’s highly complex and dynamic business
environment, the executive will usually find that it lacks the data, cognitive powers and time to
monitor all the important day-to-day activities and trends, to fully understand them, and
autonomously take all the actions needed to correct strategic misalignment (Simon, 1946). The
conditional approach delegates a level of freedom to local management to use its own
information and capabilities to develop and implement strategy at its own levels, within bounds
set by the leadership. The motivational problem that we have seen in the directive leadership
mode will disappear, due to the empowerment of the local management.
One of the main disadvantages is that the process of empowerment causes a slow-down in
decision-making. As seen in the previous section, organizations that use this leadership mode
tend to have complex processes. In this mode there is a need for more explanation of the strategy
to lower levels, and there will be more debate whether a certain strategy will be fruitful. This
comes at the cost of reaction speed.The reaction time versus the awareness time of the problem
is larger than in the directive mode. In a highly dynamic environment this can be costly for a firm,
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because they will be too late with the initiation of a good strategic direction.This empowerment
is rooted in the structural context, as observed by Burgelman (1994) at Intel. An important
cultural element of Intel’s structural context was the tradition of encouraging open debate about
the business merit of different strategic initiatives, constructive conversation (Jelinek and
Schoonhoven, 1990), and the rule that knowledge power should not be overwhelmed by
hierarchical position power (Grove, 1983). Since more layers are involved in strategizing, there
also is a risk of misalignment of local initiatives with the firm’s overall vision.
The lack of direct control of top management over the organization makes it difficult for
the multi-unit firm to engage in any large-scale developments that require central coordination
or synergy across units (Volberda et al.,2001). But this strategy model also enables the emergence
of knowledge-intensive teams of entrepreneurs, which should provide some compensation.
The strategic initiatives that take place in this leadership style revolve around the CEO’s
ability to define organization purposes broadly enough to encourage innovation, to select
judiciously from among those projects or strategy alternatives that reach his attention
(Bourgeois & Brodwin, 1984) and to impose an appropriate set of controls to make sure the local
initiatives remain aligned with the overall purpose. “Definition” can be seen as the process by
which the basic technical and economic characteristics of a proposed investment project are
determined (Bower, 1970).Too broad a definition can be counter-productive and might lead to an
unproductive diversity of strategic proposals (Bower, 1970). On the other hand, an excessively
narrow definition will lead to the elimination of initiatives because front-line managers are
afraid that their ideas will have a limited probability of approval (Carter, 1971). In the conditional
mode it is difficult for the leadership to choose the appropriate level of conditions, which leads to
loss in decision speed, which is not desirable. Bower (1970) demonstrated that some firms were
not able to transform themselves because the leadership of the firm established a context that
gave no room for new strategic initiatives unless they were in line with the conditions.
Another disadvantage is the increase of complexity in the conditional approach. In this
leadership style, many processes have to be managed at the same time (Bower, 1970; Burgelman,
1983 & 1994). The leadership sets the context, and local management comes with new business
ideas that might be in contrast with this context. The leadership acts as judge and must decide
whether the new signaled trend justifies a change in the strategic context. As we have seen, this
can be a time consuming process, and complex to manage.
Applications of the Conditional Approach
This chapter has elaborated on the conditional approach when a firm is faced with an
inflection point. If the leadership opts for a conditional approach, it means that the capabilities,
knowledge and support need to be present at the local management level, which are the
conditions necessary to make and implement the many decisions needed to execute the overall
leadership vision in the field. The leadership needs to have enough understanding of the
environment to be able to set an overall course for the firm. Furthermore, knowledge and
capabilities of a more supervisory nature are also needed at the leadership level.These important
conditions cannot be instantly created as soon as the inflection point occurs: time is needed to
understand what is going on and to determine the general direction. And time is needed to
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involve local management for the decision-making and implementation work that is expected
from them. This context in which local management works, involving both procedures and
structures to guide local decision-making as well as targets and accountability provided from
above, also means that the level of complexity of the organization ends up being relatively high.
Conditional leadership approaches, based on the capabilities, know-how and support of
local management, may take somewhat longer to enact, but do result in complete and effective
development and implementation at the local level. Because of the more important role played
by local managers, their limitations in capability, know-how and support may limit the number
of strategic options available to the leadership; within these options, however, alignment with
the leadership’s intent can be close to complete.
The conditional approach is extremely suitable for complex business environments,
where the leadership knows where it wants to go and local management has the best knowledge
of the day-to-day operations. This approach deals with the top-down versus bottom-up tension
by combining the two into a “U-turn”. In situations demanding a quick response, this approach
may be of no use because of the elaborate communication between the different levels. Figure
3.17 summarizes the evaluation.
Figure 3.17: Advantages, Disadvantages and Applications of Conditional Leadership
Advantages Disadvantages Best Application
Local management Involvement Time needed to create Local detailing of main thrusts 
management conditions that have been decided before
Best possible information at Time needed to overcome Time availability: gradual change 
leadership level resistance to change
Conditional leadership can be recognized from the outside by a number of characte-
ristics that follow from the theoretical framework developed here. These characteristics can be
grouped into two categories: the kind of actions that the collective leadership takes, and the
nature of its interactions with local managers. Since large, corporate-wide actions are difficult to
realize in a collective environment,collective leadership expresses itself in small and incremental
changes in the business portfolio that are often executed by local management. Another trait is
the emphasis on management process building (including information and communications
technology). The interactions between the leadership and local management are intensive and
two-way. This means frequent and long meetings with flexible agendas, and often with many
participants – including those in the direct line of command and actions, and those involved
indirectly.
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3.8: The Ecological Approach
Introduction
This section will describe the ecological approach and discuss under which circum-
stances it can be effective.After this introduction,we will discuss the theoretical grounding of the
approach. Subsequently, we will see how it fits with the managerial anchoring points. We will
then describe the most relevant management tools that can be used by practitioners of this
approach. Finally, we will debate the main (dis)advantages of the approach and its main
applications.
The ecological approach is a leadership style in which management conscientiously
leaves it to the markets in which the firm operates to select out those businesses that do not
possess the competencies that meet their needs. According to the ecological perspective on
management, the only changes the leadership and local managers can make to the business
units under their responsibility are minor (Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Barney & Zajac, 1994). Only
local management is capable of incremental adjustments to the unit it runs. And the firm’s
leadership can decide only what its expectations are towards its business units. Based on these
expectations, it can set (rudimentary) ex-ante targets, and, more importantly, hold the local
managers accountable for meeting these targets (Bartlett et al., 1994).
Accordingly, an ecological leadership style differs fundamentally from the directive and
conditional approaches in that it lacks up-front and continuing leadership action (e.g., via
detailed target setting,conditions or actions),and thus relies mainly on ex-post accountability to
exercise management power.
Ecological thinking is relatively new; the seminal work dates from the 1960s and 1970s
(e.g., Hannan & Freeman, 1977). Also, by definition, an ecological approach is limited in the
number and scope of tools it can use. These factors mean that this section is somewhat shorter
than its predecessors. It is, however, no less relevant, given the popularity of ecological models in
the recent internet upswing.
The Theoretical Grounding of the Ecological Approach
The ecological approach is grounded in population ecology (Hannan & Freeman, 1977 &
1984; Aldrich & Pfeffer, 1976) and in institutional theories (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Greenwood
& Higgins, 1996). There also are useful linkages with complexity theory (Kaufman 1995, Sanchez,
1993), particularly in tracing strategy deployment as a process without central, top-down
direction.
Population ecologists have brought forward the notion that organizations are subject to
strong inertial forces; that is, they seldom succeed in making radical changes in strategy and
structure in the face of environmental threats.“Even within broad areas of organization action…
there appear to be substantial obstacles to substantial structural change. we will continue to
doubt that the major features in the world of organizations arise through adaptation or learning
(Hannan & Freeman,1977).The structural inertia noted by these authors is grounded in a number
of processes that can be classified as arising from either internal structural arrangements or
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from external pressures. In case of internal arrangements, we can categorize four forces that
predicate this inertia and inability to adjust to external challenges (Hannan & Freeman, 1977):
• sunk costs combine with financial resource limitations and traditional accounting rules
in motivating a firm to earn back the investment from the assets with which that
investment was made;
• leadership’s bounded rationality, in particular, limits the ability of the leadership to
adequately gauge the new environmental trends of an inflection point, which is
exacerbated by a lack of good information from existing channels about new develop-
ments.
• political rigidities,and resistance to change among employees who are confused and de-
motivated by rapid change and
• path dependencies and inertia, which translate into an inability to change the myriad of
formal and informal processes that characterize the modern firm.
As consequence of these four internal forces, firms that have enjoyed success over a long time
period tend to suffer from increasing institutional rigidity (Baaij & van den Bosch, 1998).
To these internal rigidities we can add external pressures, including the following:
• barriers to entry and exit, including a lack of capabilities or resources necessary to enter
a new business when the old one ages, as well as legal and fiscal barriers,
• external constraints on the availability of information,
• legitimacy constraints, which set a limit to the positioning options available to the firm
in relation to its shareholders and other stakeholders
• collective rationality in the business community, involving myriad suppliers and
customers who through the years have established an equilibrium.
(Hannan & Freeman, 1977)
These internal and external pressures are depicted in the following figure (3.18).
Figure 3.18: Internal and External Inertial Pressures
Source: Hannan & Freeman, 1977
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Environment: external pressures
• Entry and exit barriers
• Constraints to availability external information
• Legitimacy constraints
• Collective rationality problem
The firm’s internal considerations:
• Sunk costs
• Bounded rationality
• Resistance to change
• Path dependencies
As result of these rigidities, we can regard organizations as “buffeted by the forces of the
environment, lucky if they manage to get into a favourable position, fated to die if they do not”
(Aldrich & Pfeffer, 1976), as the market selects out those units that have competencies that no
longer are appropriate (Bartlett et al., 1994; Barney & Zajak, 1994). In a volatile environment, the
changes that established firms are able to make are so marginal that they are frequently
insufficient to assure survival (Kaufman, 1985).
An important development of ecology theory was the realization that, whereas small
companies are entirely subject to external ecologies, the individual units in larger corporations
could be considered subject to an internal ecology, as they compete not only in the outside
environment, but against other units for limited organizational resources and support from
corporate management (Burgelman, 2002). The internal ecology model is defined not only by
distributed strategic decision-making and simultaneous strategic action,but also by a strong ex-
post accountability by the corporate leadership.This form of ecology is characterized by variation
(as individual units seek different strategic initiatives to express their unique set of capabilities),
by selection (as the leadership screens out what it regards as the more promising initiatives, via
administrative of cultural means), by retention (of those initiatives that survive both external
and internal competition), by internal competition, and by external competition.
The difference in this internal ecology and the framework described by Hannan &
Freeman lies in the availability of a credible and effective corporate strategy. One can define this
strategy as the theory that the leadership has about the basis of its past and future successes,
which provides a shared frame of reference for local managers and expresses the leadership’s
strategic intent. In the view of Hannan & Freeman, the leadership is in no position to form a clear
and viable strategic intent. This is certainly the case in periods of rapid environmental change
and uncertainty that characterize the inflection point, which mitigates the value of the internal
ecology concept for this study.
The second main inspiration of the ecological school – alongside population ecology –
comes from the institutional theorists, who claim that renewal journeys result from coercive,
normative, and mimetic isomorphism. Firms have a strong motivation to conform with the
norms of their industry, and will only alter their structure and processes if they maintain
congruence with these norms and the shared logic of the industry of which they are part.
(Dimaggio & Powell, 1983). Institutional theory, thus, does not debate organizational change, but
rather focuses on the similarity of organizations within a given business sector. Institutional
pressures (such as regulation) are ‘a powerful force’ against transformational change (Buckho,
1994). Benchmarking by firms against their industry peers will lead to more similarity, as firms
try to copy popular features of competitors that they consider to be more successful.
In an institutional framework, isomorphic change does occur. Here, we can distinguish between
three mechanisms (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983):
• coercive isomorphism, which results from both formal and informal pressures exerted
on organizations by other organizations upon which they are dependent,and by cultural
expectations in the society within which organizations function (e.g. the existence of a
common legal environment).
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• mimetic isomorphism, which results from uncertainty. When organizational
technologies are poorly understood (March & Olsen, 1976), when goals are ambiguous,or
when the environment creates symbolic uncertainty, organizations may model
themselves on other organizations (e.g. benchmarking). This, of course, is particularly
relevant in an inflection point situation.
• normative isomorphism stems primarily from “professionalization”, which is the
collective struggle of members of an occupation to define the conditions and methods of
their work, to control “the production of producers” (Larson, 1977:49-52), and to establish
a cognitive base and legitimization for their occupational autonomy (e.g. managers who
have the same education and background).
A firm’s strategic behavior can thus be seen as the product of ideas, values and beliefs
that have originated from an institutional context (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). These pressures that
originate from the context lead to the adoption of the same organizational form and
organizational processes by firms that operate in the same environment. Firms cannot change
dramatically because their norms are embedded within this institutional context. This implies
that changes in the firm under an ecological leadership style will be modest and incremental in
nature.
A third inspiration for the ecological view of leadership comes from the complexity
school, which sees the different units within a firm as independent optimization strategies in a
fluctuating fitness landscape. Each of the units finds an optimum, but many of these are local,
and only one is the best position for the entire firm (Kauffman, 1993).The role of the leadership is
to enable these independent teams to pursue their own optimization paths (Beinhocker, 1999).
But the power of the leadership to influence the paths of the different (local) units is quite
limited. In a dynamic, complex environment that characterizes the inflection point – and in
particular its beginning phases, as we will see later – the leadership simply does not have the
information,expertise or time needed to make specific strategic decisions, to draft plans for their
implementation, and to monitor full compliance with these plans. As result, the leadership will
have to function within a system of largely self-managed processes, in which it has only a limited
role in setting boundaries and broad milestones, and in holding its unit managers accountable
for staying within these boundaries and meeting the broad milestones (Sanchez,1997). In its pure
form, this is ecological leadership behavior. An ecological perspective on managing a firm may
also be derived from resource scarcity, in addition to the convergence to industry norms and the
structural inertia mentioned above (Volberda et al., 2001); it may also result (as we will see) from
lack of information and/or understanding of the dynamics of a rapidly changing market place
(Simon, 1947).
When we look at the ecological system around individual units from a leadership
perspective, we gain an additional viewpoint.There, the units compete not only externally in the
markets in which they operate, but also internally for (financial) resources that are disbursed
from the corporate centre. It has been stated that success in obtaining the support from the
leadership in the internal accountability and selection process is more important for the survival
of a business unit in an inflection point than the stated strategy of that unit (Burgelman, 1996).
When this internal competition process is run in an orderly way, distributed decision-making,
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and simultaneous strategic action of a number of business units may be combined into a
coherent firm-wide direction through frequent and specific selection and accountability actions
by the leadership; at this point, ecological leadership may transform itself into a form of
conditional management.
If, on the other hand, the unit’s strategic actions depend on the sequence in which
problems, solutions and decision opportunities arise, we find that firm-wide coherence depends
on chance.This is an extreme form of the ecology model that has in the literature been called the
“garbage-can model.”It is characterized by a lack of clear goals,a lack of understanding on how to
achieve outcomes, and a fluid participation of the different internal units and functions (March
& Olsen, 1976; Smith & Zeithaml, 1996). It should be noted, however, that a new order can emerge
from chaos through a process of spontaneous self-organization (Stacey, 1993).
A more balanced form of ecological leadership is provided by Bourgeois and Brodwin,
when they describe the “crescive”model, in which the role of top management is that of premise-
setter and judge – in the style of traditional Japanese management (Bourgeois & Brodwin, 1983),
but also comparable to the venture capitalist who diversifies his strategies along three
dimensions: length of time frame, risk, and relatedness between his businesses (Burgelman,
2001; Beinhocker, 1999). We can regard the local units as “platoons of hikers” that move
independently from each other, each seeking to maximize their individual odds of survival and
success (Beinhocker, 1999).
The Ecological Approach and the Anchoring Points
This section elaborates on the fit of the ecological leadership style with the five main
managerial anchor points: (1) leadership; (2) content: strategy development; (3) context:
environment; (4) management & organizational structure and processes and (5) performance &
accountability.
(1) Leadership in the Ecological Approach
The ecological leadership approach gives total freedom to local management. The
leadership of the firm does not interfere with the entrepreneurial activities that are deployed by
the local management, nor does it actively stimulate entrepreneurial behavior. Local
management is given complete freedom in running the show,with the results being assessed ex-
post: a few clear performance targets, such as Return on Investment, may have to be met. The
justification of this behavior at the executive level can be found, amongst other arguments, in
the limited information and understanding that the leadership has of the dynamics of the
environment in an inflection point (Nadler & Heilpern, 1981). Even in more stable times, there are
limits to the cognitive skills of the CEO (Simon, 1947).
Volberda et al. (2001) call this behavior the emergent journey of renewal in which the
leadership is mainly outward-oriented and managerially passive. Strategic initiatives generally
emerge at the bottom of the organization, with local management. At a later point in time, when
the leadership is more comfortable with the dynamics of the market place and is thus able to set
new directions for the firm, it decides whether the new strategic initiatives taken in the field are
in line with their vision and strategy: at that point, their approach is no longer ecological.
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The point at which the decision of the leadership suddenly becomes crucial is the accountability
point, when the selection is made which units to support and which to drop. The success of the
overall firm then depends on the strategic management capability of the leadership (Burgelman,
1996). This strategic recognition involves the ability of the leadership to recognize the strategic
relevance of local management actions directed at new business initiatives or at the reduction of
existing businesses. This process in itself again illustrates the bottom-up character of ecological
management.
In the ecological leadership approach, local management has the freedom to initiate
strategic actions as long as they eventually meet the targets that may have been set by the
leadership. Local management is not encouraged to think beyond its own business: the
leadership stresses the dangers of straying outside the competence boundaries (Volberda et al.,
2001).There is scope, however, for a multitude of new activities and entrepreneurs.
(2) Strategy Development: Content in the Ecological Approach
The introduction to this segment made a distinction between internal and external
considerations that lead to strategic inertia, by which we mean an inability to pursue new
strategic directions. Some of the factors that generate strategic inertia are internal to
organizations: these include sunk costs in plant, equipment, and personnel, the dynamics of
political coalitions, and the tendency for precedents to become normative standards. Others are
external, such as legal and other barriers to entry and exit from certain businesses. Population
ecologists as well as institutional thinkers bring forward the notion that these inertial pressures
are much stronger than most people think. We have stressed that leaders may also opt for an
ecological style when they feel uncertain about the dynamics of the environment, which is a
likely mindset during an inflection point.
In the ecological approach the leadership makes no up-front strategic decisions, and
leaves the local managers in charge of reactions to the new environment, realizing that it is
unlikely that they will be able to cope fully and find fully satisfactory solutions. Once the
leadership has the information and mindset to make the necessary strategic moves, they must
shift to a forceful directive or conditional leadership style to realize a strategic redirection. For
example, when the leadership moves to acquire or divest units, this is usually a directive move.
When it moves to restructure the business, this is usually a conditional move. As result, the speed
of strategic adjustment of the firm as a whole is low.
Due to the ‘laissez faire mentality’of an ecological leadership, the local managers are not
stimulated to think beyond the boundaries of the unit. Capability development at the level of the
business-unit takes no account of the needs of the other businesses and of the firm as a whole. In
an ecologically run firm, there thus is no mechanism to create and ensure any level of consistency
of capability development across the organization.
(3) Environment: Context in the Ecological Approach
In the ecological approach, the leadership of the firm is passive in its direction of the
units, and in using the inputs it may receive in monitoring changes in the business landscape.
Faced with the high uncertainties presented by the environment, the management has to
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navigate between reining in chaos and letting chaos reign. In this approach, it has – for the
moment – opted for the second stance. No substantive attempts are made from the top level to
align the units with the demands of the environment, and to realize a better fit with these
demands.The scope for alignment as seen from the perspective of the leadership – which has few
options to act – is low. However, the scope for local learning can be quite high. At the
accountability point, at the end of the chosen reporting period, the leadership has to make the
necessary selection decision, at which point a suitable recognition capability is important, if the
leadership is to end up with a collection of successful units (Burgelman, 1996). A basic sense of
environmental trends, gained through analysis or intuition, is a crucial element of this
recognition capability.
(4) Management of structure and processes
An ecological approach is a strong form of a bottom-up management model, and in a
bottom-up model those who create information are local managers (Nonaka, 1994). Knowledge
that is created in this leadership approach is not accumulated at the leadership level or across the
firm, due to the rudimentary knowledge exchange between business units and the executive,
and among each other. Accordingly, unmanaged adaptive learning by the units is the only
feasible method for changing organizations, because the firm’s management lacks the
intelligence to comprehend the world around it and to direct the learning process from above
(Lindblom, 1959). Experience in what is going on in the marketplace is gained in the first place by
the local managers (Huy, 2001). Firm-wide knowledge creation and learning as seen from a
leadership perspective are low and emergent.
In the ecological approach, the discussion on the appropriateness of structure and
processes can be conducted only by local management. Where the local units are small, which is
often the case, structure and complexity are non-issues (they are also, in any case, non-issues for
the leadership of the firm, which is, after all, interested only in the ex-post performance of its
units). From a leadership perspective, the complexity of structure and processes is thus low, and
could be called rudimentary.
(5) Performance & Accountability in the Ecological Approach
The leadership leaves the development of strategy and actual execution of operations to
the people responsible for the performance of those entities, and it assesses the results ex-post
(Merchant, 1998). At the beginning of the accounting period the leadership may set a few
concrete performance targets that have to be met.The emphasis in terms of content and process
is thus on ex-post accountability. After the accounting period, the leadership evaluates whether
or not the unit managers have met the targets.They then have the choice of either continuing to
commit the (financial) resources to the unit, increasing this commitment,or cutting off resources
(these actions conceptually are directive, but also are logical endpoints of ecological behavior). If
the leadership shows anything more than “binary”behavior – in writing a new check or stopping
the venture – they decidedly have crossed the line into a different leadership style.
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Important Tools in the Ecological Approach
In the ecological approach, the simple and only key process is the accountability review in
which the performance of local managers and/or units is formally or informally measured
against (un)written targets,followed by the selection step,in which financial and other resources
are granted or withheld from units and unit heads. In an inflection point, the shock of the
environmental change and the ensuing fall in performance threatens the ability of the
leadership to perform this role. With regard to ecological leadership in a period of upheaval, we
may identify four stages of reaction: 1) denial that the units of the firm are facing a new, life-
threatening challenge, 2) escape, sometimes by wasting time on irrelevant subjects, sometimes
even physical, by initiating business trips or a headquarters move, or by initiating unrelated
actions, like acquisitions. If the leadership does not develop a vision for the new post-inflection-
point business, they are on the way to the eventual destruction of the firm. However, if all goes
well, the leadership will enter 3) a phase of acceptance of the new business rules,and 4) pertinent
action to support the promising units and close the ineffective ones. (Burgelman,1996) These last
phases are often accompanied by a replacement of those leadership members and managers
that are no longer effective. Interestingly enough,these are often not basically more capable than
their predecessors,but do not have the emotional investment in past strategies.The chances that
the leadership, and the firm, will survive the first two stages and come to the right decisions in
stage four is enhanced in a major way if the leadership is able to develop a mental image of what
the industry will look like and the firm will look like when it has successfully passed through the
inflection point.
One condition for effective ecological leadership is that it should have the selection
mechanisms that enable it to make the right decision regarding continuation or discontinuation
of support for a given unit.The leadership should have the reserves – or slack – that makes failure
and experiment possible (Anderson,1999).Finally, the leadership must also have the courage and
independence of thinking to accept the demise of a unit that has not met expectations. In
traditional management cultures, this is difficult to accept. However, the termination of
ineffective organizations or organizational activities is increasingly becoming part of normal
managerial processes, both in the macroeconomic sense (Van der Mandele, 2000) and in
corporate life (Burgelman, 2002).
Nonetheless, ecological leadership can be regarded as a way forward in that it is can be
regarded as an ultimate consequence of capability-based strategy deployment. When the
leadership has acquired local units with highly developed capabilities and motivation, and has
provided them with the necessary resources, the process of strategic control of these units can
evolve into a process of creating self-organizing systems (Sanchez, 1997).
Advantages and Disadvantages of the Ecological Approach
The ecological approach is simple and clear to the participants. It is, however, rather
inflexible and marked by a lack of adaptation. From a holding perspective, the adaptability of the
firm in the ecological approach will be very low, due mainly to internal and external inertial
pressures.The main advantage of the ecological approach is the simplicity for the leadership.The
only knowledge streams that are traceable are the ex-ante and ex-post facts. The binary
accountability is very clear to the participants. The communication between the leadership and
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the local management is low and rudimentary. Communication and knowledge integration is
extremely low in the ecological approach. Adaptations are moderate and don’t have a significant
effect on the existing business portfolio. Another disadvantage is the high theoretic level of the
approach, which makes it difficult to translate into practice (figure 3.19).
Figure 3.19: Advantages and Disadvantages of the Ecological Approach
Advantages Disadvantages Best Application
Full involvement of local management Lack of (up-front) leadership High market uncertainty
control
No understanding of markets Risk of local independence Limited resources at stake
needed by Leadership
Applications of the Ecological Approach
Ecological approaches depend heavily on the strategic insight and entrepreneurship of
local managers, which means that high demands are set on their knowledge, capabilities and
motivation. Moreover, there are only few contextual targets, management procedures and rules
set to their behavior, which means that the complexity of the leadership structure can be
extremely simple. From a leadership perspective, the number of strategic options is limited to
two: to support or not to support. Accordingly, the leadership has no means of enacting an
adaptive strategy track, and is relegated to a selective mode of strategy development. Given the
leadership’s lack of influence on the actual operations of the units, the ecological approach, from
a firm-wide perspective, becomes incremental. Since decision-making is concentrated at the
local level, the speed of transition of the units, however, can be relatively fast. Leadership action is
entirely ex-post, and this approach is only suited to selective strategies that are enacted bottom-
up.
Interestingly enough, the ecological style is best suited to the two extreme states of
environmental dynamism: it works reasonably well in stable environments, where few
innovations take place, and experienced local management can be left in charge as long as the
targets are met. And it works well – for a limited span of time – in highly dynamic environments,
where the leadership lacks information and intelligence to set a firm-wide course,and gives local
management leeway to experiment in the new conditions.
If the segregation of three leadership approaches is to have any value in the field, it is
important to be able to recognize ecological leadership behavior when it occurs in a firm. From
the descriptions in this chapter, and the summary of figure 3.27, we can deduct a number of
characteristics that can be readily recognized in a firm. These fall into two categories: the nature
of the decisions that the leadership takes in a firm, and the way in which communications with
the local managers are handled. Regarding the nature of decisions, the ecological style is clearly
incompatible with actions that require substantial involvement of local managers. Thus, the
emphasis is on portfolio decisions that can be executed at the corporate level, which implies a
minimal size (which, by the way, can vary substantially between industries and individual
companies).The second type of ecological decisions are the hiring/firing of local (unit) managers:
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since there are few if any other means to impact the well-being of the units, and therefore the
firm, a relatively high frequency of these is likely to be observed, too. Communications will be
quite minimal, limited to infrequent target setting and accountability sessions with the
responsible local managers, which means few – in many cases just two – participants in the
meetings.
3.9: A Dynamic Framework of Leadership Approaches to the Inflection Point
Introduction
This chapter started with a characterization of the inflection point at the beginning of
this chapter in sections 3.1 through 3.5.We reviewed the approaches that have been identified in
the literature to manage inflection points, and classified them into three categories: directive,
conditional and ecological approaches. Section 3.6 explained that the directive approach has the
advantage of centralization of strategic thinking and action. It has the disadvantage of imperfect
information flows from the field, as well as a lack of motivating influence on local management.
As result, implementation in the field may be flawed. The directive approach thus appears to be
most appropriate for realizing major corporate changes at high speed, with limited local
involvement.
The discussion on the conditional approach, in section 3.7, shows how this approach
excels in involving and mobilizing local management, and in using the know-how of local
markets that exists in the field, albeit with a penalty for the time needed to create the new
management conditions, as well as the time needed to overcome resistance to change at lower
levels. It thus appears most useful in situations in which the main strategic thrusts and
boundaries have been set, and there is enough time available to set the new course.
Finally, the ecological approach has the advantage of putting local management in full
control of the strategy, which means that the leadership does not have to have a specific
understanding of what is going on in the markets, for which it pays the price of loss of up-front
control. It appears most useful in times of high market uncertainty,when the leadership lacks the
understanding to set a direction but wants to retain full control of the result.
These three leadership approaches are illustrated in figure 3.20:
Figure 3.20: A Summary of Leadership Tools
102
Directive – adjust:
• Business portfolio
• Competencies
• Boundaries
Conditional:
• Restructure
• Install processes
• Learning
Ecological:
• Set targets
• Accountability
This section will describe,and expand on,the segregation developed by Utterback (1994) for three
transition phases of an inflection point. We will propose that the leadership of a firm has a
propensity to prefer one of these three approaches in each phase of the inflection point, and that
the compatibility between the three approaches is limited. Subsequently, we translate our
propositions into ten underpinning questions that can be tested in the field. We then describe
our field research,and discuss its validity and reliability.Thus, the stage is set for the presentation
of the outcome of our field research in chapter 8, in which we look at the use of the different
approaches in an actual inflection point situation.
The Fit of the Leadership Approaches with the Phases of the Inflection Point
At this stage of the analysis, we can fit the three leadership approaches that we have
identified in the initial sections (section 3.3) of this chapter to the development phases of the
inflection point (section 2.4).We will do this in two steps. First, we will see how the characteristics
of each of the phases are perceived from the perspective of the leadership, and how they impact
the functions that the leadership can perform. Subsequently, we will see how the scope of
functions that the leadership can perform leads to a choice of approach. The leadership thus
chooses the approach that, from its vantage point, allows it to cope as well as possible with the
challenges that it perceives from the inflection point, as well as the limitations of its own
function in each phase of the inflection point.
The starting point of this exercise is a recapitulation of the most relevant characteristics
of the three phases of the inflection point that were described in the preceding paragraphs:
In the fluid phase, we see the firm confronted with a fluid and dynamic market
environment.The new activities are in a start-up situation, resource needs are relatively modest,
and the structure of the exploratory activities is entrepreneurial and informal, with a low level of
development of hierarchy and processes. Looking at these conditions from a leadership
perspective, we find that its understanding of the situation is usually opaque. It will find that it
does not know which capabilities to apply, and may find that it does not (yet) have the
capabilities necessary to lead the firm through the transition. Demand for leadership action may
be low, however, since local managers do not yet have major resource needs that require
executive appropriation, do not need firm-wide reach and support for their activities, and
themselves wrestle with a view of the markets, and the best strategic course to take. Looking at
the most appropriate leadership approach, one can conclude that a “hands-off” style that looks
only at local actions ex-post is not only attractive for the leadership, but is also the most sensible
way to manage.
Conversely, we can see that the two other approaches are not attractive in this phase, the
most important reason being that the leadership lacks the understanding of the environment to
make appropriate and credible decisions, and to supervise the actions of local managers to
whom it may have delegated management powers.
In the transitional phase, the environment is stabilizing, and the main directions are
becoming clear. Customers are becoming more demanding,as they have found through trial and
error what they can get and what a reasonable price and other buying conditions are.
Competitors are staking out their claims. At this time, the combination of increasing customer
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needs and competitive pressures forces the firm into making their investments needed to
establish a defensible market position – be it through the development of products or services
that satisfy and excite the increasingly demanding customer, and beat competitive offerings, or
the development of cost-competitive delivery processes. Resources are needed in the form of
capital, experienced manpower, new technologies and capabilities. At the same time, the main
trends in the marketplace have become clear enough for the leadership set the strategic direction
and to decide where the scarce resources (capital, people or franchise) can best be invested. Local
management will reach out for these decisions from above, since they know that commitments
now made, and positions now staked out in the marketplace will determine the future of the
entire firm: if they now move ahead without leadership direction, they have usurped the latter’s
function. The appropriate posture of the leadership is thus hands-on, to shape the portfolio of
activities and resources that determine their future success. The timing for this is right, since
there is enough understanding to nullify these decisions, and enough flexibility in the market to
conquer the position without excessive effort. This hands-on leadership, taking major decisions,
is congruent with the directional style of management.
In the transitional phase, an ecological style of leadership implies inaction of the top
executive in a period of strategic formation, through which it effectively loses its license to
function. Conversely, the key portfolio decisions that characterize this period can and should not
be delegated to local management, as is done in a conditional mode, because they are not, and
should not be, entrusted with decisions that pertain to the entire firm.
In the specific development phase, markets are starting to mature. Demand conditions,
including the rate of innovation and growth, are stabilizing. Customers are becoming
experienced and demanding, and margins shrink accordingly. Competition is gradually
concentrating into an oligopoly.The name of the game now is cost control, and the use of flexible
and innovative tactics to boost, in minor ways, market share and prices. These actions are best
realized close to the sales point, in the marketplace.Resource needs to sustain a good competitive
position are moderate to high. In this phase, the tactical needs of the marketplace are best met
through delegation, which is made possible by the in-depth understanding of the environment
that is shared by a wide circle of managers in the firm, including the leadership. Since delegation
thus is possible and desirable, the role of the leadership can be limited to setting overall direction
and targets, and to defining the framework of organization and processes within which this
delegation can take place.These are all characteristics of the conditional leadership approach.
In the specific phase, an ecological management style is not able to achieve the fine-
tuning of objectives and actions across the entire firm that are necessary to realize the tactical
advances and cost containment that characterize success in these markets. A directive style lacks
the capabilities to maintain close touch with local markets, and to motivate local management,
which is necessary to maintain, entrepreneurship and tactical innovation in the field.
We have thus provided a logical linkage between the fluid phase of development and an
ecological management approach, between a transitional phase of development and a directive
style, and the specific phase and a conditional leadership approach. This reasoning is
summarized in figure 3.21
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Figure 3.21: Inflection Point Phases and Leadership Approaches
Phases
Characteristics of the Environment* Fluid Transitional Specific
Markets, including offerings, Dynamic Stabilizing Efficient oligopoly
competition, innovation
Resource needs Low High Moderate
Firms’ structure Unstructured, Changing Major changes still possible Stable
Leadership scope of functions
Market understanding Opaque Main lines clear Details clear
Strategic competencies of leadership Few if any Sufficient for broad Sufficient to permit
decisions delegation
Demand for leadership Low/varying High Moderate
Appropriate leadership approach
“Hands-off” “Hands-on” Delegation possible
and appropriate
Ex-post Major thrusts possible
Ecological Directive Conditional
*source: Utterback, 1995 (summarized)
Four Defining Assumptions and Three Propositions
Following the work done in the preceding chapters and paragraphs,we come to five basic
propositions regarding the inflection point that address the three specific questions posed in the
beginning of this thesis (chapter 1.2),about the “what”,“how”“and “when”of leadership behavior
in the inflection point. These questions all are subservient to the overriding issue, which is why
the leadership of a firm shows different approaches in coping with an inflection point.
Two defining assumptions relate to the initial “what” question (i.e., the description of the
inflection point):
A: An inflection point can be described in three dimensions: amplitude, abruptness and
complexity
B: Firms passing through an inflection point go through three phases: fluid, transitional
and specific (Utterback, 1975)
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The basis of these two assumptions is laid in, respectively, Chapter 1.2 and the beginning of this
chapter. Chapter 2 explained that the literature identifies a number of different characteristics of
major change strategies (see figure 1.1.B). We also see that our focus on a leadership perspective
as well as on reactive, longitudinal strategic change that is instigated by external factors reduces
the number of relevant dimensions of the inflection point to three, which were explored in
Chapter 2. Assumption B derives largely from Utterback, who uses it in a wider context of
internally as well as externally caused innovation: in this case, we limit ourselves to externally
caused change trajectories.
The next defining assumptions – “C” and “D” – relate to the “how” question, i.e. the possible
leadership approaches to an inflection point:
C: We can identify three leadership approaches to an inflection point: the directive,
conditional and ecological approaches
D: A chosen leadership approach may be supported by a second approach.
These two assumptions are grounded in chapter 3, where we have deduced these three
approaches from a series of seven grounding theories, and tested their relevance against five
managerial anchoring points.
The three propositions relate to the “when” question regarding the inflection point (i.e.,
the phase of passage through an inflection point),and the use of the three leadership approaches
in each of them:
Proposition: Each of the three leadership approaches is congruent with one of the three industry
development phases:
I: In the fluid phase of an inflection point, the leadership will tend to use an ecological
approach
II: In the transitional phase of an inflection point, the leadership will tend to use a
directive approach
III: In the specific phase of an inflection point, the leadership will tend to use a conditional
approach
These propositions have been developed in the preceding pages of this chapter in which
we have found that there are characteristics in each of the phases that make them more or less
amenable to one, and sometimes to a lesser extent a second, of the three leadership approaches.
Since we found that there are different phases in an inflection point that each has an
appropriate leadership approach, we can now deductively explain why the leadership of a firm
shifts its style as it passes through the inflection point. The leadership of a firm will change its
approach through an inflection point because 1) an inflection point changes in nature as it
passes through its phases (assumption C), and 2) the challenges of each phase are best met by
adopting different leadership approaches (assumption D).
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We can now finally present the full conceptual figure that will guide the fieldwork (Figure 3.22).
On the left-hand side, this figure shows the three defining dimensions of the inflection point –
amplitude, abruptness and externality – as explained in chapter 2. These three dimensions feed
into, or rather play their role in, the three transition phases to which the firm is subjected – fluid,
transitional and specific – which were introduced earlier in this chapter. The three possible
leadership approaches that were identified earlier in this chapter – directive, conditional and
ecological – are listed on top, and are connected to the three phases following the discussion
earlier in this chapter.The propositions made above each refer to their own part of this figure.
Figure 3.22: A Dynamic Framework of Leadership Approaches to an Inflection Point
The Questions to be Asked
If we want to substantiate the five propositions made above in section 3.9, we need to
answer the following ten questions, which fall into three topic areas, through our fieldwork.
Before embarking on the development of a plan for fieldwork, we need to determine
what will be the overriding question. This overriding question determines which tools – like a
historic analysis, survey or case study – we will use, and how we will use them. As we stated in
chapter 1 (1.2), the overriding question in this case is why the leadership of a firm uses different
approaches in coping with an inflection point.
The first sub-area that we need to probe purports to test our definition of the inflection
point – a “what” question – both from a general perspective and in a direct comparison with the
propositions made in the preceding section. It involves four questions about the dimensions and
phases of the inflection point:
107
Fluid Transitional Specific
Phases:
Inflection point
• Amplitude
• Abruptness
• Externality
Leadership
approaches
Conditional EcologicalDirective
Question 1: Which dimensions characterize the inflection points that are experienced by firms?
In answering this question, we will look at the elements of scope and characterization
that were introduced in chapter 2, and see to what extent the real world fits these descriptions.
Question 2: Are these dimensions congruent with our propositions?
This question is aimed in a more direct sense at the three dimensions that were
identified in chapter 2: amplitude, abruptness and complexity. We will see whether we can
identify these three dimensions in our field research, and whether they suffice in characterizing
the inflection point in a real-world setting.
Question 3: Which transition phases do we observe in firms passing through an inflection
point?
Although Utterback (1995) provides substantial documentation on the practice of his
three transition phases in periods of innovation and rapid industry restructuring, we will in this
case focus on transition within the more limited subset of the inflection point.
Question 4: Are these transition phases congruent with our proposition?
Utterback identifies three transition phases – the fluid, transitional and specific phases –
and provides ample field examples to demonstrate the validity of this segregation. Our field
research will explore to what extent these phases also apply when seen through the more limited
lens of the inflection point.
The second question area covers the “how” questions, as it looks at leadership
approaches to the inflection point by posing four questions that both explore the topic in a
general sense, and test the specific propositions that we developed above on the leadership role.
Question 5: Which leadership approaches can we observe in an inflection point?
Here we will look at the variety of tools and options that the leadership has in an
inflection point and see whether we can come to a categorization of approaches. In doing so, we
will have to comment on the effectiveness of the different approaches in each situation.
Question 6: Are these leadership approaches congruent with our proposition? 
The actual leadership behavior that we observe in our fieldwork will have to be tested
against the three approaches – directive, conditional and ecological – that we derived from
theory in chapter three, to see whether its segregation into three types indeed holds in practice.
Again, the effectiveness question comes up, since ineffective approaches do not support a
functional proposition.
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Question 7: Do we observe the use of a second approach as support?
In our theory development in this chapter we have found that there is a level of
compatibility between the directive and conditional approaches, although one of the two will
stand out as dominant. Fieldwork will have to show whether we can indeed observe the use of a
second approach in a supportive role.
Question 8: Which approaches are compatible and which are not?
This question tests the premise underlying the preceding issue, i.e. the proposition that
directive and conditional approaches may support each other.
The third question area contains the “when” questions; this area investigates the
temporaryness of each of the leadership approaches. It seeks to determine whether a leadership
approach may not have universal applicability through time, but rather an applicability limited
to a certain stage in the development of a firm – in this case, a certain phase in its transition
through an inflection point.
Question 9: Do we observe a sequence of approaches as the firm passes through the phases of
an inflection point? If so, which sequence?
It will be interesting to see to what extent and how the leadership of real world
companies change their strategic posture as their firms move through the inflection points.
Conceivably, we could observe a leadership using only one approach, or using approaches in a
different sequence than suggested in the beginning of this section.
The fourth and final question area covers the “why” question, and seeks to explain the
leadership behavior for each of the three phases of the inflection point.
Question 10: Can the preference for a particular approach in a phase be explained and justified?
The range of approaches that the leadership can try using to help a firm through an
inflection point is wide. Our thesis concerns approaches that work, and we therefore must test
the positive impact of the approach, or at least explain why using that particular approach was
the most logical and promising way to develop and implement the next steps of the strategy
through the inflection point.
These questions follow directly from the defining assumptions and propositions
provided in section 3.9. In specific terms, questions 1 through 6 are derived from assumptions A,
B and C. Assumption D leads to question 7.And propositions I, II and III lead to questions 7 through
10. Figure 3.23 illustrates the linkages.
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Figure 3.23: Questions emanating from the Defining Assumptions and Propositions
Defining Assumptions Questions to be Asked
A: Inflection point described by amplitude, 1. Which dimensions characterize inflection 
abruptness and externality points?
2. Are these dimensions congruent with 
our propositions?
B: Three phases of an inflection point: fluid, 3. Which phases do we observe in firms 
transitional, specific passing through an inflection point?
4. Are these phases congruent with 
our propositions?
C: Three leadership approaches: directive, 5. Which leadership approaches can we 
conditional, ecological observe in an inflection point?
D: A given leadership approach may be 6. Are these leadership approaches congruent
supported by a second approach with our propositions?
Propositions
I: In the fluid phase, leadership will use 7. Do we observe the use of a second 
an ecological approach approach support?
II: In the transitional phase leadership will use 8. Which approaches are competing 
a directive approach and which not?
III: In the specific phase leadership will use 9. Do we observe sequences of 
a conditional approach approaches through an inflection point?
10. Can the preference for an approach 
be explained/justified?
3.10: A Methodology for Case Research and the Units of Analysis
Introduction
After the review of available theories and the development of an outline model, we are
left with a number of elements that need to be verified and explored in the field. In order to do
this, we have conducted a series of case studies of five publishing companies based in the
Netherlands, researching how they have coped with the arrival of e-business.
This section explains why we chose the introduction of e-business as analytical unit, and
opted for the case analysis method. We will also explain our selection of the five publishing
companies and outline our research strategy, as well as the validity checks.
As stated above, the most important determinant of the research strategy is the type of
question that is asked (Yin, 1994). Research questions can exist in various forms, including “who”,
“what”, “where”, “how”, and “why”. Each of these has its most appropriate form of research, of
which we can conceptually outline five: the experiment, the historic and the archival analysis, the
survey and the case analysis. Theoretically, each of these is appropriate to answer the overriding
“how” question that we have posed. Each of these techniques is also appropriate only for the
analysis of a specific set of data. Some of the most important characteristics that determine this
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suitability of research forms are (1) the nature of the research question, and (2) the degree to
which the analyst can influence the environment – in which case the experiment is a very
attractive tool. The final screen (3) is, according to Yin (1994), contemporariness as opposed to
historicalness: if we want to analyze a contemporary event – which we do, as we will see later – a
number of research techniques (like archival and historical analysis) are not feasible. Through
this process of elimination we end up with the case analysis.
Figure 3.24: Determinants of the Research Strategy
Which question? Control of event? Is the event Resulting research 
contemporary? strategy option
How, why? Yes Yes Experiment
Who, what, where? No yes/no Archival analysis
How many, how much?
How, why, when? No No History
Who, what, where? No Yes Survey
How many, how much?
How, why, when No Yes Case study
The shading refers to the strategies used in this analysis
Source: COSMOS Corporation (1994), adjusted.
The alternate research strategies described above have in common that they can all be
used to describe, to explain and to explore. We will see in our fieldwork that each of these three
objectives plays a role in our work.
A case study is a research strategy that focuses on understanding the dynamics present
within a single setting (Eisenhardt, 1989). This definition implies that we can speak of a case
study when a phenomenon is investigated within its natural environment. As result, the
phenomenon studied cannot be separated from the real-life context in which it takes place. A
case study is qualitative in nature, although it may contain quantitative sub-analyses.
Case analyses can be generalized to theoretical propositions and not to populations or
universes.The essence of a case study and the central tendency amongst all types of case studies
is that it tries to illuminate a decision, or set of decisions: why they were taken, how they were
implemented, and with what result (Schramm 1971).
In this thesis, our views on the succession of approaches used by a single leadership can
to some extent be viewed as grounded theory, in the sense that our starting hypotheses were
derived inductively from our experiences in the field. However, a major part of our proposals was
also derived from the available literature, in which the “punctuation” of market developments
111
had already been identified (see chapter 1), as was the succession of development phases (idem).
In the formulation of our propositions, information collection, analysis and theory development
stand in reciprocal relationship to each other (Strauss & Corbin, 1990).
One of the major advantages of a case study is that a contemporary phenomenon can be
investigated within its real-life context.This means that the interaction of context and process can
be explored (Swanborn,1996).The case study also enables a researcher to cope with a large number
of variables, albeit that the experiment is a better way to make detailed observations of a smaller
number of variables. A history does deal with the entangled relation of process and context, but
only for non-contemporary events. And surveys can provide insight into phenomenon and context,
although the scope for investigating context is quite limited: the survey designer is constantly
challenged by the limits to the number of variables that he/she can analyze.
Another important advantage of the case study is that the evolution of a process – like
our inflection point – can be investigated through time. Through multiple measuring moments,
the researcher can understand how interactions between individuals or units, the change
process and ensuing behavior have proceeded through the period of change (Swanborn, 1996).
Therefore, circumstances that influence the main process over time can be tracked. On the other
hand, a survey can study a phenomenon only at a single point in time.
A third advantage of the case method is the ability to ask a multitude of questions, albeit
from a limited number of respondents (Swanborn, 1996). This makes the approach particularly
effective for researching “why” and “how” questions, as well as the differences between the
values, norms, visions attitudes and behaviors of each of the cases and respondents.
Finally, the case method has the advantage of offering the opportunity to use multiple
sources of evidence – many more than, for example, experiments, historic analyses or surveys
(Yin, 1994).
These advantages appear to outweigh, at least for the purposes of this thesis, the
disadvantages. Of these, we can mention the risk of a lack of rigor in the gathering and analysis of
quantitative data, as well as the risk that the qualitative results may not be replicable (Miles &
Huberman, 1984). It must be noted, however, that this risk of bias also presents itself when the
research is based on experiments, surveys (which start with the formulation of a hopefully unbiased
questionnaire) and historical research (Yin, 1994). In general terms, methods for the analysis of
qualitative data are not formulated as well as methods for quantitative analysis (Miles, 1979).
Related to the first disadvantage is the problem that case analyses often provide only
limited bases for scientific generalization. Due to the small number of cases (i.e., the small
sample size), the researcher usually cannot draw relevant conclusions about the entire domain.
To this argument, a response may be that the purpose of a case analysis is not to prove the
statistical relevance of a hypothesis for a population, but rather to create and expand theoretical
networks (Niederkofler, 1991). Finally, a disadvantage of the case analysis is its labor-intensity. A
case analysis needs multiple sources of evidence, if only because of the variety and possible
ambiguity of data inputs used.
112
Looking back at the research strategy outlined above, we can note that it is both inductive and
prescriptive/problem solving in nature, and results in a weakly disciplined methodology. It also
fits our objective to identify an adequate solution to the leadership issue in an inflection. These
characteristics thus confirm the indication of a clinical research approach that we gave in
chapter 1 (Figure 1.3) (Volberda, 1992).
In launching this fieldwork,we started by looking for a recent inflection point with a high
level of actuality (with the advantage of easy availability of data). Since an inflection point is an
industry-wide occurrence, we needed to find a event that was recognized as such by most of the
participants in the industry. Obviously, the event had to fit the three defining characteristics of
the inflection point in that, for most companies at least, it occurred within a limited time span
(abruptness), had a major impact (amplitude) and touched a number of different functions in
the organization (complexity). In the period in which this thesis was written, the penetration of
Internet techniques in business was an obvious and attractive inflection point for all the
businesses that rely heavily on information and communication techniques. For this reason, we
chose the passage of firms through the inflection point as the first unit of analysis.
The second unit of analysis is provided by the scope of this thesis, which concerns itself
with the role of the leadership of the firm.The leadership role therefore forms the second unit of
analysis in developing the case analyses.
In the terminology of Yin (1994), we thus end up with an embedded case study design, in
which more than one unit of analysis are treated with the same case attention. Yin correctly
warns against using only single units of analysis (the holistic design) because of the risk of lack of
depth in the research.
Before we can do this, we must first assure ourselves that the dimensions of our model
– including the descriptors of the inflection point, the leadership approaches and the phases of
the inflection point – have characteristics that can be observed in the field. Regarding our
selection of the introduction of Internet in an information-intensive industry, we have already
made the point in the preceding sections. Looking back at the conclusions drawn in Chapter 3, we
arrive at a “checklist” of characteristics of leadership approaches as observed in the field.We can
confirm a leadership approach by looking at the actions that it takes. For example, we can find an
indication of a leadership approach by looking at the size of the portfolio moves that can be large,
or small relative to the size of the firm and its business units. We can also look at the instigators
and actors of portfolio moves that can emanate either from the corporate center or holding, or
from local/business unit management. Competency shifts that can be observed from the moves
of key people and investments made in support of competency development provide a third
indicator of leadership approaches.We can also confirm a leadership approach by looking at the
nature of the communications with local management. Key indicators here are the frequency of
meetings between the firm’s leadership and local management, the number of participants, and
the flexibility of the agenda, which may or may not support two-way interactions. Figure 3.25
links the observable characteristics with the three leadership approaches.
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Figure 3.25: Observable Characteristics of Leadership Approaches
Directive Conditional Ecological
The Nature of Portfolio moves Large Small (relatively) Large
Leadership Actions – acquisitions,
divestitures:
Execution of Corporate Local management Corporate 
portfolio management Management
moves by:
Competency/ Transfers Investment in ICT Hiring/firing only
People moves: Hiring/firing of Management training,
skilled people conferences
Large Human Resources 
staff
The Nature of Frequency of Regular Frequent (Bi)Annual or informal
Communications meetings:
with Local Number of Few Many Few
Management participants in 
meetings:
Meeting agenda: Rigid Flexible Fixed agenda: targets,
accountability
Why Multiple Case Studies?
In our fieldwork, we opted for a multiple case study, which generically offers the
advantage that the evidence – from multiple sources – is more compelling, and the results more
convincing. The essence of multiple case studies is the replication logic, which implies that the
outcome of each of the various cases matches the initial set of propositions. In this thesis, this
replication logic also can be applied in the negative sense – a contrario – when we observe
opposite (polar) behavior and can explain the opposing results through structural differences in
the independent variables underlying both sets of cases (Burgelman, 1991). In our fieldwork we
will find both types of replication logic. We will see that three of the cases (Elsevier, VNU and De
Telegraaf) lead to similar results, which indicates a literal replication. Two other cases (Wolters
Kluwer, Wegener) lead to contrary results, albeit for predictable reasons: theoretical replication
(Yin, 1994).
Choosing Internet as an Inflection Point for the Publishing Industry
Conceptually, there are four different principles for selecting cases: accidental selection,
random sampling, pragmatic criteria and context criteria (Swanborn, 1996).
The choice of event was predicated on the degree that it showed an unambiguous fit
with the three dimensions presented in chapter 2: industry participants should (threaten to)
suffer amplitudinal change in market position and financial results, requiring amplitudinal
shifts in (financial) resources and competencies (i.e.,skilled manpower).Abruptness should show
through either the actions of the industry leadership – through acquisitions/divestitures or
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through hiring/firing of skilled people, or through public statements that indicate this sense of
urgency. Externality should show through the fact that the industry participants themselves
have not developed the technologies or capabilities that drive the major change and/or
characterize the competitive environment after the event. As we will see, the introduction of
Internet in the publishing industry fits with these characteristics.
From the many major environmental changes that have recently been experienced by
industries – consider the Gulf and Iraqi wars, the advent of AIDS, the 9/11 World Trade Center
disaster and the subsequent recession, the Millennium, or the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the
subsequent opening of Eastern Europe, and many other examples – we selected Internet as one
of the environmental phenomena that in information-intensive industries showed the
characteristics of an inflection point.
To select the companies for our research, we identified a number of important criteria:
• the firms should be comparable in their main lines of business: it is much more difficult
to understand leadership behavior when comparing firms in totally different
environments (e.g. a local utility vs. a global high-tech producer) than when a number of
main business lines are similar.
• the firms should be subject to an inflection point in its fully defined sense – they must
have suffered through its amplitude, abruptness and complexity.
• for pragmatic reasons, a reasonable population of firms should be readily accessible
We selected a single industry to reduce the number of differences between the cases and
thus provide a better observation of the inflection point proper.The search was thus for an industry
that was fully impacted by the arrival of Internet (the chosen inflection point) and met the criteria
mentioned above. A number of service industries, like banking, insurance, travel and publishing
came on top of the list. As it happens, the Netherlands is the home for a disproportionate number
of global leaders in publishing, like Reed Elsevier, VNU and Wolters Kluwer. Also, the accessible
group of companies together had at least 50% share of the markets in which they operate, which
gives the case research a level of representation for the entire industry. Accordingly, we approached
the six major publishing companies in the Netherlands: Reed Elsevier (in particular, its Elsevier
Science Publishers/ESP group), VNU, Wolters Kluwer, Wegener, De Telegraaf and PCM. Five of these
agreed to participate in the study, at varying degrees of involvement.
The Work Steps
Our work plan consisted of a logical sequence of activities leading from tquestions to
final conclusions. The sequence follows the conceptual work flow documented by Eiosenhardt
(1989, figure 3.26).
The first step was the development of hypotheses. These resulted from both desk
research – theory and initial reviews of the target companies – and up-front interviews with
industry leaders, who were executive board members or division managers during the crucial
years 1995-1999. This up-front research also yielded a selection of five publishing companies
(work step 3), of interview candidates within these companies, as well as a first topic list to guide
us through the interview and data gathering process, which was finalized in work step 4.
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As part of work step 2, we conducted a wide survey of possible recent inflection points, including
candidates like the Gulf War, the millennium, the opening of Eastern Europe, etc.This survey lead
to the selection of Internet, particularly as it related to a number of information- and
communication-intensive industries like banking, insurance, ICT, transportation and publishing.
It was at this point that we were able to make a final decision regarding the companies we
wanted to approach (work step 3).
Our review of relevant theory (Chapter 2 and 3) also enabled us to develop our
hypotheses in the form of defining propositions (work step 1) and to define our units of analysis
(work step 2).
To develop the protocol and questionnaire in work step 4, and to prepare for the actual
interviews, we conducted a thorough analysis of the 1994-2000 annual reports and press files of
each of the five companies, which provided a good part of the factual underpinnings to this
analysis. Desk research consisted of both theory and initial reviews of the target companies, and
up-front research consisted of interviews with industry leaders, who were executive board
members or division managers during the crucial years 1995-1999. This up-front research also
yielded a selection of interview candidates within the five companies, as well as a topic list to
guide us through the interview and data gathering process.The resulting topic list is provided in
the appendix.
Subsequent to the desk research, we contacted senior members of the leadership in
charge during the critical inflection point years, 1998-1999. With their help, we also had the
opportunity to interview between one and three other members of the leadership (i.e., CEO,
Executive Board Members and Division Presidents) (work step 5). At a minimum, we conducted
two-hour interviews with the selected leadership. But in most instances the interviews took
longer, and gave cause and opportunity to go back for second, third and fourth discussions. Most
of the interviews were conducted in the summer of 2001, in the offices or homes of the
interviewees. Detailed notes were made. After the interviews, the results were incorporated into
a next version of the case description, which was then sent to the interviewee for review. In most
cases this resulted in corrections provided in writing or by telephone. In a number of others, there
was enough reason to conduct an additional interview.
Business is a complex activity, and it took time to isolate the inflection point and the
ensuing reactions of the leadership from the “noise” created by a living world and living
organizations. During the period in which the publishing companies had to face the changes of
Internet, they also had to contend with the impact of other “new economy” trends, like the
increase in shareholder influence and the new emphasis on management remuneration, with
the economic impact of political events like the Gulf War, and the opening of Eastern Europe and
China. We found that a lateral and descriptive perspective – going through the developments
year by year – was the most effective, and produced far more results than attempts to answer
each question in analytical order.
At the end of the interview program (work step 5) we were able to perform two cross-
analyses. The first was to check our case findings against with the original propositions. The
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outcome of this analysis is provided in the conclusions of chapter 4. The second one was a
comparison between the cases, also discussed at the end of chapter 4 (work step 6).
We finally were in a position to reach our final conclusions from the fieldwork in work step 7, as
described at the end of chapter 4 and in chapter 5.
The work steps are summarized in Figure 3.26
Figure 3.26: Work Steps in Field Research
Work step Information sources
1 Hypothesis and question development Theory review
Company reports
Interviews
2 Define unit of analysis Theory review
Interviews
Company reports
3 Select cases Company reports
Interviews
4 Develop protocol and questionnaire Company reports
5 Data collection/use crafting tools Interviews
6 Analyze case study evidence Data Analysis
7 Reach final conclusions Data and theory analysis
Adapted from Eisenhardt (1989)
Validity of the Case Research
Traditional literature on methodology regards validity as the degree to which the
measurement of a variable is free of both coincidental and systematic mistakes (Swanborn,1981).
Coincidental mistakes are caused by the influence of measurement elements (such as, for
example, the researcher, his instruments, the situation or the respondent) on the variable that is
measured. Coincidental deviations occur when the measuring results do not occur when the
measurement is repeated. Reliability is the extent to which measurement of a variable is free of
coincidental mistakes Systematic errors, on the other hand, cause deviations that continue to
exist through repetition of the measurement.
A list of quality tests that is more attuned to case study research is provided by Yin (1994),
who identifies four types of tests: construct validity, internal validity, external validity, and
repeatability.
Construct validity depends on the researchers’ ability to develop an operational set of
measures that minimize the subjective element of data gathering and analysis. In case of this
inflection point analysis, the measures were in large part developed from our theoretical
research:it was there that we were able to ground the observations that we will make in chapter 4.
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Internal validity only applies to case studies that seek causal relationships between events, and
probes the validity of this causality. For example, if we presume that an event is the cause of an
outcome, are we sure that there are no other events or contextual circumstances that are the
reason (rather than our assumed cause) for the outcome to occur? In our case, the emphasis of
the analysis is on the leadership experience of the five firms in the inflection point,rather than on
proving that one firm has better managed the three approaches than the other, and thus has
delivered better results.This is relevant, because one of the results that we analyze (i.e., financial
performance through the period), is indeed the consequence of many factors (of which Internet
is but one). For example, VNU, in our research period, embarked not only on a major redirection
towards Internet, but also on a fundamental restructuring of its portfolio that resulted in the
company losing two traditional core operations – newspaper publishing and broadcasting – and
gaining a major position in media information, via the purchase of the two Nielsen companies.
These portfolio moves undoubtedly were inspired by the leadership’s perception of moves in the
use of information in the outside world, including the perception of maturity or even ageing of
the print business, and the associated emergence of new media, such as Internet. But this
restructuring thus had a broader context than just Internet,and it is difficult to differentiate it on
financial performance and (relative) share price from the impact of the Internet developments
on their own. Similar statements can be made about the investments of Wegener in Direct Mail.
Figure 3.27, however, shows that nearly all of the major actions taken by the five companies had a
strong connection to the changes in information and communication markets, of which Internet
is a major part.
Figure 3.27: Inflection Point/Internet related Leadership Actions
Company Major direct Internet Action with strong Non Internet-related 
actions Internet connection actions
Reed Elsevier:
Elsevier Science Science Direct Lexis-Nexus Acq. Harcourt
Wolters Kluwer Atos-Origin Merger discussions 
with Reed Elsevier
VNU Creation of VIPS Acq. A.C. Nielsen 
Acq. Nielsen
Acq. Directories
Div. Newspapers
Div. Broadcasting
Wegener CityOnline Div. Arcadis
Acq. Newspapers
De Telegraaf Joint Ventures
Source: company reports
External validity relates to the ability to generalize the findings of the study beyond the
cases that have been researched. As discussed, this is often a weakness of the case study
approach. In this particular case there is little doubt about the relevance of the findings to the
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publishing industries. The sample of five companies covers a major portion of the global
scientific and professional publishing business, although the scope of the newspaper companies
is mainly in the Netherlands. Additional fieldwork would of course add depth to this
substantiation, as discussed in chapter 4.
Finally, the reliability test of case research refers to its repeatability, which in this case is not an
issue: each of the work steps described above can be repeated.
3.11 Conclusions regarding the Framework
After having described the inflection point in chapter 2, and subsequently three
leadership approaches in chapter 3, we have now developed a linkage between the inflection
point and the most appropriate approaches. The starting point of this process has been the
realization that an inflection point is not a “big bang” that takes place in a single instant, but
rather, metaphorically, a thunderstorm that announces itself in vague and threatening
rumblings, then overwhelms us with flashes, and thunderclaps, and ends in beautiful refreshing
quiet, which can be enjoyed by those who have sought and found a dry spot, and have not been
washed away by the rain.The theoretical underpinnings of this view were developed in chapter 2
through a review of the six holistic and the four specific views on major change,which resulted in
the identification of three key dimensions: amplitude, abruptness and externality.
To describe the phases of the inflection point, we have benefited from the segregation in
three phases that was developed by Utterback. Subsequently, in our review, in the beginning of
chapter 3, of seven grounding theories of leadership behavior we plotted these against the
nature and speed of strategy deployment which are essential characteristics of strategic action
in an inflection point (fig 3.4). Out of this projection, we identified three leadership approaches,
the directive, conditional and ecological approach, which were verified against five managerial
anchor points. We also developed the hypothesis that the three leadership approaches are not
uniformly congruent with all of the phases, but rather that each of these is particularly
appropriate for one of the phases,although it may have a supporting role in the others.The result
is a leadership model (figure 3.23) that links the characteristics and phases of the inflection point
with the three leadership approaches and can be verified in the field. To do this verification, we
formulated our hypotheses in four defining assumptions and three propositions that address
the three questions with which we embarked on this thesis in chapter 1, and developed ten
questions that enable us to substantiate our propositions in the field.We have explained why we
prefer multiple case studies as the main means to answer our ten questions, and explained our
choice of Internet as the inflection point, as experienced by five publishing multinationals as
cases.
The next chapter will explore whether we can observe our model in the case studies that we
selected in the outside world.
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4 Case Research - Catching up with the Internet
in the Publishing Industry
4.1 Introduction: Case Studies
Having developed a set of propositions about the approaches that the leadership of a
firm can apply in an inflection point, we still question the practicality of the theorems: how well
do they hold in real life?
To find illustrative proof, we turn to one of the more important inflection points
encountered by the business world over the past decade in the rapid introduction of Internet in
business in the industrialized countries.This chapter first provides a summarized background on
the creation of Internet and on the five case studies selected (4.1). Subsequently, sections 4.2
through 4.6 present the five individual cases. Conclusions appear in 4.7, the final section of this
chapter.
The eventual success of Internet was based on the collusion of three standards that
occurred in the early 1990s: Microsoft Windows (for the operation of personal computers), IP
(Internet Protocol) for low-cost communications between computers, and HTML (hyper text
marker language) as a tool that enables efficient and rapid access to new addresses. Alignment
of these three technologies brought forth a wave of new services and companies from 1995
onwards.For the first time,people could instantly access information across the globe at low cost,
and interact with one another or with a business in a very cost-efficient way, even if the e-mail
standard did initially limit communications to text only.This inflection point in its inception was
supported by a healthy economy that produced sufficient amounts of high-risk seed and venture
capital to enable the launch of a multitude of Internet companies, many of which failed, but
many of which also succeeded dramatically.
The basic concepts of Internet herald back to 1961, when the US Department of Defense
established a distributed network of computers called Arpanet (Advanced Research Projects
Agency Network). In 1962, Paul Baron of RAND wrote a research paper “On Distributed
Communications Networks” that explained that networks without a central node like Arpanet
were flexible and highly reliable – the disappearance of a single (central) node did not
fundamentally harm the performance of the network, and expansion and adjustment was a
continuous organic process without disruptions to expand the system. Since a number of
universities were highly involved in defense research, it was attractive to connect them to
Arpanet, and in early 1971, the first four US universities were connected, a number that expanded
rapidly to 23 universities by the end of that year. 1973 saw the first international connections,with
the UK and Norway.By then,three quarters of Arpanet traffic consists of e-mail. In 1974,Telnet, the
commercial counterpart of Arpanet, was established; in 1979, USnet introduced the concept of
discussion groups. In 1982, the word Internet was coined, and EUnet established as European
equivalent of USnet. Finally, in 1983, introduction of the TCP/IP protocols signaled the
breakthrough of Internet: one year later the Apple Macintosh computer brought us the now-
ubiquitous mouse, and in 1985 the domain categorizations .com, .edu, .gov and .uk were
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established. The design of the global web WWW was started by Berner-Lee at CERN (Conseil
Europeenne de la Recherche Nucleaire), in 1990, which took over the role of Arpanet. The first
publicly accessible HTML page was launched on August 6, 1991. In the same year the first
navigation program, Gopher, was launched, followed in 1993 by Mosaic, the first graphic web
browser.WWW went public in 1992, enabling the large scale, global spread of Internet.
In the first ten years of Internet’s existence, the number of connections grew from 23 to
more than 400,000; in the 1990s, the number grew from 130,000 to nearly 60 million, a number
that has increased to more than a hundred million as we write this page (figure 4.1)
Figure 4.1: Number of Internet connections (computers with an IP address)
Number of Connections: 23                     130K 60mln                       93mln
In 1994-1995 the first large-scale commercial applications emerged. These were limited
to commodity articles with easily guaranteed quality, like books and music-CDs, and stock
trading. First successes thus included Amazon.com and Barnes & Noble in the first category, and
Charles Schwab in the second. Products and services with a more complex or emotional
specification, or a more complex delivery (e.g. large volume groceries) came later, although an
exception should be made for businesses where the Internet’s ability to span distances created
new trading opportunities. A good example here is the early emergence of auctions of a wide
range of products – from used toys and books to cars and last-minute travel offers. Here,
companies like E-bay were an early success.
Undoubtedly, Internet was an inflection point for those organizations that rely heavily
on communications and information processing, like banks, publishers and media companies.
First of all, the entire value chain of these service companies has changed fundamentally. The
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customer interface has become much more personal and intense, and for many companies, a
systematic recording and analysis of customer behavior has become feasible (and therefore a
competitive necessity). Since a large (or at least larger) part of the customer interactions takes
place in a computerized individual continuum, delivery and production systems needed to be
adjusted – or rather redesigned and rebuilt – to take advantage of this new ability to deliver
exactly what the customer wants,at the moment he or she wants it.Within the delivery chain,the
ability to stay totally informed of events across a network of business partners has in many
instances enabled a new networked, decentralized supply system with significantly enhanced
flexibility, often with significant cost savings (figure 4.2).
Figure 4.2: Impact of Internet on the Supply Chain
For many of the existing business suppliers, the shift from traditional business to
Internet-based business was unexpected and rapid. In 1985, Internet was still a communication
tool for scientists and enthusiasts,but by 1999, it had become the basis of a number of major new
business – like auctioning and global book and CD sales – and was starting to affect a wide range
of information-intensive businesses like banking, travel, trading and retailing.The race was on.
The incumbent suppliers in the businesses mentioned above mainly showed a defensive
bewilderment with the new media, and an inability to adjust. In some cases, companies simply
opened their Internet website with only advertising text. In others, management announced
new regional or global market strategies based on Internet, while implying that this could be
achieved simply by launching advanced Internet services (thereby ignoring the key branding and
advertising processes).
In the initial years, the US took an early lead in Internet development, and as this book is
written, they are still perceived to be two years ahead of Europe (see figure 4.3), which in turn is
ahead of Asia and the rest of the world. However, the lagging regions – in particular Europe –
appear to be gradually catching up. Industry wise, information-intensive and consumer
marketing business sectors are ahead of capital-intensive business-to-business industries
(figure 4.3).
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Figure 4.3: E-Momentum by Country
Accordingly, the different ‘waves’ of penetration make it possible to see how companies
in different regions and industries are successively reacting to the introduction of this new
media.To make this comparison,a research study has been launched that covers ten industries in
the country most ahead in Internet applications (the US) and the country most years behind (the
Netherlands). The study also involves industries that are ahead in introducing Internet (like
banking), and industries that have been slower (like steel making) (figure 4.4).
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Figure 4.4: E-Momentum by Industry
For our field investigation,we selected five publishing companies that all have their base
in the Netherlands. Two of these – Elsevier Science and Wolters Kluwer – are involved in global
scientific and professional publishing. One company – VNU – is developing into a global business
supplier of consumer and professional information. And Wegener and De Telegraaf are regional
Dutch newspaper and magazine publishers. Although the roots of these companies were not
that far apart (since they all started in traditional publishing on paper – i.e., books, magazines
and/or newspapers), they are now finding that their areas of endeavor are drifting apart, a
movement that was undoubtedly hastened by the introduction of Internet. As this thesis is
written, we can see how the different strategic tracks followed in recent years have resulted in
companies with increasingly different profiles (figure 4.5).
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Figure 4.5: Summary Profile of the Five Publishing Companies
Company Main Line Geographic % Domestic 
of Business scope sales Revenues Number of 
employees
$ blns (000)
Reed Elsevier professional Global 7% 5.5 28.9
publications
Elsevier Science scientific Global 5% 0.9 3.7
publications
Wolters Kluwer professional Europe, USA 20% 3.4 19.0
publications
VNU business Europe, USA 7% 3.1 21.6
information,
magazines 
Wegener newspapers, Netherlands 90% 0.9 7.6
magazines
De Telegraaf newspapers, Netherlands 97% 1.6 6.0
magazines
Source: annual reports, 2000
In the course our case discussions we will test our observations against the charac-
teristics of the inflection points against the phases of the inflection point (figure 2.12) and against
the managerial anchor points (fig 3.11).
4.2: Elsevier Science: Continuing Success through Internet
Introduction - Entering the Internet World
Elsevier Science (ES) is part of Reed Elsevier, which was formed in 1993 out of a merger
between Dutch publishers Elsevier (founded in 1880) and Reed (founded in the UK in 1903). The
two companies still have their own legal identity,and are listed on the stock exchanges of London
and Amsterdam. Reed Elsevier has a turnover of $5.5 bln (2000), produced by four business units:
Science & Medical/ESP (18% of turnover), Business (45%), Legal (32%) and Education (5%). More
than half of the revenues (56%) are realized in North American markets, and one-third (33%) in
Europe.
Elsevier Science (ES) was and is the main cash earner for Reed Elsevier, and is one of the
most successful information companies in the world, with an unequalled track record of growth
and profitability. ES was established as successor both of the scientific publishing at Elsevier, as
well as its Excerpta Medica, an integrated database of medical articles. In the 1950s, Excerpta
Medica merged with the venerable publishing house of Elsevier, which had roots tracing back to
1880.
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ES started as a crude – by modern standards – collection of reference material, and rapidly
developed into a family of fifteen publishing firms covering a wide range of medical and
scientific topics. In the early 1980s, ES was already aware of the potential new information
technologies. Business managers visited conferences on electronic document handling, at which
the SGML standard was announced, albeit to an audience of mainly government and defense
organizations.They also commissioned a number of consulting studies by professional firms and
individual experts to try to predict the new market, and the possible role that ESP could play in it.
These studies were mainly conceptual and technical models: at that time there were few if any
relevant historic data, and the main focus of the planners was therefore to consider the features
that new information processing and communications technologies could provide, match these
against known or possible needs of different populations of actual and potential customers, and
define qualitative models of a new information environment. These reports never made it
beyond a small circle of top Elsevier and ESP managers, and in the first years no strategic
decisions and actions were taken.
A Fluid Start-up – 1988-1993
Until 1993, ES was a relatively traditional publishing house, in which about 15 publishing
units – totally independent until 1985, and each a profit center – produced 1200 journals with
15,000 issues per year, and 160,000 individual articles. Each article traditionally passed through
a pre-print round in which the first concepts were mailed to about 10 colleagues of the author for
comments, and then formally submitted for reference, before going into print (figure 4.13).
In the late 1980s (after 1987), however, the operating units of ES publishers, organized in
four divisions, started their own Internet initiatives.These were conducted independently, which
meant that each unit developed its own processes and content (figure 4.6).
Figure 4.6: ESP organization before the inflection point
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15 Publishing Groups
Agent and Library Relations
The economic process at the same time ran a different, albeit parallel, course.The main customer
group was (and is) the 2000-odd university libraries across the world that received regular visits
from ES library representatives, who traditionally performed a staff function. Staff of the
individual publishing companies, who also took care of invoicing and receivables, took actual
subscription orders.
Figure 4.7: Traditional Scientific Publishing Process Flows
Commercially, ES found itself in an attractive although increasingly risky equilibrium.
The number of journals went up, whilst the rejection rate, paper volume and production costs
also went up. To their library customers, the publishers charged increasing prices, which
stimulated a lively trade of photocopies, and the emergence of document delivery centers in the
libraries that used fax as distribution medium. As result, there was a gradual decline of
subscriptions that was, however, more than compensated by price increases of up to 15%
annually, thus continuing a profitable, albeit downward, spiral.
At the same time, the first authors started experimenting with electronic pre-press – i.e.,
the circulation of first drafts for collegial comments, as well as the formal submission and review
process. Database storage of these articles was strongly stimulated by the introduction of the
SGML standard (which proved less effective for communications), which started in the physics
area (where the graphic complexity of articles strongly stimulated quality automation).
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Unsurprisingly, the scientific community at CERN was leader in both automated pre-press and
the early introduction of Internet. For example, CERN originally developed the WWW/HTML
communications standard. The idea was popular, and before long, each of the 15 publishing
houses had its own Internet project, with a rapid expansion of the number of websites, as each of
the (main) journals started its own site.
At the central level, an important strategic experiment called Tulip was launched
together with six American university libraries. Furthermore, ES started, again experimentally, to
centrally co-ordinate the electronic filing of article abstracts (project CAPCAS/Production of
Current Awareness Services, predecessor of the later Computer Aided Production Process) – with
mixed success, both technically and commercially.
At the end of 1992, ES found itself in a rapidly changing environment in which the
effectiveness of its offerings, processes and structure – and as result of this its competitive
leadership – were increasingly uncertain.
1993 - Start of the Inflection
In 1993, ES started following a general market trend in accepting Internet as main
standard for the submission of articles, which was somewhat inevitable, given the popularity
that this channel was gaining with scientists. Other standards, however, including diskettes,
remained acceptable. On the distribution side, ES initiated dissemination of integrated
content/software CD-ROM’s through Elsevier Electronic Services (EES), which was an
implementation project of Tulip, as well as a local storage variant of what was to become Science
Direct.These introductions did result in multi-standard platforms for distribution, but also gave
ES units valuable experience in electronic media, which was also appreciated by defense
organizations and other customers that wanted to assure total confidentiality of their searches.
It was clear that the internal organization and sales were insufficiently geared towards fully
electronic (Internet) products and sales. Increasingly, the role of the ES leadership was geared
towards keeping track of investments and financial results. There was a multitude of conflicting
internal strategies and policies, which led to increasing confusion in the marketplace,
particularly when the different sales policies of each of the publishers came into play.
Comparing the situation during these years with the characteristics of the three phases of the
inflection point (figure 9.3), we can state the following:
• There was a rapidly changing diversity of products and services offered mostly on a local
basis,
• There were few emerging standards, like IP and HTML, and even those were often under
development
• Internet business processes were flexible, and conducted mostly at the unit level, and 
• There were a relatively large and growing number of (Internet) competitors; For Elsevier
ESP, the market thus was in a fluid state.
In terms of the leadership approaches observed (figure 3.26), we can conclude the following:
Most Internet initiatives and investments were made at the unit level,with the exception of Tulip
and CAPCAS.
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Internal communications were generally informal, which leads us to a leadership style that was
generally ecological, with a few directive actions
Transition – 1994-1997
From 1994 onwards, new leaders were appointed to head ES, and they gradually became
the spearhead of new strategic and organizational thinking. They realized that the strategic
situation of ES was rapidly deteriorating. The downward spiral of declining subscriptions was
accelerating and taking dangerous proportions, and it was obvious that any solutions would
seriously affect most if not all of the business functions of ES, including the development of
articles, the production and storage functions, sales and distribution. At the same time, a high
level of uncertainty persisted about the actual projections for electronic media. In the 1995
annual report, the leadership noted its expectation that hard copy journals would for some time
continue to account for a significant portion of the scientific information market. Figure 4.8
specifies the trends by function.
Figure 4.8: The Impact of Electronic Technologies on the ES 
Publishing Business
Function Traditional Transitional Electronic
Authoring Typewriter Word processor PC
Review Mail Fax E-mail
Journal assembly Paper/manual Word processor Database
Printing Paper Paper Database
Distribution Mail Mail, Fax Internet
Sales Single subscription Single subscription Package subscription
Payment Check Check Electronic
Efforts at the unit level to meet these challenges were generally ineffective, and certainly
an inefficient use of scarce resources. Also, the customers were increasingly confused and
angered by the often conflicting offers made to them by the individual publishing units. Most of
the local efforts at designing and implementing both the front-end and back-end systems were
ineffective. The leadership came to the conclusion that the time had come to move from the
experimental phase towards imposing a general solution.
At this point, the leadership made an in-depth analysis of the work process of scientific
publishing, and created a “grand design,” proposing a more centralized approach. The focus of
this vision was internal, and the analysis was thus not part of a broader market blueprint:
external conditions were either judged to be constants (like customer segmentation), or
included intuitively (like the industry-wide trend to using Internet).
The essential characteristics of the grand design were 1) a single global database for all
scientific publishing, 2) a single fulfillment system 3) global outsourcing for key functions like
editing and 4) global management of the key functions.
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ES leadership also outlined a vision for electronic publishing, although individual publishing units
continued to experiment at the grassroots level, with a resulting proliferation of local websites.
The leadership used a novel way to introduce the new process and allocate the funding,
by relying on the dedication, cognitive powers and experience of a large group of local managers
to introduce the new measures within six months following a chaotic approach. To everybody’s
surprise, the project was a success.
Early 1994 - First Directive Initiatives
In early 1994, the leadership took the first steps to implement the “grand design” by
imposing a standard production process (CAPCAS: computer-aided production process), which
was media-neutral. This process was to make use of a central storage facility (electronic data
warehouse), which ES started up in 1994 with project support from IBM, which enabled slicing
and dicing techniques. The first operational applications of this process were Content Alert and
Content Direct, which provided readers with the contents pages of journals by electronic mail
In late 1994, Elsevier acquired Lexis-Nexis for $1 bln. This company provided Elsevier with
very powerful automated database management and search routines that later were to form the
backbone of ES’s Internet activities. Interestingly, the information competencies of Lexis were but a
secondary argument in the acquisition, which had the legal and business markets in the US as
main targets. Accordingly, Lexis-Nexis was considered primarily a business acquisition, and
secondarily a competency portfolio addition. ESP management soon realized, however, what a
major contribution could be made by the powerful search engine of Lexis-Nexis, which accelerated
the transfer of know-how and software without giving up the original data base structure.
Notwithstanding the local experiments, acceptance of the idea of a new business model
was difficult: ES’s existing model had been a 40-year success, and it was difficult to convince key
players that the fundamental structure of the business had to change. Management started a
concerted effort to direct and motivate people to a new approach under the motto “fear and
excitement”.
1995 - Major Change
In 1995, ES leadership made a series of major moves to further implement the “grand
design”. The most important of these was to combine all the text gathering and database
management into one new company called Science Direct, which started in 1996, with an initial
mission to establish a central global database for all pre-press activities.
A second major action, undertaken shortly thereafter, was to focus the sales activities
into one unit, thus leaving the publishers with a sole responsibility for content (figure 9.4) A
single new global sales policy and pricing structure was introduced, with a new thrust towards
selling the entire ES database for a single high ($1 mln) fee rather than selling a collection of
individual subscriptions. At the time of this study, more than 60% of all contracts have already
been converted. Under the new policies, pricing strategy was also taken over by ES management,
leaving the 15 individual publishing units responsible for the all-important task of content
provision.
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Figure 4.9: ES Organization after restructuring
These actions had far-reaching consequences – including the following:
• all articles now had to conform to a standardized structure,
• all publishing groups were made subject to a single economic management model,
• with the introduction of global sales, country management was moved to a less
dominant role,
• relations with the agents had to be redefined, since many of their tasks were taken over
by the new sales organization – which also meant smoothing some ruffled feathers.
ES management also decided to source out any activities that were not considered core.
This included large parts of the editing function, which were moved to contractors in India and
the Philippines.
If we try to assess this period in terms of its position in the Internet transition process (figure
7.3A), we observe the following:
• Products and services are now being introduced on a firm-wide basis; if only for that
reason, the number of introductions went down dramatically,
• The acceptance of industry-wide standards, and
• The gradual reduction in the number of competitors who often were absorbed by
Elsevier and its larger colleagues.
Which leads us to regard this period as transitional, from an Elsevier vantage point.
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In considering the leadership’s approaches used (figure 9.5) we see the following:
• Large acquisitions including Lexis-Nexis
• The imposition of key business processes (CAPCAS)
• Management meetings to explain the new strategies
Which are traits of a Directive leadership style
1996 - Towards Conditional Management
Initially (i.e., in the beginning of 1996), the management opted for a hands-off approach
in implementing the new vision, and permitted the operating units to sort out the specifics of
the new policy. On one hand, the publishing units continued their own Internet experiments,
which was a major draw on managerial time and expenses: not surprisingly, financial results
were very poor in this period.There was also strong resistance against the plans of ES leadership.
But by the third quarter, the main lines had been straightened out. Overall, 1996 was
characterized by a chaotic management style, combined with increasing pressures as costs went
up and the market became increasingly confused about brand and sales approaches. With
hindsight, management regarded this period as highly valuable as a local learning experience.
Management made a conscious decision not to confront local initiative directly (“to keep
them ticking over”) in order to avoid de-motivation of unit management.
In the same year, ES recorded major losses by writing off the accrued cost of Science Direct. In
addition, the investment levels for e-publishing went up from Dfl. 15 ml/yr to Dfl. 80 mln/yr on a
sustained basis, which was of course reason for concern at the leadership level.
1997-1998 - Towards Delegation
By mid 1997, Science Direct was officially on-line, which meant that 50% of the articles
were included, albeit some of them up to three weeks late. Management reported that the test
was successfully ended. Science Direct could now be accessed by Internet: the encyclopedia
Neuroscience became the first fully Internet-based product.
ES also introduced the information service Science Channel, which supplies news and
information about the journals via Internet. This introduction had been enabled by two small
but important acquisitions, of Biomednet and Chemweb, which gave ES the necessary
experience and know-how in the creation of electronic user groups for individual scientists.
ES could also report an important improvement of its operating results, notwith-
standing the heavy investments in electronic publishing and the associated infrastructure.
In the subsequent two years, the quality of Science Direct went up,and the budgets of the
publishers for independent IM work were gradually squeezed, which meant that by the end of
2000, 13 of the 15 publishing houses had moved their databases to Science Direct, which thus
became the main physical and data-warehouse of ES. The new track did leave flexibility for
adjustment of the model. For example, when ES discovered that filling the databases of Science
Direct in a centralized process took too much time, they successfully changed to a decentralized
data delivery model.
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By 1998, the products and main processes of ES had become well defined, and the company could
focus on realizing an industry-wide rollout of its offerings, as well as improvement of the
economics of the business (including cost control). For example, the well-known medical journal
The Lancet had introduced a website in 1996, but now became fully available on a paperless
subscription basis. Also, Science Direct introduced a new generation standard for the electronic
dissemination of scientific information,which was supported by the advanced search routines of
Lexis-Nexis.
By that time, the leadership of ES had changed its posture to a more traditional corporate
style, by delegating the tactics of running the publishing, commercial and production processes
to the appropriate unit heads.The time of dramatic decisions was past.
If we try to characterize the environment as seen from Elsevier’s position, we observe the
following:
• Few product changes, although the flow of new products continued,
• The consolidation of the industry continued,albeit with a declining number of acquisitions,
• The industry concentrated on a few standards (e.g., the marginalization of Apple’s OS),
• Rigid business processes, and
• Increasingly, an oligopoly with only a few global science information suppliers,
which appears to Elsevier to be a specific development phase of the industry 
Regarding the leadership posture in this period (figure 3.10), we see the following:
• No major, and a number of minor, acquisitions in this period,
• Acquisitions initiated and executed by local managers,
• A further build-up in investment in ICT and human resources, and
• The establishment of a regular system of management conferences that included dialog
agenda items,
which leads us to a characterization of a conditional management style
The Situation after 1997: Conclusions
As this analysis is written, ES appears to be back on track, with both its market position
and financial performance improving. Accordingly, ES leadership is gradually moving towards a
more hands-off conditional approach in which the business units have more freedom to operate
within a prescribed set of policies and procedures.
In terms of inflection point behavior, all three management approaches can be
identified. In the start-up phase – until 1994 – management depended strongly on an ecological
approach, which enabled the individual units to develop learning attitudes. Entrepreneurship in
the multiple local units was encourages, but the consistency of Internet capability development
as well as the integration of knowledge accordingly were low. As often is the case with ecological
approaches, management policies often felt intuitive and not explicit, and it seemed that the
levels of accountability (new economy) both at the portfolio and individual levels necessary to
make ecological approaches work was insufficient – witness the losses made in 1997 and 1998.
The big benefit of this period was the learning experience at both the unit and company levels.
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The units learned what was possible technologically with the new medium of Internet, and
found out by trial and error that they could not run their “closed shops” without a modicum of
centralization in a common database and sales policy. Company management learned, the hard
way, how costly chaos strategies could be in terms of duplicate efforts and sub-optimal use of
competencies, as well as the confusion that these strategies evoke in the marketplace.
1995 was the short period of strong directive action, in which Reed Elsevier first bought
Lexis-Nexis, which was an important capability move, and the leadership of ES set up Science
Direct and imposed its processes on the organization in a holistic manner. During this period the
new strategic directions and a new structure were imposed, top-down. This would provide the
framework for the successful working conditions of subsequent years. The starting point was a
total rethink of the basic business processes of ES, which in turn resulted in an organizational
restructuring of the business. These changes were, to a good extent, imposed on the units. A
number of typically directive tools, like the acquisition of Lexis-Nexis and the conscious
appointment of new leaders, were used. The entire period did result in a redirection of a now
unified competence portfolio.
After 1995, the leadership of ES gradually increased its reliance on conditional tools to
guide strategy and operations within the vision, structure and processes that had been set.
Management directions now became u-turn, and provided the multiple unit managers with a
good degree of local entrepreneurial freedom. Due to the standards set in procedures and
(software) tools, consistency of capability development as well as the knowledge integration
remained high Accountability was instilled ex-ante. But the price of this balance between top-
down and bottom-up was an increased complexity of structure and processes. Figure 4.10
illustrates the approaches used.
Figure 4.10: ES Approaches Used
Phase Directive Conditional Ecological
1992-1993 Tulip Local pre-press 
Fluid experiments
1994-1995 Acq. Lexis-Nexis 
Transition Science Direct
New Management
Key Appointments
1996-2000 New processes
Specific New Structure
New policies
2001- Further delegation
The strategic posture of the holding company that owns ES, Reed Elsevier, was basically
ecological, with a small but essential interjection of directive management in the appointment
of the leadership. One can note a slight adjustment in 2001 with the appointment of a chief
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technology officer (a conditional move). But the creation of a venture capital fund in the same
year was a portfolio enhancement (potentially directive) that was run in an ecological way: one
can debate the purpose and effectiveness of such a hybrid.
4.3: Wolters Kluwer - The Track of Gradual Change
Wolters Kluwer, an international publisher of professional and scientific journals, was
the result of a relatively late (1987) merger of two long-standing publishing houses, Wolters
Samsom,founded in 1836,and the Kluwer group,established in 1889.The company,with Eur 3664
mln in sales in 2000, and 19,000 employees, has three main areas of business: Legal, Tax and
Business (70% of sales), International Health,and Science & Education.The main lines of business
are organized on a geographical basis due to the national differences in legal and tax systems.We
will see that this regional decentralization had an important influence on the reaction of the
company to Internet. Europe is the most important continent (49% of sales), followed closely by
North America (47%).
Before 1998 - First Gradual Growth
Wolters Kluwer was an early starter in digitization. Many of its operating companies
were involved in publishing reference works, and expended a great deal of effort in tracking
updates – and errors on updates – in the many editions of their (paper) databases. They soon
found out that digitization of those databases,which was not too difficult for text-only topics like
law and taxes, was an obvious way to enable instant upgrades of editions and elimination of
errors. If only due to the real cost savings, they found themselves well on the way to full internal
digitization by the early 1980s. These digital databases were so good, that by 1994 the Dutch
lawmakers found themselves writing new statutes directly into the WK legal database. In 1997, a
start was also made with Kluwer Online, which provided electronic referencing of a series of
journals and went commercial with 400 titles in 1999.
In other areas (like science and education), however, the experience was more mixed. For
example, the Samson unit, involved in textbooks for school, started early – in 1985 – with
computerization of its text material. By 1994, however, it found that the quality of its products
and services had declined, while costs had risen. Externally, WK announced in early 1995 that it
had chosen for a very gradual introduction of external electronic services
The strategic development of Wolters Kluwer (WK) in the area of Internet was to a large
extent driven by two important traits: First of all,WK was a strongly decentralized company with
a small holding staff, which saw itself mainly as a (financial) facilitating and accountability unit.
Most of the work, including strategy development, was done by the 30-odd country units, which
was also where the vast majority of the 16,000 employees were located. Secondly, WK as a
company was financially driven, and for many years prided itself with a 15% earnings growth
rate, a trend that it even publicly predicted three years ahead. Because of these considerations,
WK stressed the evolutionary element in e-publishing,and the gradual introduction of electronic
products and services. Content ownership was the core of the strategy, and this content was to be
supplied in any form the customer specified.
In 1995,the executive board began to discuss Internet,and the announcement was made that WK
would invest Dfl. 100 mln per year in electronic publishing,and would pay considerable attention
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to publishing on demand. After serious management debate, however, investment decisions
were not implemented,since it would have seriously disrupted the earnings track record that WK
had established. In 1996,WK did launch its first online journal.
A year later, in 1996,WK did announce its first offerings on the Internet and with Kluwer
Online, which made the content of WK journals available on the Internet with extensive search
routines. But it also stressed the gradual growth of the market.
If we plot the outlook from a Kluwer perspective on the outside world following the criteria
discussed in chapter 2, we can make the following observations:
• Business development – including investments, standard setting and product develop-
ment – was very much at the local market level,
• Most business processes were run at the local unit level, with the exception of financial
controls, and
• Competition was relatively fragmented,
which leads us to an observation of a fluid market
Regarding the attitudes of WK’s leadership (figure 3.25), we see the following:
A few, major portfolio moves that were unrelated to Internet and are not discussed here,
but were executed at the corporate level. Few people moves. Infrequent management meetings.
And a rigid agenda of budgeting and ex-post reporting, which was the most important formal
interaction with unit managers.This leads us to conclude that the leadership style was ecological
in nature,with a conditional undercurrent.Most of the Internet initiatives were conducted at the
local level, with a high degree of local entrepreneurship. Speed and consistency of portfolio
development was relatively low, with little overall scope for alignment and fit of Internet
activities.The same limitations applied to knowledge creation regarding the new medium.
1998-1999 A Conflictual Breakthrough
The apparent prospects of heavy investments to prepare for the Internet era were an
important reason to enter into merger negotiations with Reed Elsevier, in October 1997. From
WK’s perspective, this alliance had a number of advantages. Reed Elsevier had ample financial
resources, for example, which would have helped defray the investments in Internet. Another
advantage was the recent acquisition that Reed Elsevier had made in Lexis-Nexis, which had the
potential of providing an important technology base for developing the digital databases and
access systems needed by the post inflection company.The two companies could not agree on the
financial terms, however, and the alliance discussions were terminated in March 1998.
This state of affairs forced corporate management to develop an independent view on
Internet strategy in a very uncertain environment, and to find the right partners(s) where
appropriate. In order to start a thinking process, WK recruited a consultant, Rost van Tonningen,
as advisor: Van Tonningen had just spent considerable time familiarizing himself with the “new
economy” on the West Coast. However, there were incompatible viewpoints at the corporate and
country levels. Corporate management wanted to move ahead, but was very concerned about
the costs of developing multiple Internet systems at the country level. The country managers
generally were wary of Internet and preferred to postpone Internet investments. In 1997, the
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company did appoint a CTO. Overall, understanding of the technical and commercial potential of
Internet remained limited. Officially, the company stressed the important role of country
managers in introducing Internet applications, and also the freedom of the customer to choose
the medium.
In the course of 1998, investment analysts and journalists began to query WK about its
Internet activities,and started to make unfavorable comparisons with the company relative to its
peers Reed Elsevier and Pearson. The executive board asked each of the operating companies to
submit a “wish list” of Internet projects and received 80 proposals, requiring major sums of
investment money. The Board started a project to launch a single platform for the entire
company in which the operations could “plug in” their specific applications.
In order to move forward and to come to a coherent blueprint for WK, the executive board in
1998 appointed a fifteen-man steering group for electronic publishing consisting of “young Turks”–
bright and ambitious young managers. These started working on plans for portals, economics,
commercial actions, etc., which were received with considerable enthusiasm at the shop floor level,
but with skepticism by the majority of senior managers. As they proceeded, the few Internet
initiatives that had been launched in the field were held back, pending corporate-wide action.
The steering group started by noting that many professional in the outer world were
migrating to closed online platforms and the Internet. This trend posed a very serious
commercial threat to WK, but also a major new opportunity, because it enabled WK to maintain
a much closer relationship with its users, and respond much more rapidly and accurately to new
market needs.
The structure of the new business proved to be totally different from the tradition. For
example, the ultimate priority in off-line (paper) publications is content ownership, which
provides a strong barrier to entry and perfection, because there is no opportunity to correct
mistakes. For the new business, however, customer ownership and speed were paramount, and
on-line publications were easily improved on the go. Traditional publishers had little under-
standing of required marketing techniques, including the mechanics and value of customer
feedback. Also, traditional barriers to entry – like protected access to major databases of statutes
and jurisprudence, were lost as the suppliers, like the government and law courts, either went
public in creating their own websites, or started auctioning access off to the highest bidder. For
example, the Dutch Ministry of Justice in 2001 decided for the first time to tender its statutes,
which auction was won by SDU, although some claim this was due to political pressure. But
generally, the feeling evolved that paper was on the way out, and with it, WK dominance. WK,
however, announced in its annual report that its strategy was directed towards offering its
customers the option of paper versus electronic, and that usage of the latter was growing
gradually.
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A number of measures were already taken to pave the way forward. For legal and tax
publications, the European Internet Services (EIS) operation was started, which developed
uniform company-wide formats for data, templates presentation and branding. An outsourcing
contract was signed with Atos/Origin for central hosting services in Europe. In the US, the same
was done with Navistar. The acquisitions program was stepped up and oriented towards the
acquisition of needed capabilities: LAS was an example of such a transaction. A large number of
WK web portals were launched, which provided the basis for the first communities, and further
experiments. And corporate leadership started to actively rotate or recruit managers, with the
objective to rapidly develop and disseminate Internet competencies. Finally, the leadership took
the important step of restructuring the company away from country management into five
global business units,using Internet – with its disregard of national borders and total geographic
transparency – as an important argument.
At the end of 1999, an important debate started in the executive board about the right
balance of speed, investment and risk in the creation of the necessary technology and business
platform for WK, while maintaining a modicum of consistency with the traditional performance
growth of the firm. This discussion resulted in the departure of the CEO Van Kempen in the
beginning of 2000, and a more gradual phasing of Internet implementation.
If we look at the way in which WK management saw the development of Internet,we can note the
following:
• Views on standards were rapidly solidifying, and the rate of product introductions
decreased,
• Companies started to impose business processes, top-down, and
• Competition was observed to be concentrating into fewer companies, which threatened
WK’s strong position in its core market (e.g., legal).
The view of a fluid market thus was substantiated
In considering the approaches that WK’s leadership took, we see the following (figure 3.26):
• Large corporate portfolio moves in Internet (e.g. the outsourcing IT to Atos/Origin and
Navistar), and the proposed merger with Reed Elsevier,
• The creation of a “young Turk” group of (future) leaders, and
• Limited communications outside the Executive Board
These point to a Directive style of leadership: mostly top-down, limited local entre-
preneurship, but holistic portfolio development at high speed. But the price was limited
company-wide knowledge development.
2000 Onwards: On an Evolutionary Track
In its 1999 annual report, the executive board under leadership of the new CEO Pieterse
acknowledged the importance of realizing interactive communications with its communities of
users, and announced that 9% of turnover was realized through Internet. It further announced
its intention to invest Eur. 250 million in Internet over 2000-2003. To Pieterse and his colleagues,
the rules of the new game were becoming clear. Actual Internet strategies could thus be
139
relegated to the five clusters of operating companies operating in independence. For example,
WK announced the establishment of a Dutch commercial Internet center for its legal
publications in 2000. The building publications went beyond this and started commercial
websites for the construction industry. Full search facilities were by then available for all the WK
publications, and the leadership indicated in its 2000 annual report that it expected to receive
50% of all revenues from e-publishing.
By 2001, Internet activities were strengthened further at the division level. For example,
the European professional publications group started a “European Internet Service Center” in
Brussels, to support and coordinate activities across the division. Corporate management did,
however, make one important decision: in early 2001 it signed a contract with software supplier
Atos-Origin to outsource all edp and communications operations in Europe to that company.
In its mission statement, the leadership stated that it wanted to provide professionals
with extensive, leading and reliable printed and electronic information products, thus enabling
them to improve their efficiency and productivity and to reduce their costs.
In 2000, however, five to six portals had been launched and the company had no
encompassing front page;WK found itself on the defensive against new competitors that did not
offer a large amount of own content, but did provide rapid access to a variety of information
points that were of value to their focused set of users. For example, two sites in the US
– Healtheon (started by Jim Clark) and Web MD – not only provided easy access to the full range
of reference materials and topical information to general practitioners, but also offered tailor-
made software to help the (family) doctor run his administration and collect invoices.These were
hugely successful, and relegated WK to the position of data source in this particular segment. It
must be noted, however, that these developments are typically extremely difficult to predict.
Some considered this as a chance lost.WK was also perceived to have lost market share to smaller
competitors (e.g. to the SDU in the Dutch legal market, in which it once was dominant).
The perceived loss of position in a number of key markets led some observers to conclude
that the main actions that WK could have taken earlier to come out ahead in this inflection point
should have included investing in the paramount central technology platform earlier, and
imposing a much stronger central steering process. More thorough planning (e.g. by doing a
balance scorecard analysis, which WK never did) would also have helped WK to maintain its
position, in particular with its large customers, and avoid market losses like the medical portal
business. It would also have helped the organization accept the unavoidable cannibalization
processes that are unavoidable in major technology jumps.
Considering the perspective of WK on its industry, we observe the following:
• A more stable, evolutionary environment, with few product and standard changes,
• More formalized u-turn business processes, and 
• Competition trending towards oligopoly,
which point to a Specific development stage of the industry.
Looking at the leadership style adopted by WK in this period (figure 3.26), we see a
delegated management style with regular interactive meetings and many participants. This
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points to a conditional leadership approach, since these traits are consistent with u-turn
leadership, which relies on well-developed processes and ex-ante accountability combined with
a high degree of local entrepreneurship to enable a high level of knowledge creation.
Conclusions
Overall, from a corporate perspective,WK has through the years leading to 1998 shown a
strong ecological trait (figure 4.11): Internet strategy and implementation were left to the country
operations and, later to the five clusters of country operations. Capabilities were developed in a
laissez faire mode and their consistency accordingly was low. But the leadership relationships
were not complex, and ex-post accountability was straight-forward. In this consistent pattern
there was a hiatus of two years, in which the leadership took a number of important steps to
restructure the company for the new environment. This period culminated in the management
board changes of early 2000. In this period, the board took a clearly directive track in writing the
blueprint, launching the central platform project, organizing the five business units, and, of
course, attempting the alliance with Reed Elsevier. From 2000 onwards, the leadership has
limited its role to a conditional one, setting the standards for formats and branding and
supporting investment in databases and Internet service, but leaving detailed strategy and
implementation to the five business groups. Strategy development has a u-turn direction and
gives local management a clear own responsibility. The management processes however have
become more complex. The only exception to conditional management was the Atos-Origin
contract, which provided for company-wide economies of scale (thus explaining the corporate,
directive, decision).
Figure 4.11: Wolters Kluwer - Approaches Used
Phase Directive Conditional Ecological
1980-1997 Country initiatives
Fluid
1998-1999 Internet blueprint Central 
Transitional technology platform 
Reed Elsevier alliance
Atos Origin outsourcing
New Leadership
2000 plus Independent cluster 
Specific strategies 
Divisional service centers
4.4: VNU - Rapid Focus to Business Information
VNU (which stands for Verenigde Nederlandse Uitgeverijen – United Dutch Publishers)
was initially active in the publishing and distribution of consumer magazines, telephone
directories and information services, education publications, trade and professional magazines
and marketing information services. It was formed in 1964 out of a merger of two Dutch
magazine, book and newspaper publishers. In the 1960s, its primary operations were the
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publishing, printing and distribution of consumer magazines, newspapers and books in the
Netherlands and Belgium. But by 2000 the company had transformed itself into a supplier of
business and professional information, with a turnover of Euro 3.4 billion, and 21,600 employees,
focusing mainly on Europe (31%) and the United States (54%). In the late 1990s, it had five
business units: Marketing Information, Business Information, Directories, Consumer Infor-
mation and Educational Information.
In order to leverage the knowledge within the individual operations, marketing, editing
and sales are maintained within the business unit; only a limited number of IT activities are
provided by the central technology function, which sometimes leads to priority problems.
Specific applications are developed within the business unit itself.
1995-1996: Baseline development
VNU’s e-strategy started as one of “stepwise trial and error” (1995 annual report). In 1994/1995,
several business units started experimenting with Internet, with a preference for joint ventures
to minimize risks. For example:
• The magazine group bought 50% of Bopp Media, which produced city maps on CD-ROM
and online, but otherwise shied away from the new media
• Newspapers took a minority position in CityOnline, which had Maurice de Hondt of
Wegener as main champion. This highly innovative project created a virtual (regional)
city for the consumers, but proved unsuccessful, as we will see later. They also started
cable (teletext) newspapers in two Dutch regions (Brabant and Gelderland). But soon the
newspapers launched TV guides and other websites, which cost a lot of money but had
limited success. By the end of 1996, all the newspapers had their own websites
• Broadcasting had no Internet projects
• Business Information Europe was one of the first groups to start Internet operations,
with recruitment advertisements of Intermediair
• Business Information USA
• Educational Publishing made a careful start with VNU Interactive Media, which by the
end of 1996 had already published 17 CDs.
In the UK, VNU started a site, Scoop, in a joint venture with the Freepages group, entirely
with their own facilities, which stressed interactive consumer information accessible by
telephone, mobile phone and Internet, with high startup costs. Corporate management also
initiated large-scale automation projects in the editing and commercial departments of the
company.
Management of VNU was well versed in traditional strategy methodology, but realized
that traditional methods were becoming less capable of handling the speed at which the
environment was changing. Conversely, new strategies driven by a long-term vision appeared to
have both high costs and high risks, since they lacked checks and balances on the investments in
the startup phases. Finally, in the Internet world the two months or more needed to conjure a
vision sometimes are too long to maintain the first-mover advantage.
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1997-1998: Initial Leadership awareness
In 1997, the management board recognized the importance of Internet, in part because
investment analysts suddenly started asking pointed questions. Internet had suddenly become
an important issue in capital markets, and companies with perceived strong Internet strategies
started to be awarded with dramatically high share prices and price/earnings ratios of 70 and
higher. At the same time, VNU’s leadership found it difficult to understand the fundamental
market trends. VNU was a highly decentralized organization. To achieve some synergy between
the scores of Internet-related efforts, corporate management established a central group in mid-
1997 as part of corporate development. Initially, this group was directed at informing the
business units about the importance and opportunities of Internet, But it soon changed into a
small 15-man IT unit providing technical advice, and hosting services and website development
support, mostly in co-operation with third parties. Since most divisions quickly developed their
own IT departments to run Internet applications (under the assumption that this would speed
up implementation and improve service levels), they quickly took over these basic roles. 1997 also
saw the acquisition of ITT World Directories, which covered six European countries and had its
own Internet project. But most of Internet strategy still took place in the field:
• The Magazines started development of a series of thematic portals destined to replace
the title-linked websites,one for each magazine. In 1996 VNU could proudly announce its
first success: Libelle got high hit rates, but modest revenues.
• Newspapers continued major investments in Internet: the cable newspapers were not
developing well, and VNU considered consolidation. Also, the participation in CityOnline
was sold.
• Directories put high priority on Internet products, which it considered promising.
• Broadcasting was sold in this period.
• Business Information Europe consolidated its Intermediair websites into one portal:
Intermediair Online. It also made a 40% investment in Atwood Systems (UK) in order to
boost its competencies in database management.
• Business Information USA
• Education
The holding in Scoop – managed directly by corporate – was boosted from 25% to 75%.
Seen through the lens of this case analysis, management perceptions of the outside
world at this time were formed by frequent product tests by the local business units. Design and
standard setting were local. Business processes were run mainly by the units, and competition
was fragmented.These observations point to a fluid development stage of the industry.
When we observe leadership postures (figure 3.26), we can note the following:
• A few large corporate portfolio moves, like the acquisition of the yellow pages,
• A leadership focused on ex-post financial accountability, given the admitted lack of
understanding of the leadership of the new trends, and
• Regular, albeit infrequent and not highly interactive management meetings, during
which target discussions were the key agenda point,
which give an indication of a bottom-up direction of the company with a high level of local
entrepreneurship,and only limited overall alignment and knowledge creation,ergo an ecological
leadership style.
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1999: Time for leadership action
By the end of 1998, the management board became alarmed with the slow rate of
progress, and launched a major consulting project with McKinsey to study Internet strategy for
the Yellow Pages, and consumer and business magazines.This project provided the leadership of
VNU with a “blueprint” of the new environment, which helped it take decisive action.
The new strategy documents defined a business model for each of the divisions, and
proposed the creation of dedicated Internet business units for each. But in fact, the leadership
consolidated its corporate grip on strategy development and execution by establishing a central
coordinating committee consisting of the key division presidents and the executive board. This
committee started meeting every six weeks to decide strategy and monitor progress across the
company.
The second main direct leadership action in 1999 was the redirection of the central
Internet support unit, which was renamed VNU Internet Publishing Services (VIPS) and charged
with co-ordination of all European Internet-related efforts as well as the management of
corporate and inter-divisional Internet projects. This unit (initially three persons) reported
directly to the management board of VNU, one member of which was made directly responsible
for all Internet activities. The divisions formally remained in charge of their own Internet
operations, with VIPS providing guidance and support in the form of contracting for bandwidth
with the local telecom operators like KPN, providing market research, corporate alliances with
third parties like Microsoft and the identification of e-commerce opportunities beyond the scope
of the divisions. It was foreseen that some IT-related tasks like database development and
payment automation would eventually have to be centralized, but no decision was made out of
fear of slowing down divisional projects. To support the launch of VIPS, the company also
announced an incremental Eur.30 mln. investment in Internet activities.
The strategy study also resulted in a series of portfolio extensions. One was the creation of two
dedicated Internet projects for consumer information,Emage and Email marketing.The first was
a technology to create individualized real time advertising. The second extension was a series of
technologies to enrich e-mail addresses by electronic direct mail. Finally, a number of important
investments were made, such as the purchase of 20% of NetRatings, a US company that had
established a position in the measurement of Internet use in the US. NetRatings was the takeoff
point for a global rating company, ACNielseneRatings.com. And VNU decided to sell its regional
newspaper group to Wegener.
Under corporate pressure, Intermediair Online was rapidly expanded, and VNUNet was
started as a joint venture with Randstad (an interim services provider) This last venture created a
website called newmonday.com, but found out that its joint venture structure impeded decision
making, which cost it its initial lead position against competitor Monsterboard. Nonetheless,
VNU by then had eight very active recruiting sites across Europe, six of which were dedicated to
six countries, and two of which were pan-European. Again, local management complained of
high costs and decreasing margins (Annual Report 1999).
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The division that was most activated by the strategy work was the magazine group which,
amongst other things, started websites for VTWonen (on interior decoration), “Vrouw (woman)
on Line”(a consolidation of a number of title sites) and Wuzzup (for teenagers),and acquired 50%
of Medical Media, a medical Internet publisher that ran ziekenhuis.nl, a regional medical
information and discussion site with 650,000 page views per month, growing at 10% monthly.
The group also established a central advertising sales unit, called Medianet (20% of which was
owned by an advertising agency). VIPS ran most of the sites.
VIPS thus also started taking the lead in business creation, but was eventually found to
lack applications and market know-how to make them a success. An example was the forced
transfer, within one month, of the Yellow Pages Internet units (by then responsible for their own
revenue generation) in the Netherlands, Belgium and Portugal to VIPS, which created a lot of
unhappiness with users and local managers, and may, with hindsight, have been an error. US
management was the only division to steadfastly refuse to invest in Internet, with exception of
their successful Billboard activities, and the acquisition of Nielsen Netratings.
Interestingly enough, the consulting study proved very effective as an instigator of
Internet projects, but was less effective in predicting Internet developments. One reason for this
may have been that it relied mainly on extrapolative projection techniques.The mobilization did
create a certain amount of unrest in the organization: for example, large groups of managers
now wanted new remuneration packages with a large option content, which VNU was unwilling
to provide.
In 1999, Italtel bought the Italian Yellow Pages for a yet unheard-of price, which gave the
share price of VNU a major boost and appeared to confirm the ambitions of the strategy studies
that VNU had just undertaken. At that time, VNU had over 200 websites, most of which ran at a
loss: only Billboard.com in the US was profitable.
The leadership at that time had in the same year spent Eur 28 mln in operating costs and
invested Eur 255 in acquisitions (mainly NetRatings. There were 325 staff members dedicated to
Internet. The results of this effort (excluding Nielsen Media Research and NetRatings) were 250
Internet sites generating 500 million page views and a turnover of Eur 15 mln.
In its 1999 annual report, the leadership saw VNU as a world leader in publishing and
information provision, with leading market positions in mass magazines, telephone directories
and information services, business information and educational publications.
Looking back at that hectic year, we observe that management perceived itself driven by a threat
of a rapidly changing environment, including:
• Rapid introduction of new product concepts by existing and new competitors,
• Standards not yet established,
• Most business processes run entirely at the local level, and
• Highly fragmented and growing competition,
pointing to a fluid development stage (figure 2.12)
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Faced with these prospects, the leadership took the following actions: (figure 3.27):
• Creation of VIPS as a new Internet entity – which entailed a number of key managerial
appointments and recruitments,
• Multiple sizeable corporate acquisitions such as NetRatings and Medical Media,
• Imposition of firm-wide product innovation via VIPS, and
• Frequent one-to-one task force meetings with the business units with a disciplined agenda.
These actions point to a highly directive leadership style – top-down, not much latitude for local
entrepreneurs, high adjustment speed of the portfolio of businesses and capabilities, and rapid
alignment. This was achieved through relatively simple management processes, continuing
accountability and relatively limited local knowledge creation.
2000: New realism and consolidation
At the start of 2000, the leadership realized that it finally had a clear understanding of
the immediate opportunities and limitations of Internet, and that many of the ongoing projects
were ineffective. The company, moreover, was clearly unable to maintain the level of Internet
investments beyond 2000: in that year, operational costs for developing Internet had grown to
Eur 110 (up from Eur. 82 a year earlier), whereas the new medium had only delivered Eur. 47 mln in
revenues (vs. 16 mln in 1999).
As result, the leadership decided that the time had come to take delegation seriously,and
to leave strategy detailing and execution to the divisions. This meant that VIPS was dismantled,
and that the many Internet projects that did not show immediate promise, like Scoot, were
stopped. A few acquisition proposals made by the divisions that already had solid revenues and
good earnings prospects were approved.These acquisitions included front-page Startpagina and
the Dutch search engine Ilse, which were both already the most frequented and successful sites
in the Netherlands: Startpagina turned out to be highly profitable. A number of magazine sites
like VTwonen, vrouw online and medianet were consolidated into Startpagina. This
consolidation trend was also followed by the business publication group, which positioned most
of its sites under the VNUnet portal for IT insiders.The directory group enjoyed the first successes
of its websites, with page views going up from 75 mln in 1999 to 300 mln in 2000. This group
started up a WAP portal called Tutch.
VNU also bought ACNielsen, which owned an important Internet operation eRatings,
that focused on Internet ratings outside North America and thus provided a valuable
complement to NetRatings. An exploratory investment was a 50/50% joint venture with Naviant
to develop pinpoint Internet user marketing programs in Europe.
At the start of 2001, the management perspective on the industry was one of increasing
stability (figure 2.12), with few, regular product generation changes, industry-wide information
formatting and communication standards established, in a concentrating industry.These factors
all are indicators of a Specific development stage.
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Looking at leadership approaches used (figure 3.27), we can see the following:
• Acquisitions continuing, but managed by the divisions,
• Continuing strong investment in ICT and management development, and
• More interactive management meetings, with more attendants and more up-front
accountability.
These are consistent with a “u-turn” conditional leadership style that was slower in processes
and alignment, but did enable more local entrepreneurship and knowledge creation.
Conclusions
These notes indicate that the leadership of VNU went through three periods of strategic
posturing in reaction to the advent of Internet.The first,until 1999,was characterized by trial and
error efforts in highly fluid markets, in which the divisions and business units were stimulated
into launching Internet projects, and also were given a high level of freedom in executing them.
In the Internet sense, the directions were thus set bottom-up, with widespread local
entrepreneurship, simple processes and ex-post accountability. As result, there was a low
consistency in capability development, not too much scope for overall alignment with the
environment, and not too much integration of knowledge.
After the strategy studies of late 1998-’99, the leadership had a much clearer vision of
VNU’s markets, in which the rules of the business game were starting to emerge.VNU could thus
develop a blueprint for action, which it implemented though a corporate steering committee
and the central unit VIPS, which reported directly to the management board. In this period, a
number of acquisitions were made to either round off market positions (e.g., eRatings) or to gain
necessary competencies. As it turned out, these efforts were not always in touch with the market,
which was still developing and changing rapidly, and the centralized controls did not always
show the necessary close touch with these markets.
These developments, and the stress they put on human and financial resources, could
not be sustained. From 2000 onwards it became clear which projects were grounded in real
market needs and which were pipe dreams. The leadership thus was in a position to cut back on
the number and scope of the Internet projects. But also, by then, divisional capabilities and
expertise had advanced to a level such that further Internet development could be, and was
indeed, further delegated to local management. Figure 4.12 shows the evolution of leadership
approaches at VNU.
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Figure 4.12: VNU – Leadership Approaches used
Phase Directive Conditional Ecological
1995-1998 Initiatives:
Fluid • Newspaper,
CityOnline
• NL - Recruiting
• UK - Business 
information
1999 VIPS Acquisitions
Transitional
2000 onwards Delegation to Divisions
Specific Corporate Policies
4.5: Wegener – the Pioneer
Introduction
Johan Frederik Wegener founded the Wegener Company in 1903 as a newspaper
publisher for the Dutch provincial town of Apeldoorn. The company has since grown, mainly
through acquisitions,to its current size of Eur 978 mln (in 2000) in revenues and 7600 employees.
Wegener now is the largest Dutch publisher of regional daily newspapers and free door-to-door
papers, and a major national and international player in direct mail. It has four business
segments: Print products (including all the newspapers, 77% of revenues), Direct Marketing (14%
of revenues), Radio, and Internet.
The first Internet venturing years 1994 - 1998
New media started at Wegener as early as 1984, when it launched a cable newspaper
(Kabelkrant). Development was slow until acceleration started in 1994. In that year, Wegener set
up a new unit called WISE “Wegener Informatie Services Exploitatie to promote and
commercialize new media activities and new projects within Wegener. In 1994 it also joined with
broadcaster Veronica in setting op a digital shopping center, “Veronica Interactive Plaza” (VIP),
with shopping, news, games, product information and information about shopping on the
electronic highway, which was not (yet) a success and had to be stopped nine months later. In the
same period, Wegener also started a website for young people called “Primeur”. Its closely
controlled subsidiary Tijll Data started a joint venture (2/3 Wegener) with ADP to provide
financial market information,initially via broadcasted teletext,which went online in March 1995.
Serious Internet activities of Wegener started in 1995 with the arrival of Maurice de
Hondt,who joined Wegener as head of new media after a career in market research and with ITT’s
Yellow Pages. De Hondt was a visionary who wrote a plan for an extended portal service that was
launched later that year as CityOnline.CityOnline was a revolutionary new concept in which each
user had his own virtual house, in a street and neighborhood of people with similar interests.
Logging on caused the lights of the “house” to be turned on. CityOnline was one of the first
concepts to introduce the ICQ (“I-seek-you”) hatbox format. CityOnline had its own newspaper,
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shopping center and interest group “club houses”, and successfully integrated the three key
dimensions of a successful portal: Content, community and commerce. CityOnline was first
launched to cover three cities (Utrecht,Tilburg and Apeldoorn), and later expanded to include 18
towns by the end of 1997. Other actions in that year included the launch of Wegener Nieuws TV
(60% Wegener, 40% Edon) to provide cable news, and the purchase of a 20% holding in Planet
Internet, which had been launched by KPN Telecom together with De Telegraaf and Quote.
At the same time, a broad multimedia strategy was pursued:Wegener stated a desire to
“develop Internet concepts for third parties as well as our own companies,and to function as a so-
called “presence-provider”, assisting companies to get on to Internet with these new media”
(1995 Annual Report).Wegener also terminated the joint venture with Veronica (VIP) because this
Internet site turned out to be too small to have any impact, and constrained Wegener in the
development of its own ambitions. To support the development of CityOnline, Wegener first
acquired Riverland Network in 1995 to “provide facilities management, design an implemen-
tation of so-called websites” and integrated Wegener Internet within that unit (1996 Annual
Report).
In the 1995 Annual Report, the leadership acknowledged the uncertainties surrounding
the Internet environment and its own strategy:“despite the increasing attention being given to
the possibilities for providing information via the long-heralded electronic highway, it remains
unclear for many people as to the way in which these possibilities will take shape in the coming
years. What role will the Internet play? How can we anticipate ?.... Our multifaceted strategy
means that it is vital for Wegener to make timely use of new developments and opportunities
offered to us” (1995 Annual Report).
1996 started with major ambitions. Wegener set up Wegener Internet B.V. to provide
services to companies and organizations seeking to integrate the electronic highway to its
existing activities. First projects were the creation of websites for the Dutch Yellow pages, and a
finance web for Beursdata N.V.Wegener also arranged for a possible acquisition of 20% of Planet
Internet, a well-known local portal, and acquired 80% of NetCast, an Internet software
development company in 1996. This latter activity was quite successful and profitable in its own
right, focusing on development and service provision for so-called high-end sites. It was
reorganized into business units in 1997 to better serve its various market segments, and divested
to co-owner Lost Boys in 2000 because it was considered non-core. In 1996,Wegener also merged
with Arcade Beheer, and renamed itself Wegener Arcade, as a reflection of a stated strategy to
become a multimedia company.
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However, 1996 was not without disappointments: it turned out that available technology was
not yet able to support the functionality required to make a success of CityOnline, which thus
proved to be quite slow and cumbersome in use: it never gained more than 25,000 “inhabitants
(subscribers)”. In 1996, Wegener attempted to broaden the scope through an alliance with the
VNU daily newspapers, which, however, never adopted the concept (“NIH”/not invented here)
and got out a year later. Also,growth beyond 25,000 users resulted in increasingly more technical
problems, and necessitated a redesign of the core software, with a transition to a standard
package. Nonetheless, CityOnline covered 18 cities by the end of 1997, and the leadership
proclaimed that it was a cornerstone of the Wegener strategy in new media. In the meanwhile,
Netcast had become (financially) successful as developer and service provider of high-end sites,
and Wegener announced the intention to expand its ownership to 80%. Netcast was also divided
into a number of business units (source: interviews).
Notwithstanding CityOnline’s visionary promise, its problems mounted. Apart from the
technology up-scaling issue, and the resulting economic problems, CityOnline never linked into
the core newspapers of Wegener, which continued to consider the new activities as a foreign
entity, and in general tended to ignore the leadership’s multimedia investments. The local
managers did respond to directives from the leadership by setting up a large number of local
websites, which for the most part were unsuccessful. At the end of 1998, CityOnline was
terminated and Maurice de Hondt left Wegener to set up an Internet investment company called
New Economy. At that time, Wegener had a large number of centrally and decentrally run
Internet units with a wide scope of activities and missions, of which only a few were earning
money. (figure 4.13) 
But the leadership remained somewhat frustrated by the lack of local entrepreneurship
in identifying and developing Internet ventures, and started working on initiatives to stimulate
local actions by exposure to the “silicon valley” activities (having itself visited this region) and
designing more elaborate training and coaching schemes (which were, however, only partially
implemented).
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Figure 4.13: Wegener’s Internet Offerings, 1994-2000 (year-end)
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Kabelkrant 1)
OASE 2)
Veronica Interactive Plaza
Financeweb
Wegener
CityOnline Utrecht
CityOnline Apeldoorn
CityOnline Tilburg
AEX 3)
Track
JobTrack
Autotrack
Funda
dagbladonline
waptrack
Primeur
Haagschecourant
vacatures.haagschecourant
Goudschecourant
vacatures.goudschecourant
Tctubantia
vacatures.tubantia
Utrechtsnieuwsblad
vacatures.utrechtsnieuwsblad
Amersfoortsecourant
vacatures.amersfoortsecourant
wugo
Apeldoornsecourant
vacatures.apeldoornsecourant
Arnhemsecourant
vacatures.arnhemsecourant
Dagbladflevoland
vacatures.dagbladflevoland
Deventerdagblad
vacatures.deventerdagblad
Geldersdagblad
vacatures.geldersdagblad
Nieuwkamperdagblad
vacatures.nieuwkamperdagblad
Overijsselsdagblad
vacatures.overijsselsdagblad
Zwolsecourant
continued
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vacatures.zwolsecourant
pzc
vacatures.pzc
zeeland.woonkeuze
Dehavenloods
brabants-
dagblad
eindhovens-
dagblad
z-hc
gelderlander
bndestem
arnhemse-
courant
dagbladrivie-
renland
veluwsdag-
blad
leidscherijn
Managed by Direct Mail wegener-dm
wdmg
TMF, Magazines & Other Suurlandfalkplan
graficus
dutchgolf
tmf
tmfweb
tmfshop
Note: Arcademusic,Yntema and other divested activities not listed
1) Teletext medium; 2) Teletext + broadcast medium 
Source: Annual reports, Financieel Dagblad 
Internal Initiatives - 1996-1999
The internal introduction of new information technologies showed a disciplined approach, in
which the key processes were redesigned systematically on a corporate-wide basis. The
successful projects were as follows:
• In 1994, the Sijthoff unit started studies for electronic archiving.The company took a lead
role, which resulted in a dedicated company-wide function, Sijthoff information system
(SIS), from which the external database services were spun off in 1998 under the name
Wegener Informatie Centrum (WIC).
• A year later, in 1995, work started on the introduction of a standard page-making and
pre-press system. The choice was made for a package by Unisys, “Hermes”, which was
introduced company-wide in 1999.
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• The introduction of a new company-wide integrated advertising administration and
production system called “Enterprise” was launched in 1996, and fully implemented by
1999.
• In 1998, the company launched a subscription administration system (“Paradise”).
• Finally, in 1999, Wegener introduced a company-wide intranet “WAX” (Wegener Arcade
Exchange).
Looking at the outside world through the lens of Wegener management (figure 2.12), we
note that they observed a rapid introduction of new entrepreneurial products in fragmented
market segments, an absence of standards in the first years, followed by a rapid penetration,
mostly of Microsoft standards,business processes run entirely at the local levels,and fragmented
but growing competition.These are all characteristics of a fluid market phase.
The leadership’s attitude was mostly directive, with strong top-down direction, relatively limited
local entrepreneurship, holistic portfolio adjustments with many options, limited local
knowledge creation and relatively simpler corporate processes (witness figure 3.26):
• Multiple corporate portfolio moves,
• Recruiting (and termination) of skilled senior people – e.g. Maurice de Hondt, and
• A lean communications agenda with the operating units with regular routines of which
strong ex-post accountability was an important element
Towards a more pragmatic Internet approach - 1999 onwards
At the end of 1998, the management board decided to ask consultants Booz Allen &
Hamilton (BAH) to analyze both the situation and Wegener’s opportunities. One of their main
conclusions was that the existing operating companies should be in charge of new initiatives,
with central co-ordination through a NewMedia Operating Committee. For the new initiatives,
the leadership considered three business models:
1) building unique extensions to the existing business,
2) constructing vertical portals, and
3) taking a major leap forward, venture capital style
A choice was made for a combination of the first and second models.
In 1999, the management board was also strengthened by the arrival of a new executive
board member, and Wegener started to implement the new, decentralized strategy. Accordingly,
the newspapers were each put in charge of their respective regional “regioportals”.Wegener also
created national vertical portals, destined to help customers from enquiry of news to
background stories, to reference materials and to commercial transactions like trade or
recruiting. There was a new pragmatic focus on three promising areas: cars (AutoTrack), real
estate (Funda, planned with help of consultancy OC&C), and recruitment ads (JobTrack); the
regional newspapers obtained an additional distribution channel, with a high guaranteed
product and service quality, albeit at the expense of some speed and flexibility that are inherent
to a centrally focused effort.The vertical portals are allowed to pursue only those topics in which
they could become #1 or #2 in their market, an adage that is even more important for Internet
than for other markets. On the whole, they appear to be successful. For example, Wegener
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JobTrack succeeded in breaking through the monopoly of the competitor Volkskrant in
recruitment advertising. Apart from the three newspaper-linked market foci, Wegener
continued to develop the successful TMF-Web which was linked to its very successful broadcast
channel “The Music Factory”/ TMF which produces and distributes video clips of pop music.
Wegener eMedia (WeM) was established in 1999 to support the regional portal
infrastructure.WeM retained responsible for hosting, technology, product development, with an
additional function as “internal incubator. Wegener also considered starting up a voice portal,
but eventually dropped the idea as being technologically too challenging:being the first in a new
technology was not considered to be part of Wegener’s mission.
WeM’s new management has a newspaper background. It derives part of its revenues
from the outside marketplace. Wegener has three regional portals, each with a vertical
component, including Jobtrack and Autotrack (with 600 dealers online) and Funda, majority
owned by the national association of real estate brokers (NVM).
In entering this period, management was clearly more comfortable with outside trends,
which were perceived to show few,more predictable product changes,standardization in most of
the business areas, established business routines, and the start of oligopoly in most of Wegener’s
business arenas (like the car and real estate markets). These trends point to a specific phase in
market development (figure 2.12).
The leadership approaches used by Wegener’s leadership moved strongly towards a conditional
style (figure 2.12) – u-turn, with broad entrepreneurship and local portfolio adaptations, high
knowledge creation, continuous accountability and more complex processes:
• There were no more large corporate moves in Internet, and acquisitions/investments
were left to local management.
• Considerable attention was paid, however, to training and management development
oriented towards the new technologies.
• Meeting schedules became more two-way, with more people involved.
Conclusions
In the initial period (until 1999), Wegener’s approach was characterized by a series of
portfolio decisions taken by the leadership to explore the many opportunities that the Internet
medium appeared to offer, and to take positions in as many of the promising market points as
was possible. These multiple initiatives took place in a highly fluid and uncertain environment.
Nearly all these ventures were started and managed by corporate leadership, with limited
support at best from the local managers leading the mainstream regional newspapers. Reasons
for this were both a matter of capability and motivation. The local leaders were generally
considered to lack the skills and experience to run new technology ventures. And they generally
could not see the relevance of these ventures to their daily regional newspaper operations. As it
turned out, they were correct – in the short run at least. The result was a top-down leadership
style with limited local entrepreneurship and a moderate speed of capability development, with
limited knowledge creation across the firm. But the scope for overall alignment was high,and the
management processes and accountability straightforward.
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In the transition after the blueprinting of 1999, strategy was based more on an understanding of
the short-term opportunities that were beginning to show their attractiveness than on long-
term visioning.The leadership made the important step to move Internet strategy to the existing
business units and to manage them within a conditional framework. Activities were thus
structured within the regional newspaper setup,management processes were redefined to align
the new activities with the strengths of the existing businesses, and the leadership started
thinking about ways to improve the innovativeness of the entire company. The critical redesign
of the most important internal processes also showed a strong leadership hand: actions here
were in most instances taken with a very short time between corporate decision and company-
wide implementation.
Figure 4.14 illustrates the move from the direct, visionary leadership role to the delegated,
pragmatic approach adopted in 1999.
Figure 4.14: Wegener — Leadership Approaches Used
Phase Directive Conditional Ecological
1994 - 1998 CityOnline
Fluid (Transitional) Wegener Internet
1999 - 2000 Vertical Portals: WeM
Specific • Autotrack Regioportals
• Jobtrack
• Funda
Source: Company reports, interviews
4.6: De Telegraaf - Attempting Evolution 
Introduction
De Telegraaf is by far the largest morning daily of the Netherlands and its largest
newspaper. It is also by far the principal activity of the newspaper and magazine publishing
company of the same name, accounting for most of the overall revenues of Eur. 1788 mln
generated by the company in 2000. Other activities are regional newspapers and magazines
(which together with the main newspaper make up 89% of revenues), as well as printing services
(10% of revenues) and miscellaneous activities (1%). Advertising comprises 54% of overall
revenues, with subscriptions and vendor sales making up an additional 30%. Nearly 97% of the
revenues are generated in the Netherlands (source: company reports).
As early as 1991, the management board of De Telegraaf set up a corporate planning/commercial
development department that had as part of its mission the task of ensuring that the newspaper
company was staying abreast of new developments. Soon, the new department developed an
interest in all kinds of new media, including radio, TV, local broadcasting, and incubation of new
business ideas “avant la lettre”.The leadership of the company kept these projects at arm’s length
with ongoing operations, because this would help localize the high risk of failure of the new
activities (source: interviews).
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1993 was an important year at De Telegraaf. In that year, the leadership of the holding was
separated from the operational management of its most important activity, the morning
newspaper. This was a clear confirmation that the company expected its future environment to
go far beyond printed newspapers,and that its ambitions reached beyond printing the dominant
daily newspaper. In that year, the executive board (RvB) appointed a managing director for the
newspaper, but continued to have a heavy influence in its operations.
1994-1997 Exploratory Investments
Internet history at De Telegraaf started in 1994, when a few selected managers
conducted a series of study trips to the US West Coast to review progress in electronic
communications. As result, one of the Executive Board members gave a speech called “Wagon
Trail or Turnpike” to the staff representatives. As part of the strategizing process, the department
of commercial development wrote a biannual series of reports on Internet progress in the
business, of which the studies in 1995 and 1996 were more detailed.These studies recommended
a centralized approach. Since these recommendations on the whole were not followed, they were
not very effective in stimulating Internet ventures.
In 1995, De Telegraaf made the first of a series of exploratory minority investments,
although management was well aware of the difficulty their company generally had with
minority positions. Planet Internet was a joint venture with telecom operator KPN,Wegener and
Quote magazine to set up the first full-scale consumer portal in the Netherlands. In terms of
market interest, this venture was a major success: a year later it already had 50,000
subscriptions. But it did not make money. Similarly, De Telegraaf took a 30% holding in Kabel
Amsterdam in 1995. As of today, this activity has been transformed into MGW, with a 10% holding
by UPC, which as the publishing arm of Kabel Amsterdam is profitable, with cable news and
teletext (SBS, Net5) as main applications. In 1995, the company also made a start of a small,
focused electronic publication, Surf magazine. The operation also got its own advertising
revenue channel.
In 1996, developments picked up speed. On February 6th, the company published the
first electronic interactive version of its daily newspaper, De Telegraaf-i. To help advertisers
develop appropriate material for De Telegraaf-i, the corporate management set up a service shop,
Basis Media,and in early 1997,Telegraaf Electronische Media (TEM) as a laboratory for commercial
Internet applications. One of the first ventures of TEM was started in cooperation with the
national weather service: de Weerkamer, which was a real success and turned out to be a
cornerstone of subsequent Internet development efforts.TEM also started two other crucial sites:
Prive (associated with the weekly tabloid) and Autovisie. At the same time, the company sold its
participation in Planet Internet, in which it could obtain only a minority position: this was not
considered to be an appropriate strategic position.
In this period, management’s view on the evolution of the industry could be
characterized in terms of a world with frequent new product introductions, a lack of industry-
wide standards, “free for all” in terms of business processes, and growing and unknown
competition. Figure 2.12 summarizes the fluid perspective of the environment.
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Management attitudes nonetheless appeared to be hands-on and directive. There was a high
top-down component, which entailed limited local entrepreneurship, and holistic and moderate
speed of portfolio and capability development. Many strategic options were available, but also
low knowledge creation and simple processes involving both ex-ante and ex-post accountability
(figure 3.26).Typical indicators included the following:
• Sizeable corporate portfolio moves, such as MGW and TEM,
• Some hiring and transfers of skilled seniors, and
• Limited and disciplined interactions with unit heads on these topics.
1999 Rapid Entrepreneurial Expansion 
A year later, TEM (which still was handling Internet ventures on behalf of the
management board) launched a key portal,TelegraafNet, which eventually encompassed quite a
number of sites including veilinghal, siteshopper, chatweb, elcheapo, quickalert, netmail,
cybercard. Further TEM initiatives in the course of 1999 included the launch of Nieuwslink (with
actual news items) as well as Sportlink (with sports news) and “De Financiele Telegraaf” (dft.nl)
(the financial website).The latter website contained a host of information for investors as well as
a tax information section, and reached more than 100,000 page-views/month within six
months. Overall, however, few of the Internet applications made any money. But the manage-
ment realized that expanding sites like De Financiele Telegraaf to a commercial scale would
require major marketing and advertising investments, and many more people than the 12-odd
staff that TEM had by mid-1999. The overall perspectives on what the market had to offer, and
what it would take to succeed, were gradually becoming clear.
In the meanwhile, the individual publishing groups were left with total freedom to
launch further Internet applications. To some extent, the race between corporate TEM and the
divisions was thus on,and by year-end 1999,TEM controlled 18 websites and the newspapers 11.By
year-end, the headcount of Internet-dedicated full-time staff at TEM amounted to about 20
persons, and at the divisions to about 30. Expenses for Internet amounted to Eur. 2.5 mln in 1999,
and were growing rapidly. Figure 4.14 lists the websites of De Telegraaf and their controlling
entities at the end of 1999.
By the end of 1999, the leadership formulated the thrusts of the company’s Internet strategy in
the following terms:
• Actively building Telegraaf-i and other electronic activities under the aegis of TEM,
• Stimulating e-commerce activities of the newspapers and magazine, and
• Budgeting Eur. 15 mln for Internet development in 2000.
Source: 1999 Annual Report
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Figure 4.15: Internet Activities of De Telegraaf, 1996-2000 (year-end)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
De Telegraaf
Surf (newspaper)
PersonalFinance
DeWeerkamer
Telegraafnet
Chatweb
Cybercard
Netmail
Quickalert
Siteshopper
Veilinghal
Vertel
Auto.telegraaf
Elcheapo
Mijn.telegraafnet
Vactures.telegraaf
Wijzer
Speurders
Quicklink
Zoom
Woonkrant
Reiskrant
Nice2meet
Autobytel
De Telegraaf
Leidschdagblad
Haarlemsdagblad
Ijmuidercourant
Noordhollandsweekblad
Gooieneemlander
Dagbladvanalmere
Limburgsdagblad
Limburger
Noordhollandsdagblad
Krant.branche.net
Spitsnet
DFT
Basismedia
Managed by Magazines Autovisie
Oor
Prive
Hitkrant
Source: annual reports, websites
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At the end of 1999, management views on the environment were becoming more clear, with a
more steady and predictable stream of products, rapid standardization, in many cases industry-
wide (e.g., Microsoft software), stabilizing business practices and concentrating competition.
These are indicators of a transitional phase of development (figure 2.12).
However, the leadership adopted a two-pronged attitude, combining directive and ecological
elements (figure 4.15):
• Rapidly escalating corporate investment in TEM, both in terms of skilled people and
financial resources, enabled a holistic development of the portfolio with consistent
capability development and a wide scope for alignment and fit (which all are directive
characteristics), and
• Maintaining an arms-length relationship with the business units, which continued their
own Internet activities, allowed the company to rely on local entrepreneurship. At the
same time, a regular schedule of interactive, flexible (u-turn) meetings was instigated
with the units. The result was a high level of local knowledge creation and relatively
complex processes.These are all characteristics of a conditional approach.
2000 Emergence of a Strategy
In the course of the first months of 2000, confusion about the role of TEM increased. As
we mentioned, DeTelegraaf-i was energetically moving forward with its websites for breaking
news, sports and financial news (the infrastructure of which was implemented by TEM).TEM was
responsible for building sites, operations and commercialization, as well as for holding shares in
external investments. Website content was the responsibility of the respective site managers, of
which De Telegraaf-i, still part of TEM but closely related to the newspaper group, was the most
important. This matrix structure looked good on paper but was difficult to operate, if only
because TEM saw itself as champion in every respect of the new developments, and the
newspapers thought it had the better understanding of the marketplace and how to earn money
in it. Through all of this, TEM had by October 2000 a staff of about 1000 full-time and part-time
people, and total Internet investments for 2000 amounted to Eur. 25 mln. In the same year, the
decision was made to combine all archives into one database.
Through the year, the leadership of De Telegraaf had gradually gained a more solid grasp of the
rules of the new game, and had developed a vision on Internet based on the concept of leisure
time: basically, the premise was that:
1) the population as a whole has a gradually growing number of leisure hours,
2) printed matter is accorded less of that leisure time,
3) the ensuing gap is for the most part filled by TV and radio,
4) Internet, and its successor broadband networks, will fill an increasing number of
entertainment and information functions, and 
5) when real information and entertainment needs are filled by Internet and broadband,
people will (eventually) pay for having these needs met, which translates into revenues
and margins for Internet services.
Source: Telegraaf interviews
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It was now felt that outside advice was needed. The issue was not the perception of the
opportunity or the enthusiasm of people, but rather the inability of technology to deliver.
Management also feared competition: from the traditional publishers, only VNU was regarded a
real competitor, but there was a high level of uncertainty and nervousness about new
competition. Management thus called in consultants from McKinsey to check the Internet plans
to ensure that no attractive targets were missed, that De Telegraaf could stand up to its
benchmark competitors, and that all the necessary support was secured at corporate and
operating levels. As it happened, their impact was to mobilize people rather than to develop a
comprehensive blueprint.
After this study, the crucial decision was made to give each publishing group autonomy
in its Internet developments,and to leave them on their own in developing their e-strategies.TEM
was moved from corporate to the Newspaper group in March 2000, while retaining its role in
offering services to all the other company groups – a crucial delegation. Thus, there were no
matrix structures any more. Activities were also scaled down: for example, more than six
websites were combined or closed down, and by October TEM was down to 100 FTE’s, and was run
on a low-cost basis.
At this point, the perspective of management on the environment had advanced to the
point where they perceived a more regular stream of product offerings, established designs and
standards, established business practices and an emerging oligopoly (e.g. in car, job and real
estate advertising).These are all signs of a specific market (figure 3.11).
Leadership attitudes were oriented towards an ecological approach:
• Relegation of portfolio actions to the divisions – TEM now was under the newspaper,
• No interference with the divisions, except for financial accountability and top job
appointments, and
• A regular set of meetings directed at (financial) target setting and review.
Internet leadership had thus become a bottom-up process, with a high scope for local
entrepreneurship, simple processes and a high reliance on ex-post accountability. But this also
implied relatively low adjustment speed of the business portfolio, limited scope for overall
alignment, and limited overall knowledge creation (figure 3.26).
2001 saw a further retrenchment of Internet activities, which by then had been largely
relegated to the operating groups like Dagblad, and Magazines. TEM headcount was gradually
reduced to 70 FTE’s by mid 2001. Within the Newspaper group, progress went ahead full-steam;
within the Magazine groups and TEM, progress was more careful (albeit for different reasons).
Management, however, was left with a feeling that De Telegraaf had not capitalized on
its market strengths, and had lost an opportunity to be a forerunner. The company was still run
mainly on a product basis (i.e., newspapers vs. magazines vs. broadcasting; De Telegraaf still
owned 30% of SBS/Net5), and the leadership realized that it would be necessary to introduce a
modicum of market-based thinking (e.g. with management groups thinking about the
automotive consumer or the job seeker). At the same time, the introduction of any level of matrix
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management would be in opposition to the culture of the firm, and would be very difficult to
realize. In 2001, the Newspaper was dominant, not only in printed form but also (through its TEM
subsidiary) as an Internet application. Internet for the magazines was at a more rudimentary
stage. The leadership also started to realize that the major benefit of Internet conceivably was
not in the area where they always thought it would be (i.e. new revenue creation), but rather in
reduction of transaction costs with the consumer (e.g. in the registration of subscriptions and
advertisements).
Figure 4.16: De Telegraaf — Approaches Used
Phase Directive Conditional Ecological
1994 – 1998 Planet Internet
Fluid MGW
1999 TEM Newspaper portals
Transitional Magazine portals
2000 and beyond TEM restructuring Full delegation of Internet
Specific
Source: Company reports, interviews
Conclusions
Figure 4.16 shows how the leadership of De Telegraaf embarked on the e-publishing track
in a relatively hands-on, top-down (directive) mode, by making a number of minority invest-
ments and starting up TEM 1997. It did so, notwithstanding a low level of understanding and
confidence in the environment, which appeared to be quite fluid.This explains why the company
placed relatively small minority bets in Planet Internet and MGW, which offered a good learning
experience but little strategic opportunity, given the lack of control and the resistance of the
culture of De Telegraaf to minority holdings. It also explains why management used a supporting
ecological approach towards its operating divisions, and encouraged them to take their own
initiatives without exerting strong strategic control. The focus on competencies and motivation
of the local managers on their daily newspaper and other publishing jobs, positions that were
quite different in every respect to that of an “e-publisher”, explains the relative lack of local
initiatives until 1999, when, through market pressure as well as the internal initiatives of TEM, a
wave of business-unit-level initiatives signaled an entrepreneurial period. In this period, firm
wide knowledge creation and capability development were modest. But the complexity of
business development processes was also limited, and there was good up-front and ex-post
accountability.
In 1999 was the culmination of directive corporate initiatives that coincided, and
collided, with local ecological ventures in which many parties vied for leadership in setting the
strategy, in an environment that still was characterized by rapidly decreasing levels of dynamism
and uncertainty.The initiative gradually shifted to the publishing groups, which each initiated a
number of websites and portals.
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The McKinsey study in 2000 served to create a (more) solid understanding of the new business
rules, and to mobilize efforts in which the individual publishing groups were in the driving seat,
under conditional control of the holding company, with TEM (as part of the newspaper group)
limited to support services.
4.7: Conclusions of the Case Studies
Introduction
The following section seeks to answer the questions that were posed in chapter three
through case studies. We will first see to what extent the five publishing companies perceived
the challenges of Internet to fit the three characteristics of an inflection point provided in
chapter 2. Subsequently, we will look at the transition phases that each of the companies went
through and verify these against the three inflection point phases described by Utterback (1995)
and introduced in section 2.4. Next verification are the observation of managerial anchor points
in our cases, followed by the discussion on the applicability of the defining assumptions and
propositions for each of the case studies. We will then seek to trace the three leadership
approaches to results in terms of financial performance. And finally, we will see which answers
our case research provides to each of the ten questions. These ten questions connect back relate
to our three main three topic areas: the dimensions of the inflection point (Q 1 & 2), the phases
through which the firm passes in an inflection point (Q 3 & 4), and the approaches leadership can
use when managing the firm through the inflection point (Q 5 - 10).
Case Perceptions on the Three Dimensions of the Inflection Point
To start with, each of the five corporations experienced all three of the dimensions of the
inflection point. Regarding amplitude, the arrival of Internet indeed was for most of them a life-
threatening change (Grove, 1996), in which they felt that they were losing market position, could
no longer respond to changing customer needs,and no longer had the capabilities to initiate and
execute the necessary new mission (Tushman et al., 1986). They lost time and opportunities, and
we have seen that their performance sagged as a result, as they risked heavy financial losses
(Ansoff, 1984). They all, at different times, showed a willingness to make major investments
simply to catch up in capabilities. These were financial investments and investments in people,
who had to be recruited and trained with the new skills, and who had to suffer the departure of
those in the “old guard” who could not keep up.
The two scientific and professional publishers, Elsevier Science (ES) and Wolters Kluwer
(WK),both regarded the advent of e-publishing as an event that came upon them with speed and
was life-threatening in its amplitude. Both companies made major investments in Internet, as ES
publicly noted in 1996 and WK in 1998. For WK, the amplitude of change in terms of financing and
competencies was such that the company entered into serious merger negotiations with Reed
Elsevier. Both companies changed their leadership in the course of the transition – ES in ‘94 and
WK in ‘98: in both cases, the strategy towards e-publishing was at the heart of the leadership
change.Subsequently, the main business structures had to be adjusted for the new environment.
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In 1995, ES went for a strongly centralized setup in which nearly all of the firm’s structures and
processes were either totally redesigned or strongly adjusted. Kluwer reorganized into five
business groups in 1998. These are strong indicators of amplitude. At business information
provider VNU, the leadership noted already in 1995 that their traditional management methods
no longer were effective. And in 1999,VNU felt obliged to establish a level of Internet investments
of Eur. 30mln p.a. that was later found unsustainable for the company.
Without doubt, the two newspaper companies De Telegraaf and Wegener also perceived
Internet as an event with amplitude. Wegener showed it by making a major effort in resources
and capabilities in building a range of websites, which reached a total of nearly 50 sites by 1998.
Just as was the case with VNU, the leadership had to admit that (the amplitude of) this
investment was too large for the company, and the efforts were scaled back in 1999. De Telegraaf
appeared less impacted, since it was and is heavily dependent on its newspaper and magazines,
which has to a limited extent mitigated the impact of the Internet. Nonetheless, De Telegraaf
explicitly reorganized the company in 1993 to face the challenges of new multimedia
environment.
All of the companies also experienced the abruptness of the inflection point, caused by
the speed of developments (Kanter et al., 1992), the abundance of new information to be
absorbed by the leadership (Ansoff, 1984), and its cognitive constraints to define the rules of the
new game (Cyert & Marsh, 1963). As partial exceptions to this abruptness, two corporations,
Elsevier Science and Wegener,had started experimenting with Internet at a very early stage. In all
our cases we see acquisitions as a means of rapidly gaining access to new skills. In case of these
two scientific and professional publishers, the leadership felt that they were operating in a
rapidly changing environment in which the effectiveness of their existing business models and
leadership was uncertain (ES, 1992). This sense of abruptness was less prevalent at WK, although
differences of opinion on the speed of industry change prompted the departure of the CEO. The
new environment called for new ideas (WK “young Turk” analysis, 1998). For the two newspaper
publishers Wegener and De Telegraaf the shift of internet also was less abrupt since they already
experienced a structural decline (of on average 2% p.a.) in readership due to both the advent of
TV, cable TV, etc., as well as changes in reading habits.
Externality clearly was evident in all the five cases,with the partial exception of Wegener,
which established an Internet software department at a very early stage that it used to develop
and test a number of early applications such as its CityOnline concept. However, even Wegener
later adopted standards and software from outside. The other early adopter, Elsevier Science,
initially did so by procuring software from a number of outside vendors. VNU management
noted from 1997 onwards the questions of analysts were rapidly mounting in number and
inquisitiveness, and that the prices and PE’s of Internet-related stocks were rapidly going up. It
were these external pressures that initiated the strategic reorientation that VNU undertook
from 1999 onwards. Figure 4.17 summarizes the perspectives of the five publishers on the three
dimensions of the inflection point.
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Figure 4.17: Three Dimensions of the Inflection Point in the Case Studies
Elsevier Science Wolters Kluwer VNU Wegener Telegraaf
Dimensions:
Amplitude xx xx xx xx xx/x
Abruptness xx/x xx xx x xx
Externality xx xx xx x xx
Legend: xx Fully confirmed; x Partially confirmed
Source: Company publications and interviews
Case Perceptions of the Three Transition Phases of the Inflection Point.
At the end of chapter 2, we listed the observable characteristics of the inflection point
phases (fig 2.12). In general,we can now state that the three phases were observed in all of the five
case analyses. Starting with the fluid phase, we see that most of the companies showed the four
observable characteristics of this phase. This pertains in particular to the local and flexible
character of the standards, and the emerging competition. In some instances, changes in
products and services, as well as processes, were not yet observed (figure 4.18).
In case of the scientific/professional publishers at Elsevier Science and Wolters Kluwer, it
is clear that the leadership was well aware of the uncertainties and dynamism of the Internet
media at an early stage. ES leadership acknowledged this when they stated in 1992 that they
could no longer stand for the effectiveness of their business model. At WK, local managers had to
find their way in the new environment through trial and error – witness the failure of the
electronic database for Samson textbooks.These trial-and-error exercises led to discussions with
the leadership in which neither level of management was able to substantiate its views on
market developments, due to the fluid nature of the environment (WK, 1998).
At this point, it is of interest to note that the development phases of the inflection point
following Utterback are defined in objective terms (i.e., characteristics of the marketplace as
presumably observed by the population of participants), the observations of individual firms of
the fluidity of the market may vary. At ES, the first rules of the new game – the start of transition –
were becoming apparent in 1993; at WK this happened in 1998. This difference in timing can be
explained not only by the attitudes and approaches of management of both companies, but also
certainly by the differences in market mix. At ES, the markets were heavily oriented towards
international scientific publishing in which CERN, a powerhouse in Internet introduction, played
an important leaders’ role. WK’s market mix was relatively more professional (legal, tax), with a
heavier European and Dutch component. These (sub) markets were a few years slower in
entering the transition phase.
In the business information environment, VNU operated in an environment that until
1988 was dynamic and unpredictable. There were no accepted standards and the “rules of the
game” were unknown. In 1997, the leadership stated that it had great difficulty understanding
the Internet market environment.
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Finally,both Wegener and De Telegraaf also experienced an initial period until 1993, in which they
felt they were operating in a totally uncertain and fluid world, a time in which they could do little
more than make limited exploratory investments, as Wegener did with WISE and VIPS, or set up
study units to follow new trends, as De Telegraaf did in 1991 with its Corporate
Planning/Commercial Development group. Both companies stressed that they were keeping
new activities at arm’s length of existing operations in order to contain the risks to ongoing
business.
By 1997 and 1998 the number of portals and websites controlled by the two companies as
well as its competitors was growing rapidly, which meant that its participants were learning the
ropes, albeit sometimes the hard way: they were approaching a transitional situation. Both
Wegener and De Telegraaf were happy to publish their long lists of portals and ventures, and the
leadership of both companies admitted their concerns with the increasing levels of required
investment, as well as the lack of positive returns of the majority of the ventures.
The second phase to be considered is the transitional phase. Here we find confirmation
of the observable characteristics indicated by Utterback (1995). Product changes were regular,
product launches and standards were firm-wide, processes were imposed. One real exception
was the competitive climate that for most firms became more difficult in this period, and not
easier, as had been hypothesized by Utterback (Figure 4.18).
The two scientific/professional publishers Elsevier Science and Wolters Kluwer found, in
this period, that enough market parameters were becoming visible to enable a modicum of
objective analysis. ES leadership noted in 1993 that the authors that provided its publishing
materials were starting to accept Internet (the IP standard) as standard for the submission of
articles. ES thus launched the planning process of its “grand design” of 1994, whereas WK’s
“young Turk”planning sessions started in 98. But uncertainties persisted, as ES leadership stated
when they had their major losses, and worries, in 1996.
In the case of Wegener and De Telegraaf, however, by 1998 the basics of the new industry
had emerged to the extent that concrete strategic thinking could take place, an indication of
transition. The McKinsey studies obviously could not yet have the deterministic quality that
could have been obtained if the studies had been done a few years later (prediction techniques in
particular were found lacking), but they clearly were able to identify the main lines of the new
market structure and its dynamics. This was enough for both the leadership (which was under
time pressure from the investment community) and some of its markets to start the strong
directive thrusts of 1999.
By late 1993/early 1994, the general trends in the newspaper business were becoming
more visible. For De Telegraaf this meant a fundamental structural reorientation towards a
multimedia company in which the newspaper was but one of the activities. For Wegener, this
meant the recruitment of Maurice de Hondt in late 1994, and the subsequent development of a
Grand Design for extended portal services, including CityOnline, in 1995. But the uncertainties of
the markets remained such that the leadership of both companies felt it necessary to publicly
acknowledge the more elevated risk levels of markets and strategies.
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The last phase to be verified is the specific phase. Here, again, the characteristics that we derived
from Utterback (1995) were generally confirmed. Product and service changes were (becoming)
rare, most companies tended to company-wide standards for products, information and
communications (although this was not always fully adhered to), and business processes were
rapidly becoming more rigid. And yes, competition in most cases was trending towards an
oligopoly, which did not always translate into a lower competitive intensity.
For Elsevier Science and Wolters Kluwer, this transition phase was relatively short for
both companies, as they both perceived a clear new set of market models by 1998. This was the
year in which ES leadership was confident enough about the stability of the environment and
(thus) its understanding of its dynamics, that it could delegate future strategy development to its
business units. In the same year,WK fundamentally changed its structure from a geographically
focused one to five global business units.
In case of VNU, 2000 was the year in which the new rules of the game were clear to the
leadership, which thus felt it had entered a specific market phase. This paved the road for the
delegation and decentralization actions of that year, and the emergence of a conditional
management style.
The same “solidification”occurred two years earlier for Wegener and De Telegraaf, where
it was noted by late 1998 that market rules had started to solidify, which meant that focused
plans and structures could be developed. Both companies engaged consulting firms to help in
the process – Wegener used Booz.Allen & Hamilton, and De Telegraaf used McKinsey. The
outcome of both studies was that the specific nature of the markets now enabled much more
focus and delegation of Internet activities. De Telegraaf now moved its dedicated support
facilities TEM to the newspaper group, and Wegener moved most of its e-business operations to
the regional newspapers. Figure 4.18 provides the overview.
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Figure 4.18: Observed Characteristics of the Inflection Point Phases in the Five Case Studies
Fluid Transitional Specific
Product/services changes
• Frequent 3 4 4
• Local 3 4 4.5
Designs/standards:
• Local 5 4 2.5
• Flexible 5 1 4.5
Business Processes
• Flexible 3 4.5 3.5
• Bottom-up 2 4 3
Competition
• Growing 4.5 2 3
Legend Observed in one of the companies: 1 point
Partially observed: 0.5 point
Source: Utterback 1995, company publications and interviews
It is interesting to note that the timing of these phases tended to vary considerably
between the different companies, even if they had similar activities.The fluid phase lasted a long
time in all cases, between two and seven years. One should note that this timing was different
even for similar companies. For example, the fluid phase was seven years, and ended in 1993 for
Elsevier Science, and lasted much longer, and ended later in 1997, for Wolters Kluwer. This can be
explained by the differences in development of the different segments in which the companies
operate. Elsevier Science is active in scientific publications, where Internet was an early
development that was strongly stimulated by key scientific players like CERN in physics. Wolters
Kluwer is strong in legal and professional publications, where the user adoption speed for new
technologies was much slower. The timing of the transitional phase was much more
homogeneous across the case studies. In all cases, this phase lasted between one and two years.
With exception of ES, it took place in 1998-1999. As explained, developments at ES were earlier by
a few years.Figure 4.19 shows the timing of the phases of the inflection point as perceived by each
of the case respondents.
Figure 4.19: Timing of Phases through the Inflection Point
Elsevier Science Wolters Kluwer VNU Wegener Telegraaf
Phases
Fluid ‘92-’93 ‘80-’97 ‘95-’98 ‘94-’98 ‘94-’98
Transitional ‘94-’95 ‘98-’99 ‘99 (‘98) ‘99
Specific >’95 >’99 >’99 >’98 >’99
Source: Company publications and interviews
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Case Perceptions on the Managerial Anchor Points
Before moving to the review of our actual model, we conduct a rapid verification of the
managerial anchor points. Of these five points, leadership was observed through the entire
transition process in nearly all of the cases, with exception of Wolters Kluwer and De Telegraaf
where it was only partially observed. Management of structure and processes as well as
accountability were also generally observed in all cases, except Wolters Kluwer and De Telegraaf.
Strategy development/content and environment/context were fully observed in only two of the
cases – VNU and Wegener, with the partial exceptions Wolters Kluwer and De Telegraaf
explained.
Of the individual firms, VNU and Wegener fully applied all of the managerial anchor
points with one partial exception. Elsevier Science is follows with two anchor points fully and
three partially applied. Wolters Kluwer and De Telegraaf showing only part of the anchor points.
Figure 4.20 documents the observations.
Figure 4.20: Managerial Anchor Points in the Five Case Studies
Cases
Elsevier Science Wolters Kluwer VNU Wegener De Telegraaf
Anchor Points
Leadership ˚˚ ˚ ˚˚ ˚˚ ˚
Strategy develop- ˚ ˚ ˚˚ ˚˚ ˚/o
ment/ content
Environment/ ˚˚ ˚ ˚ ˚ ˚
context
Management of ˚ ˚ ˚˚ ˚˚ ˚
Structure & 
Processes
Performance & ˚ ˚ ˚˚ ˚˚ ˚
Accountability
Legend ˚˚ Observed through the entire transition process
˚ Partially observed
o Not observed
Source: Company reports, interviews
Case Perceptions on the Defining Assumptions and Propositions
Overall, our case analyses appear to strongly support the defining assumptions and
propositions that were laid down in section 3.9. As we can see in fig 4.21, the defining
assumptions were fully confirmed in almost all five case studies, in particular in the Elsevier
Science, VNU and Wegener cases. Wolters Kluwer and De Telegraaf, for reasons explained above,
only partially confirmed our assumptions.
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Of these assumptions, the one concerning the three dimensions of the inflection point (A), the
one about phasing (B) as well as the one relating to the support function of a second leadership
approach (D) were almost fully supported. The assumption about the three leadership
approaches(C) was fully confirmed in two of the case analyses, and partially confirmed in the
other three.
The propositions show a somewhat more mixed picture, in particular in the initial, fluid
phase. Here, only Elsevier Science fully supports our propositions. Wolters Kluwer and VNU
partially support them. Wegener and De Telegraaf do not support the propositions. As we have
noted above, Wegener’s leadership opted for a directive style from the first day onwards, which
was explained by looking at the positioning and competence base of its local management.
Similarly, and for the same reasons, management of De Telegraaf also started off on a directive
track. But in later (transitional and specific) phases, it opted for a rather ecological approach in its
Internet ventures, as we have discussed above. This was explained by referring to the highly
decentralized management style of De Telegraaf, the dominance of the newspaper company
within the group that laid the basis for a more hands-off management style.
Overall, Elsevier Science and VNU thus support our model best. Wolters Kluwer and
Wegener largely supported our model, and De Telegraaf provided a mixed picture, reasons for
which were explained above. Figure 4.21 illustrates the analysis.
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Figure 4.21: Defining Assumptions and Propositions in the Five Case Studies
Elsevier Science Wolters Kluwer VNU Wegener De Telegraaf
Defining 
Assumptions
A: Inflection point ˚˚ ˚(˚) ˚˚ ˚˚ ˚
described by 
amplitude,
abruptness 
& externality
B: Three phases of ˚˚ ˚˚ ˚˚ ˚˚ ˚
an inflection point:
fluid, transitional,
specific
C: Three leadership ˚˚ ˚ ˚ ˚˚ ˚
approaches:
directive,
conditional,
ecological
D: A given 
leadership ˚ ˚˚ ˚˚ ˚ ˚˚
approach may 
be supported by 
a second 
approach
Propositions
I: In the fluid phase, ˚˚ ˚ ˚ o o
leadership will use 
an ecological 
approach
II: In the transitional ˚˚ ˚˚ ˚˚ ˚˚ ˚
phase leadership 
will use a directive 
approach
III: In the specific ˚˚ ˚˚ ˚˚ ˚˚ ˚˚
phase leadership 
will use a 
conditional 
approach
Legend ˚˚ Fully confirmed
˚ Partially confirmed
o Not confirmed
Source: Company reports, interviews
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Case Perceptions on the Three Leadership Approaches
When we look at the leadership approaches we can observe that the five publishing
companies indeed used all the tools that were identified in chapter 3 as characterizing these
approaches, albeit in different degrees of intensity (figure 4.22) and, as we will see later, at
different time periods.We can see, for example, that the scientific and professional publishers at
Elsevier and Wolters Kluwer were the most intensive users of conditional approaches –
conceivably because the education and experience levels of local managers enabled such
behavior. Conversely, VNU and Wegener favored directive approaches, not only because their
rapid transitional phases stressed urgent and incisive action, but also because their local
management may have been less experienced in managing according to the new business rules.
Finally, the leadership of the holding company De Telegraaf showed the most ecological behavior:
this corporation has a strict holding structure, and was initially less affected by the inflection
point.
We will first see to what extent each of the five companies used an ecological leadership
style. We can observe in case of Elsevier Science and Wolters Kluwer that, in the initial fluid
development phases – which we have associated with an ecological leadership style – their
leadership left most, or all, of the thinking and testing of the new waters to the local publishing
units. Local managers were the active participants to the SGML conferences in 1980 (ES); they
were the ones to launch trails with electronic text banks (WK/Sampson, 1998). And their
leadership stated that a policy of ‘hands-off’ decentralization was the best approach to the
uncertainties of the new environment. The characteristics of the leadership approach seen here
were as follows:
1) no interference with entrepreneurial activities in the area of Internet, and thus a
‘bottom-up’ management style,
2) budgetary freedom as long as the profitability of the unit was not seriously threatened,
3) reliance on the competencies of local management to manage the exploratory ventures,
4) ex post accountability and sanctions (stop the project, or hire/fire the manager) in case
of unacceptable waste of resource and 
5) and acceptance of limited speed of adjustment of the overall portfolio, limited align-
ment options, limited knowledge creation.
This provides us with a leadership style that fits closely with the ecological approach
identified and explored in its theoretical concepts in chapter 3, and characterized in figure 3.25.
This style was considered by the leadership of ES and WK to be most appropriate because the
leadership itself at that point had no superior idea what the new environment would look like,
and what the best strategic posture would be. Relatively the best informed people were those
closest to the market interfaces, i.e., the publishers and salesmen – and even their views were
uncertain, their decisions risky. A highly delegatory style was thus the best option.
In case of VNU, we observe that its leadership maintained a very high level of delegation
in the beginning years up to 1995, leaving the individual units freedom to run their text
management, publishing, marketing and sales to Internet markets in the way they deemed most
appropriate. One exception was the IT function that was centralized and remained so through
the entire inflection period.The ensuing leadership style had the following characteristics:
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1) a strategic independence of the business units in Internet development, as long as they 
2) stayed within the resource allocation limits agreed with the leadership and 
3) intermittent but tough reviews.
In comparison with our three approaches, this approach lies closest to an ecological
approach, although one senses a level of conditional leadership both in the imposition of central
IT services and in the overall financial limits. Given the lack of understanding of the fluid market,
in which the operational people in direct market contact had the best (albeit modest)
understanding of new developments, this was the highest level of control that the leadership
could strive for, and thus the best approach the leadership could choose. We do find, as stated
above, that conditional tools support the main thrust ecological approach.
It is interesting to note that in case of Wegener, the leadership in its ten-year history
through Internet did not display ecological behavior. As stated, this was due to both the active
interest taken by the management in the new technology at an early stage, and the (perceived)
lack of interest and competency at the field level to address the new medium,
De Telegraaf, however, opted for an ecological leadership approach both in the fluid and
specific phases of development, this mostly due to its corporate structure with strong business
units that served individual markets. Corporate leadership could therefore fully delegate
entrepreneurship in the new markets to these units.The technology development team TEM, for
example,was restructured under the largest operating unit.This approach was consistent with a
leadership vision of an overall somewhat arm’s-length holding company that the news group
adopted at the same time.
The next approach to be considered is the directive leadership style. Starting with
Elsevier Science and Wolters Kluwer, we can see that, as they entered the transitional develop-
ment phase, we can see a marked change in attitude, with the leadership taking a much more
forceful and proactive posture. At ES, the leadership started the phase in 1994 by developing a
grand design, and ended it with the Lexis-Nexis acquisition and the imposition of the CAPCAS
central data entry process. The establishment of the Science Direct centralized text database in
1995 was a further strong leadership imposition. At WK, the merger with Reed Elsevier would, if it
had gone through in 1998,been a similar strong leadership action.The consulting study launched
by Rost van Tonningen, and the “Young Turk” studies in the same year, can be seen as actions of a
leadership that senses it can no longer leave Internet strategy totally in the hands of local
management. The same applied to investments, as the leadership of WK took the initiative of
outsourcing all Internet facilitates and their operations to Atos-Origin in 1998, as well as
structure, as the leadership reorganized WK into five global business units. These management
styles at ES and WK had the following characteristics:
1) direct imposition – top-down – by the leadership of resources,competencies,structure or
processes,
2) major corporate portfolio moves involving important resources or many functions
(complexity),
3) rapid execution of the task undertaken,
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4) accountability for action and follow-up remained with the leadership,
5) advisory or supportive roles for local management.
This style fits closely with the directive management approach identified and described
in chapter 3, and summarized in figure 3.25. Undoubtedly, a directive style is an attractive option
for the leadership,since it offers the advantages of speed and effectiveness associated with major
moves like acquisition (Lexis-Nexis) and centralization (Science Direct), albeit at the price of
limited local knowledge creation. We observe in these cases that the leadership that combines a
period (or series) of directive moves with conditional action experiences fewer errors in
implementation and fewer motivational problems (e.g. ES introduction of Science Direct).
In case of VNU, the consulting study of late 1998, which resulted both from market
pressures and from mounting investor pressure,gave a better insight in the transitional markets,
and a perceived need for rapid, decisive structural action. Among other actions, VNU leadership
created the powerful central co-coordinating committee, and its operating unit, VIPS, with a
budget of Eur. 60mln. Its management style was characterized by 
1) top-down planning, decision making and implementation of Internet projects by VIPS or
under weekly leadership supervision,
2) central reporting of key projects either directly or via VIPS,
3) committing of sizeable resources to the new projects and 
4) recruitment or transfers of key people into VIPS.
This style of work is entirely congruent with the directive approach, which indeed was
the best way to achieve rapid results in view of outside pressures. The entire process was
comprehensively managed, so there was only a minimum of delegation, which with hindsight
proved to be a disadvantage,since a number of the VIPS ventures lost touch with (and support of)
the core businesses.
Wegener and De Telegraaf stand out as companies in which the leadership took an early
active role in developing and launching e-publishing strategies even in the fluid phase. This was
not due to any superior understanding of the structure and dynamics of the new markets, but
rather due to the lack of interest in the new media at the operating levels. It was – and to some
extent still is – very difficult for a printed newspaper publisher to envision a multimedia offering
(or series of offerings) within a practical time horizon. Thus, it was either leadership action or no
action. De Telegraaf bit the bullet by establishing its commercial development department at the
corporate level in 1991;Wegener followed in 1994-’95 with the establishment of WISE and VIP and
the subsequent recruitment of De Hondt in the leadership, who initiated and directed a series of
ambitious e-publishing projects. It is interesting to note that, in its general directive thrust, De
Telegraaf in 1993 added a conditional element by separating the holding from the newspaper,
and leaving quite a number of Internet projects within the newspaper and magazines. This
turned out to be the cause of turf frictions and was thus ineffective. Wegener’s directive
approach was not a big success either,because many of De Hondt’s big initiatives, like CityOnline,
were too far ahead of the market (and certainly the traditional operations) and had to be spun off
or stopped.
173
In conclusion, the better option (at least for Wegener) might at this stage have been to opt for an
ecological leadership approach and accept the slow initiation of new initiatives. In that way,
hindsight tells us, the results would at least have been aligned with the resources and
competencies of the traditional operations, and there would have been better overall control
between the leading units producing multiple projects, and the leadership keeping its hand on
the till. In summary, we can in both cases identify 
1) a dominant role for the corporate leadership in Internet strategy deployment, with a
more passive position taken by local management,
2) a number of sizeable acquisitions and/or investments,
3) relatively formal and one-way relationships with the field units.
This confirms the directive profile.
Both companies continued working under directive leadership styles until 1999, when
improved insights in the transitional markets and the organizational support of consultants
helped the leadership of both companies to set new courses. At this point, the leadership of the
two companies made different choices.
Finally, we need to review the extent and nature of conditional leadership approaches at
the five companies. In case of Elsevier Science and Wolters Kluwer, the leadership found that,
after having imposed broad structures for the new business, it was in a situation in which market
developments were more evolutionary and thus easier to understand and communicate
between levels of the company. At the same time, it was impossible to manage the detailed field
implementation, as ES found when it made a few attempts to impose Science Direct in its
entirety in 1996: attempts like these resulted in errors and de-motivation. At the same time,
capable local managers were available to take over many of the roles. Both companies therefore
reverted to a much more of a delegation style (ES in 1998 and WK in 1999), with the following
characteristics:
1) leadership imposes and controls strategic targets,
2) leadership imposes key operational procedures and the use of central facilities (e.g., text
storage),
3) local management responsible for detailing and executing the unit strategy.
This style is very close to the conditional management approach described in chapter 3.
This management style was feasible for both ES and WK, given the training/experience levels as
well as the interests of the majority of the local cadre, although quite a number of management
transfers within and outside both companies were necessary. The approach has the advantages
over a directive approach of leverage of local competencies, and the advantage over ecological
approaches of more close control by the leadership, which in this case is feasible, given the level
of shared understanding of (specific) market conditions at all management levels. Obviously,
where (major) shifts of portfolio or structure are necessary (e.g. when ES bought Biomednet and
ScienceNet in 1996), the directive approach remains appropriate.
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We should note that, since the timing of the inflection point phases was different for the two
companies, the same applied to the leadership approaches.This indeed was apparent in the early
shift to a directive style at Elsevier Science (in 1994-’95), compared to 1998 for Wolters Kluwer.The
same was observed in the move to conditional leadership that was observed in 1996 at Elsevier
Science, and 2000 at Wolters Kluwer. These differences can be explained from the traits of the
specific market segments in which each of these two companies operates.
At VNU it took until 2000 until it became clear that the directive approach of the
preceding two years was outlasting its value.The costs were very high and increasing, the success
rate of the projects and the support from operations were low. Where co-operation with the
businesses was called for, the directive projects necessitated matrix management structures,
which slowed down progress. Management decided to go for a strongly decentralized approach
in which 
1) business units would develop and run their own Internet operations,
2) the leadership would agree upon a priori targets with the units and control the results
and 
3) coordination of strategy would take place via regular two-way conferences.
This in essence is a conditional approach, and was the best of the three choices, given the level of
shared understanding of the specific market conditions through the different levels of the
company, as well as competencies that existed at local management levels to effectively run the
local projects.
Wegener went for a conditional approach in 1999, witness 
1) emphasis on management/coaching processes and training,
2) continuing ICT investments, and
3) u-turn and continuous target setting and monitoring.
In their case, the choice appears appropriate because, whereas the ambitions of the leadership
towards the new media had become more realistic, local management had gone up the
awareness and capabilities curve. The most attractive option was then to delegate the actual
development and execution of Internet plans to local management, under strong guidance and
control from corporate.
In case of De Telegraaf, the conditional approach can only be considered alongside the
more dominant ecological and directive styles used by that company. Undoubtedly, many
conditional tools were used, including use of key processes, but nonetheless this was not a
dominant approach of leadership in this period.
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Figure 4.22: Use of Leadership Approaches and Tools
Key Tool Used Elsevier Science Wolters Kluwer VNU Wegener De Telegraaf
Directive Approach
Adjust Business ** * *** *** *
Portfolio ** ** *** *** *
Adjust Competency * * *** *** **
Portfolio
Redraw Boundaries
Conditional Approach
Structure ** *** * ** *
Processes *** ** ** * *
Learning ** ** * ** **
Ecological Approach
Accountability * * ** ** **
Overall *** ** *** *** **
Source: Company reports, interviews
Results in the Field
After determining what the leadership styles of the different companies have been
through the inflection point, a logical question is what the impact of these different styles has
been on the success of the respective companies. A conclusive answer to this question is near-
impossible to give, due to the many definitions that exist of the concept “corporate success” as
well as the number and variety of factors that contribute to the results. Nonetheless, an attempt
is made to at least consider a number of indicators that were available from public sources. For
this, we took:
• the cumulated aggregate growth of the revenues of each of the companies between 1993
and 2000
• the autonomous growth of revenues,calculated in the same way,after elimination of the
revenues attributed to acquisitions
• the operating margin n 2000 of the case companies
• the return on invested capital
• the turnover per capita and its growth between 1993 and 2000
• the average price/earnings ratio of the case companies in 1994 and 2000
We also were able to create two pairs of companies: Elsevier Science and Wolters Kluwer
who both operate in related scientific/professional markets, and Wegener and De Telegraaf who
both are heavily involved in newspapers. We thus are able to compare both the leadership
approaches of these companies and their performance, and find a first indication but not proof
of causality. We had no comparative base available for VNU and its business information
position.
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Elsevier Science (ES) and Wolters Kluwer provide a first challenge in comparison. From the case
review and the subsequent comments made by Elsevier management, it is clear that the
company gained market share, and attributed its performance in large part to the operations
base provided by Science Direct and the associated new automated processes.On the other hand,
Wolters Kluwer faced a policy adjustment in late 2000, and admitted to being somewhat behind
in introducing Internet-based publishing, while stating the advantages of being a follower in
new technologies (this probably with good reason). The consequences of these actions are to
some extent reflected in the financial results (which were for both companies impacted by
acquisitions), but also show ES having overall better performance in autonomous revenue
growth, margin, return on investment and turnover per capita. Good divisional performance by
ES helped lift the price-earnings ratio of Reed Elsevier above that of Wolters Kluwer.
Determining how much of the economic performance of VNU is due to the leadership
approaches applied is much more difficult due to lack of suitable comparative material within
the scope of this study. In the 1993-2000 period VNU had, by any standard, excellent overall and
autonomous growth and ended the period with an extraordinary P/E of 54.Other indicators – like
the operating margin, return on invested capital and per capita productivity – seemed more
“normal”, albeit that there was no standard to measure this normality.
At the newspaper side of the publishing business, De Telegraaf shows up more
successfully relative to Wegener in the comparison of the relevant financial statistics that could
be gleaned out of the available sources (figure 4.22). From these, we can deduct that De Telegraaf
ended with a better higher revenue growth, higher margins and higher productivity (expressed
in turnover per capita) than Wegener. As result, De Telegraaf was able to catch up with Wegener
in PE terms: it started with a much lower PE of 6 in 1993, but by 2000 had come up to a PE of 14
– the same as Wegener. With hindsight, this better performance can be explained by the
conservatism of De Telegraaf, and conceivably its more extensive delegation of strategy matters
to its business units. As result, the development and sharing of competencies and knowledge
may have suffered, and the investments may have been less efficient. But the developments
remained close to the market place, and there turned out to be less need at the end to undo
strategic investments. But the relatively slower development of Internet markets turned out to
be an advantage for the conservative leaders of De Telegraaf. Key financial data are shown in
figure 4.23.
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Figure 4.23: Key Financials of the Five Publishing Companies (2000)
Elsevier Science Wolters Kluwer VNU Wegener De Telegraaf
Overall use of leadership *** ** ** *** **
approaches (fig 4.22)
Revenue growth (1993-2000) 5.2 17.5 18.2 15.6 7.9
Autonomous growth cagr % 5.2 5.0 (est.) 8.8 5.1 (est.) 7.9
Operating margin % (2000) 36.3 21.5 21.5 12.8 17.4
Return on invested capital % (2000) 89.8 16.9 10.5 13 26.2
Turnover per capita:
• Euro (000) 262 191 157 128 134
• Growth %, 1993-2000 2.1 3.8 3.3 6 3.7
P/E 2000 27 26 54 14 14
P/E 1994 21 20 15 15 6
Legend 15.9 – best of subcategory
Source: annual reports
In case of Wegener and De Telegraaf, we were able to trace the impact of Internet
leadership through an analysis of the website introductions done by the two companies in the
period 1994-2000. The data of this review came from documentation published by both
companies, and from a scan of the sites that both corporations currently operate. The latter is a
review of the financial reports of both over this period, which delivered a number of interesting
indications of the effectiveness of their external and internal Internet strategies.
The review of website development at both newspaper companies (figure 4.24) shows a
number of interesting parallels. In this diagram, Wegener’s development through time (the
vertical axis) is shown on the left, and that of De Telegraaf on the right. For each company, we
show the number of websites maintained by corporate leadership – an indication of directive
behavior –, the number of websites maintained by local management – and indicator of
conditional or ecological behavior –, and the cumulative total number of websites. Both
companies ended up with about 35 websites, most of which are directly tied to the individual
newspapers and magazines. They both retain a set of central websites that mainly serve direct
commercial purposes, like the sale of real estate and cars, and recruiting. There also are
interesting differences. Wegener was quick off the mark in 1994, with its first site in 1994 and
seven sites in 1996. Of these, three were related to the CityOnline project. However,Wegener took
risks in its early launches: it started no less than 63 sites, but had to close 27 of these. These
closures, by the way, fall into two categories: the early starts like CityOnline (which turned out to
be beyond both the immediate needs of the market and the capabilities of then-existent
technologies), and ambitious launches of the local newspapers in 1998 (which included a series
of local recruiting sites for which there was insufficient demand; they were all closed two years
later). One should note that the initiative of nearly all of the Wegener launches was either taken
directly by corporate or, in case of the 38 local sites started in 1998, prompted by a corporate
directive. This confirms our statement regarding the strong directive leadership approach by
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Wegener in the period up to 2000.De Telegraaf had a much more conservative and gradual build-
up. One corporate site was started in 1996, with a buildup to eight sites in the ensuing two years.
The major expansion took place in 1999, when corporate TEM started 18 sites, and the
newspapers and magazines 11 sites. Corporate interference with the newspaper activities in e-
business was limited in this case, which may have played a role in the higher success rate of the
local sites, of which none had to be closed.We can thus see that the conservatism and the higher
ecological tolerance of local initiatives by De Telegraaf leadership paid off in a better fit of the
local initiatives with market needs (figure 4.24).
Figure 4.24: Website development by Wegener and De Telegraaf, 1994-2000
Wegener Year De Telegraaf
Total Local Corp Corp Local Total
+2 +1 +1
2 = 1 + 1 1994
+1 +1
3 = 1 + 2 1995
-1+5 -1+5 +1
7 = 1 + 6 1996 1 = 1
-1+1 -1 +1 +3 +4
7 = 0 + 7 1997 3 + 5 = 8
-5+39 +38 -5+1 -1 +2
41 = 38 + 3 1998 2 + 7 = 9
-1+2 -1+1 +1 -1+18 +11
42 = 38 + 4 1999 19 + 18 = 37
-19+13 -19+9 +4 -7+2
36 = 28 + 8 2000 14 + 18 = 32
Summary statistics:
Website introductions: 63 Website introductions: 41
Website deletions: 27 Website deletions: 9
Legend:
1-3 active websites
7-9 active websites
More than 30 active websites
Sources: Field research, annual reports
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Concluding Remarks: Answers to the Ten Questions
Reviewing each of the ten questions that were set against the five propositions made in
chapter 7, we arrive at the following statements:
Answer 1: We have observed that firms experience the same characteristics of an inflection
point.
Our case studies reveal that the advent of Internet was generally perceived as an
existential event characterized by the speed and lack of clarity of structural change in the
relevant markets (ES, 1992) which made it impossible to plan ahead in the normal way (VNU,
1998) The event touched on all, or nearly all, of the functions of the companies involved (ES 1995),
and usually required a fundamental organizational reorientation of the firms involved (ES, 1995,
WK, 1998, De Telegraaf, 1993). The leadership of the companies involved often felt that they could
survive the inflection point only by making a major resource- or capability-enhancing alliance
(ES, 1994; WK, 1998) or by major development investments (ES, 1996; WK, 1999; VNU, 1998; De
Telegraaf, 1999). A sense of urgency was provided to the necessity to develop an appropriate
strategic reaction by client and supplier demands (ES, 1993) as well as investor inquiries (VNU,
1997;WK,1998).
Answer 2.These experiences are congruent with the three dimensions that we have identified in
an inflection point
Out of the long list of characteristics of the e-publishing inflection point, two of our
defining dimensions emerge quite clearly, and the third in a less prominent way. Amplitude
shows clearly, both in the existential nature of the inflection point and in the size of change of
both the portfolio and the organization that it entails. A number of respondents (ES, 1995; WK,
1998) also mentioned the abundance of functions and interrelations that had to be
fundamentally changed.
The abrupt nature of e-publishing is also evident. The leadership of ES in the 1980’s and
Wegener in 1984 certainly were aware of a pending major change up to five years before it really
started to affect their companies. The complication was that the markets were in a state of
extreme fluidity (opaque and dynamic), which meant that there were no signals to steer on. Only
after markets entered the transitional phase was there enough understanding to start action
beyond the experimental levels. Transition phases proved to be surprising short, however, from
one year (VNU), to two years (ES and WK). The following specific phase is characterized by
emergent competition, and the period of initiating appropriate strategic action can indeed be
called abrupt. Overall, one can state that the entire move from solid awareness of a fluid
environment to the stable and specific end-state took between three years (VNU) to up to nine
years (ES). Figure 4.25 illustrates the point.
180
Figure 4.25: Perceptions of Timing of the Inflection Point, Years
Company First public acknowledgement Start of major restructuring 
to industry stability to industry stability
(three phases) (transitional phase)
Elsevier Science 9 years 2 years
Wolters Kluwer 5 2
VNU 3 1
Wegener 6 2
De Telegraaf 5 2
Source: case analyses
Externality undoubtedly was an important challenge for the five publishers. Internet
originally had come out of the US defense establishment via the scientific world, with CERN
playing an important role. Of the five, Elsevier had the most intensive contacts with this
community, which did not alleviate the insecurity of its leadership to the point that they
commissioned a number of consulting studies in the mid-1990s to try to sharpen their
expectations. For the other firms, the sense of foreignness of Internet was even stronger. Like ES,
they all decided to ask consulting firms or individuals to support them in understanding the new
phenomena, and had to import the necessary technologies. Their inexperience with the new
tools shows in their hands-off,ecological, leadership styles over the initial years,which contrasted
with the more assertive approaches that they adopted as soon as they (thought they) understood
the new media.
Answer 3. The firms passing through the inflection points clearly perceive different phases in
environmental development, shifting from a period of rapid change and high uncertainty to an
end-state of stability.
All the companies researched felt that they were initially operating in markets that were
unclear in terms of structure and rules as well as highly dynamic (ES, 1992; WK, 1998; VNU, 1995;
Wegener, 1995). A complication is that the leadership of each company seems to differ in how
they perceived the timing of this fluid phase. We have analyzed this timing shift in the light of
comments made by ES and WK about the start and end of the fluid phase, and concluded that
differentials in the observation of timing can be explained partially by the subjective perceptions
of the leadership, and partially by the differences of the sub-markets in which each of the
companies operates.
After this extended period of total and dynamic uncertainty, most companies
experienced a short period in which the main lines of the new business became more apparent,
the composition of customer, supplier and competitor groups became more tangible, and both
the opportunity and necessity for strategic action seemed to impose itself. ES noted as a crucial
event the acceptance of Internet standards in 1993. WK also notes the move to just a few new
platforms (in 1998, however).
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This short period of “solidification” opened the way to a phase of evolutionary market
development in which opportunities and challenges were broadly known in quite specific terms,
and thus the more traditional rules of competition and management became applicable. The
companies surveyed all perceived this to happen in late 1999 or 2000, which permitted their
respective leadership to start delegating many of the specific tasks they had taken upon their
shoulders.
Answer 4. These dynamics are congruent with the fluid, transitional and specific development
phases.
The passage from a highly uncertain period to a phase in which dominant designs or
standards as well as structures emerge, to new a more stable environment pictured above, is in
its main lines consistent with the phasing of Utterback in fluid, transitional and specific.
Utterback provides rather detailed descriptors of his three phases, which are, however, rather
oriented towards innovation in “traditional” products and services. In a number of instances,
thus, our case findings differ from Utterback’s propositions: these deviations can be explained by
looking at the technologies involved as well as the peculiarities of the publishing industry:
In the fluid phase, we can observe congruency between the innovation theory of
Utterback and our field observations in the areas of innovation sourcing by pioneering users, the
key success factors (being functional performance) and the reliance on entrepreneurship by local
management to maintain local control.The main differences – in new designs, process efficiency
and cost of change – are all caused by the characteristics of information- and communication
technology-based innovation, as opposed to innovation in more traditional products and
services. In case of ICT innovation, the design and implementation of a new system is a major
effort with a high fixed project cost. Once launched, the ICT systems are efficient to operate, with
a near-zero marginal cost for expansion within the capacity bounds of the system. Most
traditional (“tangible”) products and services that still dominate Utterback’s thinking can in
most instances be developed in small series in a start-up phase and can thus be tested in a very
flexible way (albeit with high variable and marginal cost).
In the transition phase, there is much more congruency because the traditional
innovation explained by Utterback also becomes more rigid (e.g. in its design and supply
processes). In both cases, ramp-up to full deployment usually involves major design adjustments
and investment in equipment and software. The key differences between traditional innovation
and the inflection point observed in the case analyses lie in the cost of change, which is low for
traditional innovation and high for ICT adaptations, and in the key success factors, which center
around the ability to produce many product variations in case of traditional product innovation,
and share of content in case of our publishing firms: for them, control of the important
information sources, which determines their value to the users, is crucial. Finally, Utterback finds
projects and task groups to be the preferred way to exert management control in traditional
innovation, whereas we see transition in ICT/publishing effectuated through major
deterministic actions.
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Finally, in the specific phase, we again find congruency between innovation as analyzed by
Utterback and the inflection point development experienced by the publishing companies (e.g.,
in process development (rigid), cost of change (high) competition (moderate) and organizational
control (structured)). The main differences can again be attributed to the nature of ICT and
publishing. For example, since the information generation linkage with information suppliers is
very close in publishing, information suppliers have already played their influencing role in the
first two phases of the development of e-publishing. In the third phase, the users tend to start
exerting their role. ICT technology then also enables the creation of a more differentiated product
tailor-made to individual user groups. For these users, comprehensive access to the information
they need remains the dominant success factor: either the author delivers the specific
information needed, or he/she is out of the race. Also, publishers often have an opportunity to
monopolize important information sources – for example,through exclusive contracts with well-
known authors, or by establishing a major database that is costly to duplicate. In a more
traditional business, gradually increasing competition tends to make the cost of the delivered
product much more important in this phase. Figure 4.26 compares the characteristics of each
phase as observed by our five publishing companies with those provided by Utterback.
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Figure 4.26: Phases of Innovation versus Phases of Inflection Points
Phases Shared characteristics Dissimilar Characteristics
Innovation Inflection Point
Fluid Phase
Innovation Pioneering users
New Designs Frequent
Supply Processes Inefficient
Cost of Change Low
Competition Many/fragmented: Local Global
Key Success Factors Functional performance
Organizational Control Informal
Transitional Phase
Innovation Major process/ramp-up
New Designs Dominant design emerges
Supply processes Becoming rigid
Cost of Change Moderate High
Competition Many/declining number
Key Success Factors Product variation Share of content
Organizational Control Many task groups Strong top-down
Specific Phase
Innovation Suppliers Users
New Designs Incremental improvements: Standard Differentiated
Supply processes Rigid
Cost of Change High
Competition Few
Key Success Factors Price Share of offerings
Organizational Control Structure, rules
Source: Utterback, J.M., 1994, Case analyses
Answer 5.We can identify a range of leadership approaches in companies that pass through the
inflection point
In the course of our case reviews we have seen a wide variety of management approaches
and styles, ranging from totally hands-off to totally hands-on.
In particular,many companies in the fluid beginning periods stressed a hands-off attitude,which
meant that most of the work necessary to stay abreast with fluid developments (ES, 1980), and to
launch the first trial and error projects (WK, 1998) were left to local management. Key
characteristics of this style of leadership were as follows:
1) All initiatives in the post-inflection point environment were left to local managers (ES,
1988),
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2) No ex-ante targets or expectations existed regarding what the local management
should achieve in testing the new markets: local management thus had total freedom as
to the scope, size and nature of their Internet ventures (deTel’96),
3) Ex-post accountability usually existed in the financial sense only: in most cases local
units were expected to stay within their financial constraints (i.e. not produce inordinate
losses) (WK’98).
When immediate action was possible or appropriate, the leadership of all companies proved to
be quite capable of hands-on management. Basically, this capacity demonstrated itself in eight
different ways:
1) The launch of comprehensive strategy development exercises (WK, 1998; VNU, 1998),
2) The extensive use of acquisitions to acquire capabilities (Weg, 1996) and to build market
presence (ES, 1994, 1996;WK, 1998; deTel, 1993),
3) The development and operation of major infrastructures under direct corporate control
(ES, 1995; VNU, 1998; De Tel, 1995) or the signing of outsourcing contracts for key
infrastructure functions (WK, 1998),
4) The launch of new Internet operations under direct leadership control (Weg, 1995; VNU,
1998),
5) The imposition of core operating procedures (ES, 1994),
6) Frequent (monthly at most) supervisory meetings between leadership and local
management to plan and control progress (VNU, 1997),
7) The imposition of organization structures (ES, 1995;WK, 1998), and
8) The nomination of local managers (WK, 1998).
When the markets were perceived to be relatively stable and predictable, we could
observe all of the companies reverting to a delegatory style of management in which all of the
market- and sales operations were placed under local units (WK, 1999; VNU, 2000; deTel, 2000;
Weg, 1999), and the leadership resorted to management by setting targets and conducting
regular (monthly at most) meetings with local units to monitor progress.
Answer 6. The management styles that we have observed can be classified into the directive,
conditional or ecological leadership approaches.
The leadership approaches that we have observed show a high level of congruency with
the three approaches that were developed and detailed from a theoretical perspective in chapter 3.
We see now that the ‘hands-off’ attitude used by all of the companies researched in the
fluid phase coincides very well with the ecological management approach. As we have seen
before, this approach is founded on the premise that the leadership is unable to fundamentally
change the strategic course of the firm of which it has been put in charge. The only option it has
is to withdraw its commitment. In the fluid phase, the leadership of our set of companies did not
feel they had enough information to make strategic decisions. They thus all opted for an
ecological approach and left all initiative to local managers. They did, however, continue to keep
track of the overall performance of local operations (which were in the beginning predominantly
traditional in nature), and in most cases to intercede when new experiments were perceived to
be too costly.
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In the transitional phase of the industry, we see ‘hands-on’ behavior that meets the
characteristics of the directive leadership approach. As we have seen before, this approach comes
forth from the various leadership schools, and seeks direct leadership actions like portfolio
changes, boundary selection and appointments as key strategic actions to achieve the desired
adjustment of the firm to the new environment. Our list of eight types of actions mentioned
above closely fits this leadership approach.
Finally, we mentioned that all of the leaderships adopted a highly delegational style of
leadership once their companies were steering towards more tranquil waters of the specific
phase. This fits with conditional leadership approach, which stresses the capabilities of local
management as the basis of a more decentralized, but also u-turn, process of leadership.
Answer 7. We observed the use of a second approach as support.
As noted,we have regularly seen conditional leadership backed up by incidental directive
action.This can be explained by the fact that even in a specific environment and a well-delegated
company,a key acquisition or change has to be made now and then,and should be done centrally.
We also observed directive leadership that adopted a more laissez faire conditional approach in
managing less important functions. This can be explained by the manpower constraint that the
leadership invariably experiences in a directive mode. It is physically impossible for an individual
or a small group of people to conceive of major actions, implement them and provide follow-up.
There are no instances found of a second approach used in support of an ecological
leadership approach. This can be explained by the philosophy that drives this approach (i.e., the
inability of leadership to formulate strategy given the environmental uncertainties), which
results in a passive corporate posture.
Answer 8. The directive and conditional approaches are compatible
From the above, it appears that directive and conditional approaches are mutually
compatible, but that neither of them is compatible with an ecological approach. A directive
leadership may enact dramatic shifts in the portfolio of activities and capabilities of a firm, and
at the same time impose new structures and processes, and initiate learning experiences in the
ongoing operations. Simultaneously redirecting the firm along these two lines presents a
considerable challenge to the leadership, which may explain why in our field studies we usually
observed the sequence directive first, conditional later.
Answer 9. The leadership changes its approach as the firm passes through an inflection point.
Our observations indicated that as the industry passed through the fluid and
transitional phases to the specific phase, the leadership of most firms researched justified their
propensity to move from an ecological leadership style to a directive style and, finally, to a
conditional style. The main exceptions to this rule were the two newspaper publishing
companies, which had insufficient grassroots capabilities to venture in the new environment to
permit an ecological approach in the fluid phase.
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Answer 10. The preference for an approach in a phase be explained and justified.
The preference of the leadership of each of the companies for a given approach was the
logical consequence of 1) their level of understanding of the environment; 2) the urgency of
action and 3) the capabilities of local management to further develop and implement strategy.
Our finding is that the companies often made this choice intuitively, but always were consistent,
and thus all came to similar approaches that followed the rules given above.
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5 Conclusions and Closing Remarks
5.1: Introduction
The preceding chapters characterized the inflection point and identified three
approaches that can be used to lead the firm through this period of upheaval.The inflection point
was dissected into three phases, and we showed how each leadership approach is particularly
appropriate for one of the three phases. Our analysis of five publishing companies as they
encountered the Internet revolution has provided us with substantiation of our findings.
This chapter will first bring to the fore the questions of chapter 1 – regarding the “what”,
“how”, “when” and “why” of the inflection point –, link them to the defining assumptions and
propositions of chapter 3, and then comment on their validity. Subsequently we will point to
those elements in our findings that we regard as scientific contributions to in the form of
concepts, methodology and applications. This leads us into a discussion of a number of research
topics that will further build on the work done here: we will look at the application of our work
outside the publishing field, at chances to predict an inflection point, at organizational
resistance, at interactions with the external world, and finally at the concept of reactive
strategies. Finally, we will debate the management implications of our work by formulating
three recommendations, and end our study with our concluding comments in the epilogue.
5.2: The Four Questions and their Underlying Propositions
In the first pages of this study – section 1.2 – we posed the four questions that have
underpinned our work: 1) what, from a strategic perspective, is the most effective description of
an inflection point? 2) how can leadership approach an inflection point, 3) when is each of the
identified leadership approaches relevant and 4) why does the leadership of those firms that
successfully pass through an inflection point appear to vary its style. The answers to these
questions were hypothesized at the end of chapter 3, in section 3.9, in our defining assumptions
and propositions. As we can see in figure 5.1, the questions can be directly linked to these defining
assumptions and propositions.
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Figure 5.1: Four Questions, Defining Assumptions and Propositions
1) What is, from a strategic perspective, the most effective description of an inflection point?
A: An inflection point can be described in three dimensions: amplitude, abruptness and
externality.
The three dimensions of the inflection point were theoretically grounded in chapter two.
In the fieldwork, we found that the case study companies fully experienced amplitude and
externality. Abruptness, however, was defined less in terms of surprise, and more in terms of a
lack of understanding what measures to take, and the short time span available to management
to take appropriate strategic initiative. In the transition phase there was enough understanding
of the new environment to formulate strategy, and competitive positions had not yet been pre-
empted.This assumption is thus supported by our analysis.
We found that the necessary understanding of leadership behavior in the inflection
point is improved if we take a longitudinal view of the latter. In doing so, we can state the
following:
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Questions Defining Assumptions
1. What is an inflection point?
A. An inflection point has three dimensions:
amplitude, abruptness and externality
B. An inflection point has three phases:
fluid, transitional and specific
2. How can leadership approach an 
inflection point?
C. There are three leadership approaches:
directive, conditional and ecological
D. A chosen leadership approach may be
supported by a second approach
3. When is each approach
appropriate?
4. Why does successful leadership
varies its approaches through time?
I. In the fluid phase, the leadership will use
an ecological approach
Propositions
II. In the transitional phase, the leadership will
use a directive approach
III. In the specific phase, the leadership will
use a conditional approach
B: Industries passing through inflection points go through three phases: fluid, transitional and
specific.
This assumption was first formulated and substantiated by Utterback (1995) in the
broader context of industrial innovation. Our case analyses revealed that the companies
reviewed indeed perceive the industry in which they operate to pass through three phases –
dynamic uncertainty (fluid), structural formation (transition) and increasing stabilization
(specific). A complication was found when some companies experienced the start of a particular
phase up to four years earlier than others. This was explained by considering the sub-
segmentation of the market as well as the subjectivity in cognition of the leadership. This
assumption is thus supported by our analysis.
The second question that we posed at the beginning of this analysis was how the leadership of a
firm can approach an inflection point. To answer this question, section 3.9 made two defining
assumptions, which we can now substantiate after reviewing our fieldwork.
2) How can the leadership of a firm approach an inflection point?
C:We can identify three leadership approaches to an inflection point: directive, conditional and
ecological.
In all of the five case studies, we found that the leadership had used three approaches
that coincide with the classification provided above, albeit in different degrees. Some firms, such
as VNU and Wegener relied heavily on directive approaches; others, such as Elsevier Science and
Wolters Kluwer, tended more towards conditional tools. De Telegraaf leadership stands out as
being a modest user of all of these tools.
D: A chosen approach may be supported by a second approach.
This assumption was supported for conditional and directive management. From
deductive reasoning it follows that directive and conditional approaches may well support each
other, but that ecological leadership is not compatible with the other two approaches. In the
fieldwork, we indeed found situations in which an overall directive or conditional style was
supported on an incidental basis by, respectively, conditional or directive actions. At De Telegraaf,
we observe a somewhat confused period of ecological leadership combined with conditional
measures, which was not very successful and was rapidly abandoned.
3) When is each of the leadership approaches appropriate?
The third question that we posed in starting this analysis was when each of the
leadership approaches is appropriate. Chapter 3.9 formulated a proposition to answer this
question. After reviewing our fieldwork, we can now substantiate this proposition.
E: Each of the three leadership approaches is congruent with an industry development phase.
This assumption is supported for firms with innovation-oriented local management.
Our theoretical work and our fieldwork demonstrated that an ecological management style is
most appropriate for fluid industry conditions; a directive style is best for a transition phase, and
a conditional approach best for the specific development phase. We did identify an important
exception for companies in which the local management lacks the capabilities or motivation to
undertake the experimental ventures that are a necessary feature of the fluid phase.
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4) Why does the leadership of a firm that successfully passes through an inflection point appear
to vary its style through time?
The last question of chapter 1, why the leadership of a firm that passes through an
inflection appears to change its approach, can be answered from the assumptions and
propositions. An inflection changes in nature as it evolves (assumption B); we have seen that
different leadership approaches are possible (assumption C), and that each leadership approach
is congruent with a phase. Since the leadership of a firm will seek to use approaches that are
particularly effective in each phase, this provides an overall explanation of the changes in
leadership approaches that were identified in our fieldwork. When we specifically look at the
propositions, we see that:
I: In the fluid phase of an inflection point, the leadership will tend to use an ecological
approach.
We have seen in Chapter 3 (section 3.3, figure 3.4) that the ecological approach combines
a selective nature of strategy deployment with an incremental speed of transition. In the fluid
phase, market conditions and trends are unclear, and it is difficult, often impossible to make
essential strategic decisions on resources, capabilities, structure and processes on logical,
informed grounds. This provides the logical underpinning of a hands-off ecological style that
leaves decision-making to the local management levels. In the case reviews, we observe that an
ecological stance was fully adopted by one of our companies, and partially adopted by two
others. In the two cases where there was little or no indication of an ecological approach in the
fluid phase, these aberrations were explained by taking the capability balance between
leadership and local management into consideration.
II: In the transitional phase of an inflection point, the leadership will tend to use a directive
approach.
The directive approach combines adaptive strategy deployment with radical speed (fig
3.4). In the transitional phase, new market structures and trends become clear, which renders an
active leadership posture possible. This, and the need urgent and rapid change combine to
stimulate the leadership towards a hands-on management style in which it undertakes the
necessary restructuring of the business and competency portfolios as well as the organization
and processes on its own initiative. In the case reviews, we observed a directive posture in all of
the situations observed, with one part confirmation that was explained in chapter 4.
III: In the specific phase of an inflection point, the leadership will tend to use a conditional
approach.
The conditional approach is a balanced phase in which either a selective nature of
strategy deployment combines with radical speed, or an adaptive nature of strategy deployment
combines with incremental speed (fig 3.4). In both these situations, there is a relatively high level
of understanding and control ability at leadership levels that thus enables a measured level of
delegation through well-developed processes. These are characteristics of the conditional
leadership approach. Here, too, we observe four of the five case examples to fully deploy the
assumed leadership style, and the fifth to partially apply it, with again an explanation provided
in chapter 4.
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In conclusion, we have thus confirmed the dimensions, phases and leadership approaches of the
inflection point as well as the linkages between these three sets of elements, as hypothesized in
figure 3.23 which is reproduced here as figure 5.2
Figure 5.2: A Dynamic Framework of Leadership Approaches to an Inflection Point
5.3: Scientific Contributions
This study purports to make scientific contributions in the form new concepts – through
the identification of three dimensions in the inflection point –, through methodology – by
analyzing the inflection point in a longitudinal way –,and through application – by looking at the
inflection point through the leadership lens.
Conceptual Contribution: the Three Dimensions of the Inflection Point
As we have seen in chapter 2, there are at least thirteen theories that describe rapid
change and that we have used as reference base in our description of the inflection point. More
close examination however shows that none of these describes the three dimensions compre-
hensively and in the specificity needed to define appropriate leadership behavior. Of the ten
theories discussed in Chapter 2, only four cover all three dimensions of the inflection point, which
are all necessary to describe and scope out an environment shift in such a way that the leadership
ends up with limited, well-defined behavior options. Without amplitude there is no need for
decisive, far-reaching action.Without abruptness there is time for contemplation and preparation.
Without externality, upfront management control of the industry change becomes possible.
When we look at the four schools of thought that cover all three dimensions of the
inflection point in more detail, we find out that Kanter et.al.(1992) and J.B.Quinn (1980), take an
ecological perspective on changes in the environment, which is described as a given entity.
Change is caused by “major external or internal events that would precipitate urgent, piecemeal
interim decisions”. Major corporate change then is effectuated by the “change strategist” who is
as much the actor of internal adjustment as a re-actor. The nature of these events is left
undescribed. Abell (1993) on the other hand does identify a series of internal and external forces
of change, like product life cycles, seller and buyer behavior, technology effects and globalization.
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But he considers this at the market level, not the firm level, which makes the linkage with
leadership reactions an indirect one. In case of Nadler et.al. (1995),changes in the industry are not
differentiated, and the distinction between these changes those in the immediate environment
of the firm also are not discussed in any level of detail. They do provide a segregation of
organization changes along two axes – reactive vs. anticipatory, and incremental vs. disconti-
nuous that leads to organization re-creation (reactive and discontinuous) as their equivalent of
inflection point behavior. But overall, their work focuses on change leadership within an
organization without an attempt to describe the reasons for these changes in any specificity,
which again makes it more difficult to make the transition to the management’s perspective.The
characterization of an inflection point into three key dimensions – amplitude, abruptness and
externality, and thus in such a way that it can be fitted into a model of leadership behavior, is a
new contribution of this study.
Methodological Contribution: the Longitudinal View
Regarding the longitudinal view, we can note in a similar vein that many authors have
addressed the phenomenon of major industrial change, but that a company perspective on the
phasing of the inflection point is new.
One of the first classical writers of major change (Ansoff) describes his “strategic
surprises” in terms of 1) sudden arrival, 2) novel problems, 3) failure to respond, which carries a
strong penalty and 4) response that is urgent and extraordinary (Ansoff, 1984). Similar
descriptions were written by quite a number of authors, including Tushman & Romanelli (1994),
Abernathy & Clark (1985), Stopford & Baden Fuller (1994) and Kanter et al. (1992). All of these
authors appear to treat the inflection point as a single “big bang”event: yesterday it wasn’t there
and today – hey presto – a new world.
A few important exceptions to this general statement can and should be made. First,
Ansoff in his 1984 book does make note of the fact that there is a time line involved in the
economic analysis of an inflection point (i.e., there are opportunity losses in the period before the
leadership undertakes action,and there are investments to be made).There are the revenues and
margins out of the traditional business that go down in linear fashion. There are the start-up
costs, revenues and margins out of the new business that materialize in a discontinuous way,
resulting in a more unpredictable curve. The result are losses that will increase “though the
ceiling” unless the leadership checks these by restructuring the old business and building the
new to profitable levels. Ansoff drew figure 5.2 to illustrate his point. He stresses the longitudinal
– time – dimension of the inflection point, but does not, however, pursue his longitudinal
thinking beyond the economic dimension.
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Figure 5.3: Economic Passage through the Inflection Point according to Ansoff (1984)
Paul Strebel provided one of the more dynamic views on major change. He considered his
breakpoint the result of a shifting balance between industrial change forces and resistance
forces. However, the “blow-by-blow” account of the breakpoint as it unfolds, and the possibilities
for leadership action in each phase, is not given.
As we noted, a few exceptions exist in this void. Lewin (1947) analyzed major change
within an organization that passes through three stages (unfreezing, adjustment and
refreezing); the firm has an internal managerial focus and lacks the element of urgent
environmental upheaval, including externality and abruptness, which is a crucial ingredient to
the inflection point. And Utterback (1995) provides a detailed and effective description of
development phased through an inflection point (of which we have made extensive use in this
thesis). But his scope of analysis is the industry, which means that he does not look at the
transition through the lens of the firm.
This study has projected – for the first time – the three phases of industrial development
of Utterback onto the firm.We have seen how the leadership copes with each of his phases – fluid,
transitional and specific. The leadership indeed perceives these phases, and adapts a different
approach to each of them. We have thus developed a longitudinal perspective on the transition
through an inflection point from a firm’s perspective.
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Application Contribution: Perspective of the Leadership
Leadership per se has been an important topic on the management literature list almost
as long as it exists. Interestingly enough, one of the early mentions is also one of the most
relevant: in 1920, Schumpeter regarded the entrepreneur – the leader in innovation – as some-
body who is “not concerned with the administration of existing industrial plant and equipment,
but rather with the incessant creation of new plant and equipment embodying new techno-
logies that revolutionize existing industrial structures”, (Schumpeter, 1946). Schumpeter sees the
leader as initiator of major innovative change, but apart from that, his description fits our
requirement to the ‘t’. The Schumpeterian view was recently reinforced by Stopford and Baden
Fuller, who stated “all types of entrepreneurship are based on innovations that require changes
in the pattern of resource deployment and the creation of new capabilities for positioning in
markets” (Stopford & Baden Fuller, 1994).
A great deal of research has been done on the role of the leader in determining and
implementing strategy. One can state,for example, that he “conceptualizes,expresses or implies”
the strategy in terms of 1) the long-term objectives or purposes of the organization, 2) the broad
constraints and policies, either self-imposed by the leader or accepted by him from his superiors,
which currently restrict the scope of the organization’s activities, and 3) the current set of plans
and near-term goals that have been adopted in the expectation of contributing to the
achievement of the organization’s objectives (Lorange & Vancil, 1977)
The focus in recent years has shifted to major change processes in organizations, and the
factors of success in surviving periods of major change. Tushman and Romanelli conducted
extensive analysis in industries developing through a punctuated equilibrium,and found that in
periods of turmoil, replacement of the leader often is a key ingredient to survival (Tushman et al.,
1985). It is clear that a good intellectual and intuitive grasp of the post-inflection point world is
crucial for success, that this world is presumably quite different from the pre-inflection point
world, that therefore the likelihood that the existing leadership has a good understanding of the
new world is relatively small, and ergo that replacement of the leadership is thus the best way to
promote the survival changes of the firm – this in particular when we do this as early as possible
in the inflection point (Kanter et al., 1992)
We get somewhat closer to our target if we look at the personality of the leader who
must pass two tests relating to his understanding of the new (external) environment and his
skills in leading the (internal) organisation. In other words,does the leader have the foresight and
environmental understanding to see where the firm can and should end in an (external)
industrial revolution? And does he/she have the administrative and leadership skills to help the
internal organization pass through a major change process? (Hamel, 2000) 
None of these analyses, however, covers the strategic posture (or approach) that he (and
his team) can take (the ‘how’ questions that form the centerpiece of this analysis). Schumpeter
and his colleagues tell us how important a good leader is for major change. Lorange, Vancil and
their colleagues describe the leader’s task list. Nadler & Heilpern and Kanter et al. inform us that
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replacement of the leader is a key step to success. Hamel tells us what kind of person the leader
should be. But how should the leadership go about their job? It is in this area that this analysis
makes a contribution.
The preceding chapters explained that passage through an inflection point involves three
development phases,and that each of the three has its appropriate leadership approach.We may
note that in three of the five case studies (ES, WK, Wegener) at least part of the leadership was
replaced. But we have also explained both from a theoretical perspective and from case
experience what the best leadership approach is in each of the phases.
5.4: Further Research Topics
As is usually the case with research that has been worthwhile, this thesis leaves us with the
perception of more questions than the list with which we started. The most important ones can
be categorized into five groups:
A) How applicable are our propositions outside the publishing field? 
B) Can we predict an inflection point?
C) How do we overcome organizational resistance to the adjustments necessary to succeed
through the infection point? 
D) Can we influence the environment, or is the inflection point in all its aspects dictated
externally? and 
E) Is strategy development through an inflection point simply a sub-set of general theory
on reactive strategy development?
A) How applicable are our propositions outside the publishing field?
One of the most difficult questions to ask about the statements made in this thesis
relates to their general applicability and their validity outside the area of publishing covered by
our five case studies. It would obviously be of considerable interest and relevance to conduct both
a more extensive series of case studies and a broad survey. Regarding the case studies, and
barring comprehensive coverage of the gamut of businesses, one should think of the unique
traits of the publishing industry and find complementary counterparts, preferably outside the
media industry.
Development of a full-fledged survey on inflection point behavior is more straight-
forward. The list of questions is provided the appendix; these can be detailed and phrased in a
form that is more amenable to multiple-choice interrogation. An important question is to whom
the questionnaire should be sent. Obviously, it would be the most interesting to have the
responses of both leaders and local managers in large and small companies.The coverage of both
leadership and local managers is of particular importance because one can expect a bias at both
sides. Ideally, ways should also be found to obtain an unbiased response rate (e.g., by making the
survey obligatory to all recipients). The coverage of a number of industries and countries would
enable important cross-comparisons across industries with widely varying structures and
dynamics, and countries with very different cultural patterns.
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This additional fieldwork would also shed more light on the two idiosyncrasies that we were able
to resolve on an indicative basis only:
• The dichotomy between the three approaches used by the majority of publishing
companies vs. the two used by the newspaper publishers, and 
• the differentials in timing in the development phases experienced in particular by the
scientific and professional publishers.
B) How do we overcome organizational resistance to the adjustments necessary to succeed
through the infection point? 
The fascinating quality of inflection points is that the incumbent organizations that
suffer under them often have the underlying competencies to restructure and reorient them-
selves to the new environment. More often than not, people have the background to retrain, the
financing exists to buy the new hardware and software needed, and a beautiful brand has been
established. And, of course the necessary reorganization intellectually is nothing more than the
drawing of a new organigram together with new position descriptions and process figures.Why,
then, is the resistance of an established organization to these changes usually so high? And why
is it that, even if the organization is highly motivated to change, it more often than not turns out
to be incapable of making the about-turn that is needed?
When we consider resistance, we will first examine internal resistance elements, and then
external resistance, outside the organization proper. Internally, there are four main sources of
rigidity: a) vision and values, b) unwritten rules of the game, c) hierarchy and d) business
processes.
A common vision and values are essential for a large group to function effectively. Since
it is not possible to instruct every individual of the group about every detailed action he or she
must make, delegation of decision authority is needed. It is surprising, actually, how much
delegation takes place even in a highly centralized organization (like an army).This delegation is
possible only if each member is aligned regarding the direction of the organization and its
mission.These alignment patterns run deep,often starting at the point when the individual joins
the organization: an army recruit joins the army to “fight the communists”; a business gradate
applies for a job with a certain brokerage firm because he likes the prospects of the high bonus he
will earn. One of his engineering colleagues goes for a computer company because it has a
reputation of putting quality before short-term gain. The successful company has optimized its
ability to meet these personal ambitions. In an inflection point the new vision may no longer fit
personal ambitions as well as the old one did: employees seeking annual bonus packages find
that the company has to invest heavily in restructuring – ergo no bonus for a few years. The
engineer who loves the quality of his mechanical devices finds the concept of quality totally
redefined by the inflection point – gone are the intricate visible gears,toggles and levers,replaced
by the dull zeroes and one’s of a sophisticated software package. After the inflection point, not
only the community but also the members often have to change their vision about what makes
life worthwhile. Undoubtedly, some will feel inspired by the new challenges. But many will end
up either demotivated or quitting.
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The second key rigidity are the“unwritten rules of the game” – coined by Scott-Morgan,referring
to the multitude of uncharted behavioral patterns that govern how a company functions. These
can vary – from making a round of lobbying visits to senior influencers before presenting a
proposal to top management, to making sure one is promoted or at least moved out of a job
within three years to gain experience in different functions and countries. The problem is that
these rules fall (by definition) outside the codebook (so it is not easy for management to track
them down). Their impact may also be very different – and often undesirable – in the new
environment: the consensus management achieved by the round of lobbying may no longer be
effective when bold entrepreneurship is needed, and the job rotation schedule may no longer fit
with a more decentralized scale of a reformulated company. Adjusting to these unwritten rules is
not easy. They must first be identified, and then changed, which may call for a variety of
instruments. Sometimes, this will be a new compensation and career structure. Sometimes a
new report will be called for (Scott-Morgan, 1994).
Interestingly, hierarchy itself, which can be seen as the main lever through which change
is achieved, more often ends up being an impediment. Isn’t it obvious that things are changed
when the boss tells his underlings to start doing other things or at least to do them differently?
The complication lies in the fact that a superior can give the right orders only if he understands
the task that must be performed by his underling: an army officer is no good at ordering the
sailors of a ship to hoist anchor because he has no understanding of the variations involved in
this maneuver. So what does the manager of a pharmaceutical plant do when the process
switches to fermentation with biological modified microbes? He has a problem, and it requires
training or replacement – reason enough for resistance (with thanks to Prof. P. Bouw).
The business processes are analytically easier to tackle, if only because the subject is well
understood and thoroughly debated in the scientific and business literature. There is thus
presumably less need to describe how processes are first identified, then prioritized, codified,
designed and implemented. The books by Champy & Hammer (1996) on re-engineering the
company provide more than enough examples.There is a multitude of processes: main business
processes, like design, purchasing, production, marketing, and sales; key functional processes,
like financing, human resources, technology development quality; and support processes, like
communications (internal and external), training,etc.All of these processes have been developed
and optimized through the years to serve the old business vision, to make the company
successful in the old environment.The chances that they will work well in the new world are slim.
There is also the interesting question regarding how these four principles find their way into
specific hurdles that companies appear to face in taking appropriate action at an inflection
point. In a study of companies that need to implement an innovation rapidly, Foster finds the
following impediments to immediate action:
• Belief that an evolutionary approach (to existing technology) will be enough,
• Assuming that there will be ample warning about a coming discontinuity if the present
technology, customer needs and competition are understood,
• Conviction that the company understands what its customers want,
• An incorrect definition of the market,
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• Overestimating the ability to see discontinuities coming because the company under-
stands its competition, and
• Thinking the company can react fast enough.
(Foster, 1986)
Abruptness is a characteristic of an inflection point, and the risk of organizational
resistance is therefore high (ES, 1986; WK, 1998; DeTelegraaf, 2001). It is important that further
research be done to see how the organizational barriers to action can be rapidly broken down.
C) Is the inflection point in all its aspects dictated externally, or is there an opportunity to
influence the outcome?
In the scope of this thesis, we have purposefully limited ourselves to major industry
upheavals that found their origins outside the sphere of influence of the firm. This limitation
proved to be consistent with our fieldwork, in which the companies studied in most instances
saw themselves at the receiving end of customer demands and market trends. One possible
exception may have been the modest degree of influence that ES and WK had on the use of media
by their customers and text suppliers.
Interestingly enough,this assumed passivity with regard to structural market developments is in
marked contrast with the theories on innovation, starting with Schumpeter. Schumpeter views
the entrepreneur as initiator of structural change in the business in which he/she operates. His
main function is to take the resources that he can lay his hands on, and to develop hereto-
unforeseen combinations (Schumpeter, 1920). His challenges to the individual – entrepre-
neurship, after all, becomes quite a job – were not actively pursued for a number of years, when
more process- and oriented-oriented strategy models were more popular. But in the 1970s,
Richard Foster and others picked up on the theme, as innovation once again became a hot topic.
Gary Hamel is the most vocal recent champion of the innovator forming his own world; it is the
entrepreneur’s mission to revolutionize markets around him (Hamel, 2000). When Hamel wrote
his book, stock markets were up and venture capital was easy to come by – the right world for
somebody who wants to transform an industry. As we write this thesis, stock markets are down,
venture capital is tight and business is cautious. We believe there is a role for the industry
transformer, Hamel style. The focal point of this thesis, however, is the incumbent, who
presumably has been around for a number of decades, and who has gained an important
position in his traditional markets – a description that fits, by the way, all of our case studies.This
important incumbent is faced with a critical transformation of his markets: an inflection point.
To what extent can he and should he attempt to use his strong position to influence his markets? 
In conclusion, we have helped ourselves in this thesis by assuming the environment to be an
independent monolith, an unpopular source of challenges. If we relax this premise, we open a
new area of research into the interreaction of important incumbents and their environment as
the challenge of an inflection point occurs.
D) Is strategy development through an inflection point a sub-set of a general theory on reactive
strategy development?
Classical strategy development has always been pro-active. The general view has been
one of the leadership of the firm leaning back and taking stock of the challenges and
opportunities of the future. In this respect there is no difference between the design approach of
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Chandler, the planning philosophy of Ansoff, the positioning school of Porter or the resource-
based views of Penrose & Wernerfeldt: they all need time and effort to blueprint the situation
and the outlook. And the more complex the business is, the less differentiated the company
appears,and the more effort and time the analysis takes.This does not translate into a guarantee
of a workable blueprint. Alas, the trade routes of strategy are lined with the bleached bones of
failed plans, developed too often at great expense by consulting firms of high repute. But one
highly illustrative example is provided by the apparently sophisticated consulting work done to
support the market position of the British motorcycle industry in the USA against the Japanese
build-up (Mintzberg, 1990), which clearly was ineffective in countering the almost total demise
of this market position.
These challenges have been exacerbated by gradual shifts in the macro-economy.
Compared to the 1950s and 60s, a relative decrease can be observed in the importance of capital-
intensive industries-steel making,refining and chemicals now make up less of GNP than they did
twenty years ago. There is also an increase in availability of capital, which is less of a scarce
resource than before, and human capital has emerged in different dimensions – knowledge,
competencies, and entrepreneurship – as an ever-increasing (scarce) economic factor. On top of
all of this, time horizons are shortening. To put it succinctly: a software package may have a
typical economic lifetime of five years, and a refinery a lifetime of thirty.
One of the major disadvantages of the “traditional” strategy schools – leadership losing touch
with an increasingly capable and vocal group of middle managers – was overcome by the
organizational learning theories popularized by Senge (1990). Another promising approach was
launched by Volberda, who made a pioneering comprehensive analysis of the strategic gains to
be made by improving the flexibility of the organization. These approaches at “mass mobili-
zation” were successful, but only if ample time and effort had – again – been spent in preparing
the groundwork. Work on new approaches is not abating; the talk now is of virtual corporations
(Davidow & Malone, 1992), “hollow” or “doughnut” corporations, dynamic networks (Miles &
Snow,1986),hypertext (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995),platform (Ciborra,1996),and shamrock (Handy,
1995) organizations, and cellular structures (Miles et al., 1997; Volberda, 1998).
On the outside, the environment has not simplified matters. Chapter 1 noted the decrease in
lead-times required for major new innovations to penetrate global markets.This is undoubtedly
fostered by the improvement of communications and the disappearance of global trade barriers.
The time available to react to new trends, and to prepare for new arenas as they emerge, appears
to have shortened.
One outcome can be the increase in the number of inflection points, for which we have tried to
develop an appropriate strategic response in this thesis. But even in circumstances less abrupt,
more complex, and with less amplitude, many firms experience a combination of less clarity
about the environment, with less time to think about it.
For information intensive industries, the latter half of the 1990s of course appeared to be an era
of major change and opportunity, and it was there that we observed the emergence of the
somewhat playfully coined the “new economy” school of strategy, which was based on playing
options combined with an ecological approach to each option, and was therefore largely void of
analytical content. The process was simple: test the capabilities (and if possible the track record)
of the venturing team, with due care, and give them the money; then come back at three-month
intervals to see how they are doing (figure 5.4)
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Figure 5.4: Strategy Development in the New Economy 
The mild recession that appears to have started in 2001 caused capital to become slightly
less abundant, which spelled the end of this school, but does seem to leave us with an analytical
gap between the cognitive tools currently available to develop our strategic thought and the
needs of today. Not every firm faces an inflection point every year, fortunately, but there is a need
for new ways to look at the uncertain environment and deduce the best paths possible. Is the
future for reactive strategies?
5.5: Management Implications
Nobel prize winner Herbert Simon, who started his career at the school of management
and ended at the psychology department of Carnegie Mellon University, was one of the first to
focus attention on the mind of the strategist and his cognitive skills and limitations. In his view,
the world is large and complex (particularly in an inflection point) while human brains and their
information-processing capabilities are highly limited in comparison. Strategy development
thus becomes not so much rational as a vain effort to be rational (Simon, 1947). This may help us
understand why many leaders already are challenged in managing an ongoing firm, and why
many more feel, or find themselves, powerless at the advent of an inflection point that imposes
an entirely new set of complex rules applying to an already complex world.
A contribution to resolving this dilemma was provided by Derek Abell, who stressed the
necessity to separate strategy development for the ongoing business from strategy development
for the post inflection point environment (Abell, 1993). He correctly points out that it is difficult to
maintain two worlds of thought in one person. How often does a manager, in the throes of
202
Investment Manager
Withdraw
Commit Funds
Results
Review
Plan Invest Operate
Venture
Evaluate
Business
Evaluate
Management
Coach
turmoil surrounding his ongoing affairs, lean back and consider the challenges of a new post-
inflection-point world that is slowly starting to take shape around him? And then he must
consciously decide what his personal posture will be towards that major change.
The leadership of all the five companies researched did take some distance and made
decisions in view of each phase of the inflection point that in most cases amounted to a different
leadership approach. There was a lot of thinking about the specific decisions to be made. There
was no systematic thinking about the overall approach to be used. It is remarkable that they all
nonetheless came to the same outcome. Undoubtedly, time and effort were lost in the process.
This leads us to the first recommendation:
a) It pays for leadership to conscientiously decide for a management approach whenever a
fundamental shift in business rules occurs.
The second recommendation relates to the timing of different approaches. As we have seen, an
inflection point in actuality consists of three development phases, and each of these phases has
its appropriate leadership approach.Therefore
b) It pays for leadership to be aware of inflection point phases and choose their approach
accordingly.
Finally, we should realize that an inflection point is an abrupt event, in which timing is
critical. Moving too early in terms of investments and approach translates into resources lost to
a market that is not ready to appreciate the new services or products, as shown by the first years
of Wegener/CityOnline. Moving too late means that competition may have pre-empted
important market positions, as WK medical information found in the US. The advantages to the
party that gets the timing right are not minor, which leads us to the third recommendation:
c) Having the best possible understanding of the phases of the inflection point and making
the transition between approaches at the right moment spells the difference between
failure and success in the inflection point.
5.6: Epilogue
This study was initiated to look at an economic phenomenon of sudden, unpredictable
changes that seem to threaten the existence of the corporations of this world with increasing
frequency. This may be one of the reasons why so many researchers have embarked on analysis
covering the concept of major corporate change, as the list of thirteen concepts provided in
Figure 1.2 shows.
However, none of these thirteen concepts has focused on the role of leadership in a firm
that passes through an inflection point. None of these concepts takes an external change as sole
starting point for change. And none of these concepts looks at management roles in a
longitudinal way in each phase of the inflection point as it evolves, step-by-step. Looking at the
passage through the inflection point through this lens provides a model that can easily be
translated into leadership action.
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The ensuing model was derived from a relatively comprehensive literature review and can thus
claim to be grounded in current management theory. It was tested on five publishing firms that
survived the Internet revolution – undoubtedly an inflection point for them.The three leadership
approaches are thus well rooted in theory and practice.
We hope to have made a contribution.
Looking at the way ahead, strategy as a managerial process may be moving ahead of
strategy as a (analytical) way of thinking. We accept that many analytical methods of the recent
past – in particular extrapolation techniques – no longer are effective in the current uncertain
world. But beyond scenario analysis, options theory and chaos theory, the number of analytical
tools that are available and useful to the strategy practitioner is small. And, seemingly, the
interest in strategic analysis as an important source of important corporate and academic
renewal seems to be waning. Annual procedures are routinely followed, markets are segmented,
portfolio analyses conducted. But the real interest of top management appears to be shortening
to the next quarterly results – or the next major incident, be it the 9/11, the Iraq war or SARS, for
which Porter and the 1980’s techniques provide little answer. Figure 5.5 plots the grounding
authors of inflection point thinking on a time axis, and signals that, after the wave in the early
1990’s, there has been only one really new concept, by Scott Morgan et.al. in 2000. Are we now
experiencing the Fall of Strategic Planning, as predicted by Minzberg in 1994?
Figure 5.5: Inflection Point Schools Through Time
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One reason of the decline in interest in strategic planning may lie in finding the right object for
the next strategy exercise. Are we seeking to maximize returns on capital – in a time when capital
is relatively abundant,or shareholder returns – with the role of the shareholder under debate? Or
would we rather increase the satisfaction of the right set of stakeholders, or build competencies,
or focus on human assets? The options available to the strategist in selecting his priorities are
many. And only the (financial) analysis tools that serve the shareholder and other capital
providers are well developed.
Strategic Analysis makes sense only when there is scarcity – scarcity of financing, people
or other resources, scarcity of market opportunity, or scarcity of time. One of the most important
functions of strategic analysis is to provide the algorithms to make the best of this scarcity.
In the post-war decades,until about 1990,scarcity meant financial scarcity.This may help
explain why the main body of strategic analysis tools, from DCF analysis to EVA, to the market
attractiveness matrices, related to the generation of margins and cash flow.
We now face uncertain times. In the late 1990s, which are the focal point of our case analysis,
capital was certainly not the scarce commodity, knowledge and competencies were. Capable
manpower was in short supply, too. But the planning and control tools available to the
publishing firms – and other companies entering the Internet era – in the areas of knowledge and
competence management lagged far behind available financial techniques in breadth and
depth.
The function of strategic analysis has thus become to help understand what the scarce
commodity of the next round will be, and to provide the analytical tools to make the best out of
that scarcity.This may be the next frontier in strategy thinking.
Santa Monica, October 2002/Leiden, August 2003
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Leiderschap en het Inflectiepunt
– Een Longitudinaal Perspectief –
Nederlandse samenvatting
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Nederlandse samenvatting
Beleidsvorming als vakgebied voor bedrijfskunde is een betrekkelijk nieuw terrein dat
pas in de twintigste eeuw ontstaan en tot een mate van wasdom gekomen is. Nadat schrijvers als
Schumpeter in de twintiger jaren een eerste beeld gevormd hadden van ondernemerschap en
invloed daarvan op de economie, was het aan naoorlogse denkers als Chandler, Porter, Ansoff en
anderen om de eerste theoretische beelden te vormen van het gedrag van ondernemingen en
hun leiding. Al aan het eind van de vijftiger jaren was al een aantal management theorieën
ontstaan, die door Ansoff (1984) onderverdeeld konden worden in vier categorieën, die zich
baseren op, respectievelijk, het achteraf beheersen van de ontwikkelingen van de onderneming,
een extrapolatie van het heden, anticipatie in een evoluerende omgeving, en tot slot flexibiliteit
en aanpassing.
In de tachtiger jaren van de vorige eeuw raakten de leiders van ondernemingen
bovendien steeds meer geneigd om hun wereld te zien als een arena die regelmatig van een
toestand van relatieve rust door perioden van chaos en onrust verkeert naar een nieuwe en
onvoorspelbare positie. Schumpeter bekeek als eerste deze omwentelingen vanuit het
perspectief van industriële innovatie. Later gaven schrijvers als Tushman, Newman & Romanelli
(1986) inhoud aan het begrip industriële discontinuïteit. In de negentiger jaren raakte het
dynamisch denken in ondernemingsstrategie verder in zwang, met de invoering van concepten
als competentiedenken (Prahalad & Hamel,) flexibiliteit (Volberda, 1999), en netwerkdenken
(Davidow & Malone, 1992). Hoe een onderneming met turbulente verandering moet omgaan
werd pregnant aan de praktijk geschilderd door Andrew Grove, die als bestuursvoorzitter van
Intel twee dramatische omwentelingen in de industrie had meegemaakt: de eerste toen het
primaat in geheugenchips van Intel en andere Amerikaanse ondernemingen over ging op Japen
en andere Aziatische landen, de tweede toen Intel de consequenties van zijn succesvolle
consumentencampagnes pas bemerkte toen het bijna te laat was. Het was Grove die in
samenwerking met Robert Burgelman van de Stanford Universiteit met zijn boek “Only the
Paranoid Survive” (1996) de term “Inflectiepunt” populariseerde.
Is er in de afgelopen jaren het nodige gepubliceerd over snelle omgevings-verande-
ringen, het blijkt dat er nog weinig bekend is over de houding die de leiding van de onderneming
kan aannemen als deze veranderingen plaatsvinden. Het doel van deze analyse is dan ook om
vast te stellen 1) wat een effectieve beschrijving van een inflectiepunt is, 2) hoe de leiding van een
onderneming met een inflectiepunt om kan gaan en 3) wanneer de verschillende benaderingen
die de leiding kan toepassen het meest geëigend zijn. Deze drie vragen geven een pragmatische
invulling aan de overkoepelende vraag 4) waarom de leiding van een onderneming die door een
inflectiepunt gaat een strategische gedragsverandering moet ondergaan.
Deze studie beoogt met name twee nieuwe gezichtpunten naar voren te brengen. Ten
eerste wordt het perspectief van de ondernemingsleiding ingenomen: de vraag wordt gesteld
welke maatregelen de leiding kan nemen. Ten tweede wordt een longitudinaal perspectief
aangenomen. Het inflectiepunt en de reacties van de leiding daarop worden niet als een
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enkelvoudige gebeurtenis gezien, maar als een sequentieel proces dat met een beginfase
aanvangt en stapsgewijze naar een eindfase toe loopt. Hoofdstuk 1 geeft de hier in samenvatting
weergegeven inleiding. Een analyse van theorie (Hoofdstuk 3) en van een aantal praktijk-
voorbeelden (Hoofdstuk 4) brengt ons nader tot de beantwoording van bovengenoemde vier
basisvragen.
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2 Beschrijving van het Inflectiepunt
Een overzicht van relevante theoretische concepten van Tushman, Newman & Romanelli (1986)
en Strebel (1994) en anderen brengt ons tot een begripsbepaling in drie dimensies:
• Amplitude, dat wil zeggen de ingrijpende aard van het inflectiepunt, waarbij een groot
aantal ondernemingsfuncties aangetast wordt en het voortbestaan in gevaar komt –
zoals beschreven door onder meer Abernathy & Clark (1985) en Quinn(1978)
• Abruptheid, dat wil zeggen de korte tijdsperiode waarin de veranderingen in de
omgeving plaatsvinden, die dwingen tot een snel ingrijpen en niet zelden voor de
ondernemingsleiding verrassen – zoals beschreven door Ansoff (1984), Kanter, Stein &
Jick (1992) 
• Externaliteit, dat wil zeggen ontwikkelingen die van buiten af aan de onderneming
opgelegd worden – zoals beschreven door Tushman et.al. en Abernathy & Clark.
De volgende stap is een nader onderzoek naar de dynamiek van het inflectiepunt.
Hiervoor kunnen wij gebruikmaken van de onderscheiding die Utterback (1995) maakte van
industriële innovaties: hoewel deze een terrein bestrijkt dat groter is dan het inflectiepunt – het
omvat enerzijds een bedrijfstakperspectief, anderzijds interne innovaties – blijkt zij uitstekend
bruikbaar om te ontwikkeling van het inflectiepunt te volgen. Utterback onderscheidt drie
ontwikkelingsfasen:
• In het begin, een fluïde fase, een periode van een industriële omwenteling waarin veel
veranderingen tegelijkertijd plaatsvinden, de uitkomsten van deze veranderingen in de
zin van produkten, ontwerpen, processen, concurrentieverhoudingen, en de structuur
van ondernemingen uiterst onzeker zijn,
• Een transitiefase, waarin de markt de nieuwe produkten en diensten begint te
accepteren, dominante ontwerpen ingang vinden en de aandacht van ondernemingen
van innovatie naar productie verschuift
• De specifieke fase is het laatste ontwikkelingsstadium, waarin produkten en diensten in
hoge mate gedefinieerd zijn en de voortbrenging zich concentreert op volume en lage
kosten.
De bovengenoemde onderscheidingen stellen ons in staat om het strategisch proces dat
het bestuur van een onderneming volgt om de organisatie door een inflectiepunt heen te gidsen
te zien als een reeks achtereenvolgende leaderschapsattitudes. Deze opeenvolging is een
longitudinaal proces.
Aan het eind van dit hoofdstuk kunnen de bovengenoemde concepten gecombineerd worden tot
een model dat de benaderingen van de leiders in een inflectiepunt beschrijft (fig. 1)
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Figuur 1: Een Dynamisch Model van Leiderschapsbenaderingen in een Inflectiepunt
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3 Leiderschapsbenaderingen van een Inflectiepunt
De aandacht kan zich nu richten op de leiderschapsbenaderingen die onder deze
omstandigheden mogelijk zijn. Hiervoor is gebruik gemaakt van een zevental theoretische
modellen, terwijl de effectiviteit van de resultaten geijkt is tegen vijf belangrijke management
functies.
Voor de zeven theoretische stromingen is gezocht naar voorbeelden die leiderschap
belichten in periodes van radicale en snelle verandering, waarbij met name gelet is op de
behandeling van adaptieve en selectieve managementbenaderingen, en naar de behandeling
van incrementele versus radicale managementstijlen. Op grond hiervan kon gekozen worden
voor 1) de leiderschapsschool van Schumpeter (1934) en Barnard (1938), 2) de “resource”
benadering van Penrose(1959) en Wernerfelt (1984), 3) de dynamische vermogensschool van
Teece, Pisano en Shuen (1997) alsmede Eisenhardt en Martin (2000), 4) de lerende benaderingen
van Argyris & Schon (1978) alsmede Weick (1979), 5) de institutionele school van DiMaggio en
Powell (1983) en Greenwood en Hinings (1996), 6) de populatie-ecologie benadering van Hannan
& Freeman (1977) en Aldrich en Pfeffer (1976) en tot slot 7) de levenscyclus/onderbroken
equilibrium school van Tushman & Anderson (1986) alsmede Romanelli en Tushman (1994).
Een beschouwing van deze zeven stromingen leert ons dat zij over twee assen – de aard en de
snelheid van transitie – vergeleken kunnen worden. Daar uit blijkt dat drie leiderschaps-
benaderingen mogelijk zijn:
• de directieve benadering die een adaptieve aanpassing paart aan een radikaal-snel proces
• de conditionele benadering die adaptief/incrementeel dan wel selectief/radicaal is.
• de ecologische benadering die een selectieve aanpassing combineert met een
incrementeel-snelle transitie.
Wij kunnen deze drie benaderingen verifiëren tegen vijf gangbare management
functies die wij gekozen hebben, namelijk 1) leiderschap, 2) strategische inhoud, 3) omgevings-
context, 4) managementstructuur en -processen en 5) prestaties en verantwoording. Bij een test
tegen recente indelingen als het dynamische krachtenmodel van Burgelman blijken deze vijf
functies het arbeidsterrein van de ondernemingsleiding te dekken zonder met elkaar te
overlappen. Als wij de vijf functies onderzoeken in ieder van de drie leiderschapsbenaderingen,
blijkt dat iedere benadering hier op een geheel eigen wijze inhoud aan geeft. Hiermee deze drie
leiderschapsbenaderingen niet alleen getoetst op compleetheid en differentiatie, maar zijn zij
ook verder verduidelijkt.
In het volgende deel van hoofdstuk 3 worden de directieve, conditionele en ecologische
leiderschapsbenaderingen theoretisch verdiept met hulp van de eerdergenoemde vijf functies
van management. Voorts worden van ieder van de benaderingen de belangrijkste middelen
(“tools”) beschreven. Deze middelen vertalen de theoretische benaderingen naar de praktijk in
de zin dat zij door de leiding van bedrijven als daadwerkelijke acties gezien kunnen worden,
maar ook in de zin dat deze “tools” in de praktijk verifieerbaar zijn.
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Aan het einde van hoofdstuk 3 kan niet alleen het volledige dynamische kader, de dimensies en
de fasen van het inflectiepunt en de mogelijke leiderschapsbenaderingen gepresenteerd
worden, maar kunnen ook vier bepalende onderstellingen en drie stellingen geformuleerd
worden die uit de vier basis vragen van hoofdstuk 1 voortkomen:
• Betreffende vraag 1, wat is de definitie van een inflectiepunt zijn er twee bepalende
onderstellingen:
– Een inflectiepunt kan gedefinieerd worden in drie dimensies: amplitude, abruptheid
en externaliteit
– Binnen een inflectiepunt kan een onderscheid worden gemaakt in een fluïde, een
transitieve en een specifieke ontwikkelingsfase 
• Betreffende vraag 2, hoe kan de leiding een inflectiepunt benaderen zijn er ook twee
bepalende onderstellingen:
– Wij kunnen voor een inflectiepunt drie verschillende leiderschapsbenaderingen
onderscheiden – de directieve, conditioneele en ecologische benadering
– Een gekozen leiderschapsbenadering kan ondersteund worden door een tweede
benadering
• Betreffende vraag 3: wanneer zijn de verschillende leiderschapsbenaderingen toe-
pasbaar, zijn er drie stellingen die er van uitgaan dat ieder van de drie leiderschaps-
benaderingen bij uitstek toepasbaar is in een van de ontwikkelingsfasen van een
inflectiepunt:
– de directieve benadering past bij de transitieve fase,
– de conditionele benadering bij de specifieke fase en 
– de ecologische benadering bij de fluïde fase.
• Betreffende vraag 4: waarom gebruikt het leiderschap van een onderneming
verschillende benaderingen blijkt dat de synthese van het voorgaande hier antwoord op
geeft.
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4 Praktijkstudies
Wij toetsen deze stellingen in hoofdstuk 4 aan de praktijk middels een tiental
verifieerbare vragen. Verder bevestigt onderzoek van de researchlitteratuur (Yin, 1994,
Swanborn,1996,Strauss & Corbin,1990) dat praktijkvoorbeelden (“cases”) in combinatie met een
vraagonderzoek een goede bevestiging kunnen leveren van dit soort stellingen. Voor deze
praktijkvoorbeelden is, vanwege de duidelijkheid van het waargenomen inflectiepunt, de
overgang van vijf grote uitgeverijen naar het internet tijdperk gekozen. Deze vijf bedrijven zijn:
Elsevier Science,Wolters Kluwer,VNU,Wegener en De Telegraaf.
De vijf praktijkstudies worden eerst afzonderlijk, vervolgens in vergelijk behandeld. Uit
de praktijkstudies blijkt dat de vijf uitgeversbedrijven de drie dimensies van het inflectiepunt
– amplitude, abruptheid en externaliteit – ervaren hebben. In alle gevallen was er een gevoel van
grote onzekerheid over de nieuwe structuur en spelregels van de bedrijfstak, gecombineerd met
de realisatie dat het voortbestaan op termijn van de onderneming in het spel stond. Wel waren
op deze brede bevestiging een aantal gedeeltelijke uitzonderingen: zo experimenteerde
Wegener al in een vroeg stadium zelf met internettoepassingen (waaronder het CityOnline
project) waardoor er sprake was van een zekere mate van interne innovatie in plaats van
externaliteit. Zowel Elsevier Essence als Wegener hadden een vroege start in internet, waardoor
het element van abruptheid hier verminderd werd.En bij de Telegraaf droegen zowel het karakter
van het bedrijf – met nadruk op kranten en magazines – als het niveau van decentralisatie bij tot
een relatieve beperking van de omvang van verandering.
Uit de voorbeelden blijkt duidelijk dat al de vijf bedrijven door de drie fasen heen zijn
gegaan, hoewel gesteld kan worden dat de transitieperiode bij Wegener zwakker werd ervaren
bij de anderen. Dit laatste kan mede worden verklaard uit de lange periode van “fluïde”
voorbereiding bij dat bedrijf. Opvallend zijn de verschillen in fasering: hoewel Elsevier Science en
Wolters Kluwer in vergelijkbare industrietakken werkzaam zijn – eerstgenoemde in weten-
schappelijke publicaties, de tweede vooral ook in juridische en professionele uitgaven – zijn de
eerste onzekere signalen van internet als serieuze uitdaging ongeveer tien jaar eerder bij Wolters
Kluwer doorgekomen dan bij Elsevier. Desondanks vond de transitiefase bijna vier jaar later
plaats. Oorzaak van deze afwijkingen moeten gezocht worden in de aard van de individuele
marktsegmenten. Zo was de internetdruk op alle activiteiten in de uitgeverijketen bij Elsevier
Science al van de eerste dag zeer hoog (een van de grote klanten van ES, CERN in Geneve, stond
aan de wieg van internet). Bij Wolters Kluwer waren het bedrijfstechnische gronden die al vroeg
reden gaven tot automatisering van de productietrajecten bijvoorbeeld van de (juridische)
referentieboeken, terwijl de markt aanvankelijk achter bleef. Wij kunnen hier zien hoe het
marktsegment “uitgeverijen” uiteenvalt in een aantal microsegmenten die een groot verschil in
marktgedrag laten zien. De drie overige ondernemingen – VNU,Wegener en De Telegraaf – laten
allen een grotere homogeniteit in fasering zien, zij het dat Wegener een voorloper was.
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Als wij kijken naar de leiderschapsbenaderingen, dan zien wij dat al de vijf ondernemingen
successievelijk ecologisch, directief en conditioneel leiderschapsgedrag laten zien, zij het dat de
intensiteit van dit gedrag nogal verschilt. Zo zien wij dat de leiding van Elsevier Science en
Wolters Kluwer een meer conditioneel strategisch gedrag vertoonden, onder meer omdat deze
ondernemingen een vroege start hadden gehad in internet,en hoog opgeleid management in de
eenheden in het veld. De leiding VNU en Wegener daarentegen vertoonde meer directief
strategisch gedrag, wat verklaard kan worden uit het relatief minder opgeleide plaatselijk kader
bij beide ondernemingen, en de relatief late aanvang van de transitie bij VNU. De Telegraaf liet
het meeste ecologische strategische gedrag zien wat verband houdt met het sterke
holdingkarakter van deze onderneming en de relatief lagere urgentie van de internetuitdaging.
Wij konden tot slot in exacte termen na gaan in welk opzicht de faseringen van innovatie die
oorspronkelijk door Utterback hebben voorgesteld verschillen van de karakteristieken van het
inflectiepunt zoals door ons vastgesteld. Geconstateerd wordt dat er inderdaad een aantal
verschillen zijn die aan de bruikbaarheid van het model van Utterback voor de fasering van het
inflectiepunt geen afbreuk doen.
Aan het eind van hoofdstuk 4 kunnen de vier bepalende onderstellingen en de drie
stellingen die in hoofdstuk 3 geponeerd zijn middels beantwoording van de tien daaruit
afgeleide vragen met een aantal nuanceringen bevestigd worden.
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5 Conclusies
In Hoofdstuk 5 worden tot slot vanuit bovengenoemde aannames en stellingen de vier
basisvragen van dit boek positief beantwoord. In dit hoofdstuk wordt verder ingegaan op de
bijdragen die dit boek hoopt te leveren tot de theorievorming. Ten eerste is hier een analyse
gemaakt van het strategisch gedrag van de leiding van een onderneming in een inflectiepunt. In
eerdere werk was het nodige onderzoek gedaan naar majeure veranderingen in ondernemingen
(wij noemden in dit kader reeds Tushman, Newman en Romanelli 1985 en Kanter, Stein & Jick,
1992), maar dat was niet eerder gebeurd vanuit het optiek van het leiderschap. Ten tweede was
het onderzoek naar grote veranderingen tot op heden in een opzicht statisch, in de zin dat
omgevingsveranderingen gezien werden als een enkelvoudige ommekeer (of een trage evolutie)
zonder dat over her algemeen aandacht werd besteed aan de fasering van deze omkeer. De
bijdrage van dit boek is dat de fasering die Utterback ontwikkelde om industriële in algemene zin
innovatie te beschrijven toegepast wordt op het strategisch gedrag van de ondernemings-
leiding.
Tot slot worden naar aanleiding van dit onderzoek een aantal onderwerpen
gesignaleerd voor toekomstig werk. Om te beginnen roepen de beperkingen die het veld-
onderzoek van vijf uitgeverijen vragen op over de algemene toepasselijkheid van de uitkomsten.
Verder konden twee terreinen die voor het leiderschap in een inflectiepunt van het grootste
belang zijn – de voorspelling van inflectiepunten en de weerstand van organisaties tegen sterke
veranderingen – binnen het kader van dit onderzoek niet verder in beschouwing worden
genomen. Een vierde onderwerp betreft de interrelatie tussen innovatie en het inflectiepunt: in
welk opzicht is de in dit onderzoek waargenomen leiderschapsgedrag toepasselijk op omwen-
telingen die niet extern zijn maar binnen de onderneming worden gegenereerd? En tot slot
wordt de vraag gesteld in hoeverre dit onderzoek niet een aanzet is tot een veel breder en
mogelijk actueel terrein van reactieve strategievorming,waarbij de leiding niet meer voorop kan
lopen in het ontwikkelen van strategische modellen voor de onderneming, maar moet reageren
op nieuwe wetmatigheden die zich onverwacht aan de markten waarin de onderneming
opereert opdringen.Volberda initieerde een aantal belangrijke gedachten op dit terrein met zijn
exploratie van het begrip flexibiliteit in bedrijfskundige zin.Op strategisch-analytisch gebied ligt
hier terrein braak. De functie van strategisch management is om te begrijpen wat de “scarce
commodity” in brede zin is van de toekomst, en de onderneming te equiperen om hier zo goed
mogelijk mee om te gaan. Dit is een uitdaging die blijft voortbestaan.
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Inflection Point
Case Questions
1 First attempts:
• Initial awareness of ICT opportunities at leadership and local levels:
– Who became aware
– How was awareness created
– When 
– Initial reactions
• First attempts at automating text creation, review, editing, storage, distribution:
– Activities (what)
– Timing (when)
– Role of leadership and local management (who)
– Activities of leadership and local management (how)
– Results of initial efforts: new activities, investments, revenues, profits, cash impact
(what)
2 Full Internet/Intranet:
• Initial awareness of Internet/Intranet opportunities at leadership and local levels:
– Who became aware
– How was awareness created
– When 
– Initial reactions
• Internet/Intranet Strategy Development:
– Initiation
– Process
– Role of consultants
– Timing
– Role of leadership/local management
– Types of actions considered and decided:
• Acquisitions, joint ventures, alliances
• Investments in fixed assets, software, licenses, etc.
• Recruitment of experts
• Training, knowledge building
• Restructuring
• New business processes
• Imposition of company-wide standards
– Expected results: new activities, investments, revenues, profits, cash impact
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• Internet/Intranet Strategy deployment/implementation:
– Initiation (who, how)
– Process, project management
– Role of consultants
– Timing (year started, ended)
– Role of leadership/local management
– Types of actions taken:
• Acquisitions, joint ventures, alliances
• Investments in fixed assets, software, licenses, etc.
• Recruitment of experts
• Training, knowledge building
• Restructuring
• New business processes
• Imposition of company-wide standards
– Results of strategy deployment: new activities, investments, revenues, profits, cash
impact
• Monitoring/course correction of strategy deployment/implementation:
– Role of leadership and local management
– Monitoring/awareness maintenance
– Actions taken
– Timing
3 Post implementation situation:
• Role/position of leadership and local management
• Structure and processes compared to pre-strategy period
• Business position: market position, growth, profitability, cash flows
4 Current Situation (if different from 3) :
• Role/position of leadership and local management
• Structure and processes compared to pre-strategy period
• Business position: market position, growth, profitability, cash flows
• Sustainability of current situation
5 Perception of transition process:
• Successes, failures
• How things could have been managed better
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List of Case Interviews
In the course of the case analyses, interviews were conducted with the following individuals:
Reed Elsevier
Herman Bruggink Chairman, Board of Management (retired)
Derk Haank Executive Director, Elsevier Science Publishers
Herman Spruijt Executive Director, Elsevier Science Publishers
Wolters Kluwer
Rob Pieterse Chairman, Board of Management
Caf van Kempen Chairman, Board of Management (retired)
De Telegraaf
Hans Swart Member, Board of Management
Hans Elekan Managing Director
Wegener
Jan van Hanxleven Chairman, Board of Management
Peter Nientker Member, Board of Management
Joachim Driessen Head Strategic Planning
VNU
Ed Penninx Managing Director,VNU Yellow Pages
Peter Tordoir Managing Director,VNU Business Information
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Leadership and the Inflection Point
- A Longitudinal Perspective -
Once in a while, many corporations of this world are threatened by
changes in their markets and environment that threaten their existence.
These changes can be characterized by their severity, their sudden
occurrence and by their origins outside the company, which usually
makes it impossible to predict them. They are life-threatening and call
for a dramatic change in the strategy and structure of the corporation.
The deregulation of air transport was such an event. The rapid
expansion of the telecommunications industry with the simultaneous
introduction of new wide-band technologies was another. The same can
be said for the enlargement of the European Union and the addition
of a number of low wage-cost countries.
This book focuses two aspects of the inflection point. The first is the
leadership viewpoint – it looks at the transition from the perspective
of the CEO and his executive board, and considers what they can, and
cannot, do. The second is the longitudinal perspective – it does not
consider an inflection point as a single event, but rather a process that
unfolds over a number of years. 
This book provides an analysis of what the leadership of a firm can do
in each of the development phases of an inflection point. It also tests
these ideas against a case example, the transition of the publishing
industry into the Internet era. 
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